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Introduction 
 
This study is about the pathways and the mechanisms of 
effective multilateralism. The purpose is to explore the 
sources of organized cooperation as a means to manage 
common (in)security problems and, secondly, to assess the 
level of effectiveness in a number of multilateral efforts 
across the nuclear non-proliferation domain. In 
particular, this research seeks to find out what dynamics 
can possibly count for the establishment of agreements and 
the implementation of operative arrangements and, second, 
whether and to what extent endogenous qualities pertaining 
to the specific arrangement matter for explaining 
variation in the effectiveness of non-proliferation 
regimes.  
The questions framing the analysis and structuring the 
empirical evaluation are the following. First, which 
governing dynamics stemming from international cooperation 
theories and regime approaches can possibly lead to more 
or less effective arrangements over time? Second, how much 
explanatory power do endogenous qualities involving 
attributes of arrangements themselves, such as 
implementation monitoring, reporting and reviewing 
processes, plausibly command to understand relative 
institutional effectiveness? Third, are novel non-
proliferation arrangements becoming effective substitutes 
	 2	 	
for older ones? In essence, when, why and how are joint 
efforts to mitigate nuclear risks proving to work? 
In order to uncover causes of institutional 
(in)effectiveness, two distinct phases of cooperation are 
taken into account, that is, the static stage of the 
establishment and, more importantly, the dynamic stage of 
the implementation of the cooperative endeavor under 
analysis. This latter aspect in the vicissitudes of a 
system of rules, norms and practices has been analytically 
neglected. While previous non-proliferation studies have 
focused on the ‘front-end’ of the cooperation loop by 
examining explanatory factors leading states to cut deals 
in the first place, others have focused on the ‘back-end’ 
of it and explored the roles of coercive elements, 
including laws and regulations, sanctions and the threat 
or use of force.1 Less has been done with regard to 
cooperative, rather than coercive, elements of 
international regimes, and non-proliferation regimes in 
particular. While it is undisputed that effective problem-
solving entails multi-party cooperation, the institutional 
aspects of implementation and its review are 
underexplored. Both international cooperation and non-
proliferation studies, therefore, tend to overlook the 
dynamic, recursive nature of cooperation, or what happens 
																																																						
1	 On	 sanctions,	 see	 Brzoska,	 “The	 Role	 of	 Sanctions	 in	 Non-Proliferation,”	 in	Meier	 and	 Daase,	Arms	
Control	in	the	21st	Century:	Between	Coercion	and	Cooperation.	2013,	123-45.	Also,	Solingen,	Sanctions,	
Statecraft	 and	 Nuclear	 Proliferation,	 2012.	 On	 the	 role	 of	 law	 and	 coercion,	 see	 Bunn,	 “Force,	
Preemption	and	WMD	Proliferation”	and	Joyner,	“International	Legal	Responses	to	WMD	Proliferation,”	
in	Busch	and	Joyner,	Combating	WMD,	2009.		
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between ‘front- and back-end’. It is reasonable to assume 
that a great deal can be learned about changes in nuclear 
multilateralism by examining the sources of cooperation in 
the establishment phase and its evolution in the 
implementation phase. In addition, most scholarly work on 
the theme of regime effectiveness have centered on 
examinations of external factors to account for variation 
in efficacy across institutions or regimes, including the 
presence of powerful actors, the distribution of material 
resources and power capabilities, the patterns of 
interests entertained by key participants, or the 
incidence of crises. Accordingly, internal institutional 
features, including the rules, norms, operating procedures 
and programs, are considered as if they have no 
independent explanatory command because these endogenous 
properties are ultimately modeled by powerful and self-
interested actors. Conversely, this research problematizes 
our (necessarily) multilateral governance arrangements 
through which we come to organize ourselves and explores 
intra-regime dynamics as factors potentially affecting 
institutional performance.  
Informed by International Relations theories that seek 
to explain cooperation and by narrower approaches to the 
theme of international regimes, single-factor explanatory 
accounts with regard to questions of effectiveness can be 
specified and their respective propositions ‘tested’ in 
	 4	 	
the empirical sections. This research thus analyzes 
selected cases of multilateral non-proliferation 
cooperation with the theoretical arguments presented by 
the three main International Relations theories of 
Realism, Neoliberalism and Constructivism, identifies the 
strengths and weaknesses of each and determines which 
theory-based model has greater explanatory heft. The 
fundamental premise of this thesis is that, no matter the 
issue at stake, common (in)-security problems are human-
driven. Their root causes are pervasively and perversely 
anthropological in nature. Far from being exclusively 
dictated by exogenous trigger events, such as crises or 
changes in the distribution of power-based resources, 
these causes are embedded in dynamics pertaining to both 
the ‘institutional setup’ and to the ‘cognitive terms of 
trade’ that parties entertain around a given multilateral 
agreement. Both institutional and cognitive milieus are 
not static but evolve over time and, importantly, interact 
with one another to produce either progress or regress, 
effectiveness or stagnation, with respect to the 
objectives of a given instrument.    
It is to be acknowledged that the evaluation of the 
problem-solving capacity of a given arrangement is a 
daunting task to design, in the first place, and perform, 
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partly explaining the paucity of related works.2 Further, 
information is scarce because of the sovereignty-
conscious, sensitive nature of the issue area. As such, 
subjective and qualitative assessments in the form of 
semi-structured interviews and interactions with informed 
observers are employed to complement the case-study 
sections.  
The case studies fall within the realm of 
multilateral nuclear non-proliferation cooperation. The 
first case relates to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
and its implementation review process, as it is widely 
considered to be both the classic locus of multilateral 
non-proliferation efforts and the epitome of attempts at 
dealing with the nuclear dilemma – getting nuclear energy 
without proliferation risks while paving the way for 
disarmament. It focuses on the specifics related to the 
text of the NPT and its associated stocktaking review 
exercises. In so doing, an exploration into whether and 
how this first historical instance of non-proliferation 
governance has achieved its ambitious mandate becomes 
possible. The second case deals with United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1540, which was adopted in 
2004 in order to cope with the emergent nexus between non-
state nuclear risks and proliferation. The third case 
																																																						
2	Hegemann	et	al.,	Studying	Effectiveness	in	International	Relations.	A	Guide	for	Students	and	Scholars,	
2013.		
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deals with the non-proliferation initiative of the Nuclear 
Security Summits held between 2010 and 2016.   
While non-state proliferation has a narrower policy 
focus, and arguably is a rather recent phenomenon around 
which organized cooperation has been on the rise, non-
dissemination and disarmament efforts of nuclear weapons 
are as old as the United Nations itself, if not even 
older. Notwithstanding important differences between the 
cases in institutional design (treaty- or non-treaty-
based), problem area (state- or non-state-led 
proliferation risks), standard operating procedures 
(monitoring and review frameworks), as well as historical 
context, these three types arguably serve the common 
triadic purpose of furthering the regime’s primary goals, 
that is, halting the horizontal proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, reducing vertical proliferation on the way to 
nuclear disarmament and, thirdly, facilitating peaceful 
and safe nuclear energy.  
When it comes to assessing their problem-solving or 
risk mitigation capacity, one could argue that progress is 
easier to achieve with regard to less comprehensive, 
technical policy areas, such as nuclear security and non-
state dangers, while it is harder in more politicized 
fields, such as state-led proliferation or disarmament. 
This is not, however, a foregone conclusion. Not only 
issues of sovereignty and national security equally 
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pervade joint efforts to stem non-state proliferation 
risks, but also the relative successes and failures of a 
given regime component arguably affect the other and the 
consequences may reverberate across other elements of the 
NPT-based non-proliferation regime. 
The research findings come from an examination of 
both secondary and primary sources. When it comes to the 
use of secondary sources of evidence, the study draws on 
two bodies of literature. The first strand of works stems 
from the analysis of international regimes. This 
literature is useful because it depicts a wealth of 
explanatory pathways through which multilateral 
cooperative arrangements succeed or fail. A second strand 
of literature, sometimes called grey literature, is drawn 
upon in order to gather additional empirical evidence. 
These works include newspapers accounts, conference 
records and proceedings, reports, documents and guidelines 
from both governmental and non-governmental organizations, 
as well as publications from non-advocacy organizations. 
These literatures are supplemented by the use of semi-
structured interviews with individuals who had been 
involved in relevant multilateral negotiations as well as 
with non-governmental experts. In particular, interview 
data form and inform the investigation of the two cases of 
the Nuclear Security Summit process and Resolution 1540, 
for both of which comparatively less literature exists. 
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The thesis is presented in six chapters and is 
organized in the following way. Chapter I introduces the 
research topic and explains the reasons why it matters, 
both practically and scientifically, against the backdrop 
of contemporary developments across the nuclear non-
proliferation domain. It then proceeds to define and 
circumscribe critical notions used, such as international 
regimes, implementation and effectiveness. Chapter II 
problematizes sharpens the research focus on the hard case 
of non-proliferation cooperation. A critical examination 
of the scholarly writings on regimes is provided in order 
to expose three sets of approaches, each of which 
highlights three different single-factor dynamics, that 
is, (material) power, (self)-interest, and (common) 
knowledge, as the central operating mechanism by which 
regimes get formed, stay their course and, eventually, 
atrophy. Emphasis is given to questions of effectiveness. 
Consequently, this chapter operationalizes the single-
factor explanatory accounts employed to diagnose the 
cases. Chapters III to V apply this framework to the three 
case studies. Each chapter begins by tracing the history 
and evolution of these three different systems of non-
proliferation governance and concludes by reflecting on 
the implications on problem-solving effectiveness. For 
each, the arguments are presented systematically so as to 
determine what generalizable similarities and differences 
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might be identified. The concluding chapter VI provides a 
summary of the findings and draws preliminary lessons that 
can be learned to tackle the question of how arrangements 
can be designed in ways that would make them more 
effective over time.  
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Chapter One 
 
1.1 Setting the stage  
 
Current events and developments in the way in which 
several issues of human affairs – in spheres ranging from 
economic and financial cooperation to environmental and 
security matters – are governed highlight the need to 
reconsider the theme and, most importantly, the modalities 
of multilateral cooperation and reassess the status of 
international regimes. Britain’s 2016 decision to leave 
the European Union, Trump’s concurrent ascendancy to the 
presidency of the United States and his unilateral, ‘go-
it-alone’ approach to global problems, growing East-West 
divisions with an increasingly assertive China, the 
tendency to economic nationalism and protectionism are 
symptoms of a diffuse cooperation malaise. These are 
trends that seem to point to a widespread crisis of 
multilateralism.3 Notably, important structures of 
multilateral problem-solving and rules-based approaches 
have been fraying. This is precisely why the analysis of 
the pathways and mechanisms of multilateral cooperation 
acquires saliency.  
																																																						
3	See,	for	example,	Wolf,	“In	Conversation:	Martin	Wolf	on	the	Global	Economy,”	Lowy	Institute,	19	May	
2017;	Magnuson,	“Is	Brexit	the	Beginning	of	the	End	for	International	Cooperation?”	The	Conversation,	
30	 March	 2017;	 See,	 also,	 Spence,	 “Brexit,	 Trump,	 and	 a	 New	 Economic	 Order,”	 Japan	 Times,	 30	
November	 2016,	 as	 well	 as	 by	 the	 same	 author,	 “The	 Global	 Economy’s	 New	 Rule-Maker,”	 Project	
Syndicate,	29	August	2017.	Among	the	top	global	risks	that	the	World	Economic	Forum	has	pinpointed	is	
a	 “build-up	 of	 mercantilist	 and	 protectionist	 pressures	 against	 a	 backdrop	 of	 rising	 nationalist	 and	
populist	politics.”	See,	in	World	Economic	Forum,	Global	Risks	Report	2018,	6.		
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Present-day geopolitical turbulences raise a number 
of tough questions for existing multilateral governance 
arrangements. In particular, their effectiveness in 
supporting states and other actors achieve shared 
objectives and strengthen the rules, norms, procedures and 
organizations in given areas of international affairs has 
been called into question. The area of international 
security cooperation, and the nuclear non-proliferation 
domain in particular, is no exception in this regard. To 
be sure, troubling developments in the nuclear non-
proliferation regime and signs of rifts across the 
international community on the actions through which 
proliferation should be tamed and non-proliferation 
pursued have been around for a longer time.4  
After wide agreement on an action plan to boost 
cooperation and strengthen the regime was secured at the 
2010 Review Conference of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), both NPT’s nuclear 
and non-nuclear weapons states have arguably failed to 
implement it, or even backtracked on some points thereof.5 
Relatedly, the 2015 NPT Review Conference could not reach 
agreement on a substantive final declaration. The 
agreement to even hold a conference on the establishment 
																																																						
4	Arbatov,	“An	Unnoticed	Crisis:	The	End	of	History	for	Nuclear	Arms	Control?”	Carnegie	Endowment	for	
International	Peace,	2015.		
5	See,	for	example,	Wan,	“Why	the	2015	NPT	Review	Conference	Fell	Apart,”	Center	for	Policy	Research,	
United	 Nations	 University,	 2015;	 Mukhatzhanova,	 “Implementation	 of	 the	 Conclusions	 and	
Recommendations	 for	 Follow-On	 Actions	 Adopted	 at	 the	 2010	 NPT	 Review	 Conference:	 2015	
Monitoring	Report,”	Center	for	Nonproliferation	Studies,	2015.			
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of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of 
mass destruction (WMDFZ) in the Middle East remains a case 
in point.6 Moreover, negotiations on a multilateral treaty 
banning fissile materials for nuclear weapons (FMCT) have 
been stuck for several years, if not decades. The terms of 
the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Treaty (INF) and the 
2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) are 
practically no longer implemented, if not openly 
contested.7 Compounding the bleak picture, U.S.-Russian 
cooperation on nuclear safety and security matters ended 
in 2014 and Russia did not take part in the rounds of 
talks that led to the last Nuclear Security Summit in 
2016. Further, the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), a key component of the global nuclear non-
proliferation architecture, has yet to enter in force for 
a lack of few key ratifications.8  
  The non-proliferation regime, anchored around the 
1968 NPT, including a constellation of other arms control, 
non-proliferation and disarmament agreements, appear to 
find itself deadlocked between broader dynamics of 
politics mitigating against the reinforcement of, and even 
																																																						
6	 Foradori	 and	Malin,	 “A	WMD-Free	 Zone	 in	 the	Middle	 East:	 Creating	 the	 Conditions	 for	 Sustained	
Progress,”	Belfer	Center	for	Science	and	International	Affairs,	2012;	Bino,	“The	Pursuit	of	a	WMD-Free	
Zone	in	the	Middle	East:	A	New	Approach,”	Chatham	House,	2017;	Davenport,	“WMD-Free	Middle	East	
Proposal	at	a	Glance,”	Arms	Control	Association,	2017.	 
7	See	Arbatov,	“An	Unnoticed	Crisis”	Carnegie	Endowment	 for	 International	Peace;	Kimball,	FMCT	at	a	
Glance,	 Arms	 Control	 Association,	 2017.	 On	 New	 START,	 Reif,	 “Nuclear	 Restraint	 Agreements	 Under	
Serious	Threat,”	Arms	Control	Association,	2017.		
8	 Reif,	 Ibid.	 See	 also,	Melamud	 et	 al.	Banning	 the	 Bang	 or	 The	 Bomb?	 On	 nuclear	 security	 and	U.S.–
Russia	 cooperation,	 “Laura	 Holgate	 on	US-Russian	 Relations,”	Nuclear	 Security	Matters,	 August	 2016;	
Holgate,	“The	Enduring	Challenge	of	Nuclear	Security	Coordination,”	Arms	Control	Today,	2018.  
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the recourse to, cooperative relations, on the one hand, 
and narrower dynamics pertaining to the design and 
operations of arrangements, on the other. Such latter 
properties are the subject of this study.     
There exists, puzzlingly, a great deal of diversity 
among organized cooperative efforts and variation in 
effectiveness across the components of the non-
proliferation regime. While the cornerstone of the regime 
as a whole, that is, the NPT, viewed here as both textual 
agreement (NPT) and operative arrangement in the form of 
periodic NPT implementation review processes and 
quinquennial diplomatic conferences, as well as other 
regime components, such as the CTBT and a possible FMCT, 
could be taken as examples of the sorry state of nuclear 
multilateralism, there are also counterexamples 
highlighting non-proliferation successes. By far the most 
positive development concerns the peaceful, negotiated 
solution of the long-lasting case of Iran’s nuclear 
program. After more than a decade of heated debate and 
inflamed rhetoric, a negotiated multilateral agreement and 
a fully-fledged, time-limited arrangement was reached in 
2015 in the form of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA).9 Despite resistance by the current Trump 
Administration, the Iran nuclear deal is being effectively 
																																																						
9	 The	 parties	 involved	 in	 the	 negotiations	 were,	 besides	 Iran,	 the	 five	 permanent	 members	 of	 the	
Security	 Council,	 plus	 Germany	 and	 the	 European	 Union.	 See,	 Samore,	 “The	 Iran	 Deal:	 A	 Definitive	
Guide,”	Belfer	Center	for	Science	and	International	Affairs,	2015.		
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implemented. Some experts go as far as to claim the JCPOA 
to be a model that could be replicated for managing future 
nuclear state proliferation risks and, further, some 
others herald it as potentially effective blueprint going 
beyond outdated NPT language by setting innovative 
standards for cooperation, governance and compliance 
monitoring.10 On the contrary, the worsening scenario 
represented by the nuclear-related controversy with North 
Korea points to the need for constructive engagement and 
negotiated agreement. What is more, the North Korean case 
also testifies to the importance of having a set of 
institutions in place, such as common rules, procedures 
and organizations to monitor compliance and review 
performance.  
An additional area where recent positive steps have 
been taken is with regard to non-state proliferation 
threats and risks. In spite of the lack of U.S.-Russian 
nuclear rules-based relations, other cooperative 
initiatives to regulate technical aspects of proliferation 
and mitigate novel dangers, such as illicit trafficking, 
nuclear terrorism and trade in dual-use items, have become 
more widely accepted as potentially impactful tools and 
mechanisms. To name a few, the 2003 Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI), the 2004 United Nations Security Council 
																																																						
10	See	Mount,	 “The	 Iran	Nuclear	Deal	and	 the	Future	of	Nuclear	Order,”	Council	on	Foreign	Relations,	
2015.	 See,	 Biswas,	 “Iran	 Deal,	 NPT	 and	 the	 Norms	 of	 Nuclear	 Non-Proliferation,”	 The	 Diplomat,	 18	
February	2016.	Also,	Borger,	“Merkel	Offers	German	Role	in	Iran-style	Nuclear	Talks	with	North	Korea,”	
The	Guardian,	10	September	2017.			
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Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 and its Security Council 
Committee, the 2006 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism, co-chaired by the U.S. and Russia, as well as 
the Nuclear Security Summits held between 2010 and 2016, 
have scored a modicum of progress and registered cautious 
welcoming remarks by ever-more participants.11  
Be as it may, the current state of multilateral 
affairs begets some intriguing questions. Why is that some 
institutional arrangements are more successful and seem to 
deliver expected results, while others are less successful 
and seem to atrophy over time? What are, if any, the 
governing dynamics of institutional effectiveness? In a 
nutshell, when, why and how are joint efforts to solve 
common (in)-security problems and mitigate proliferation 
risks proving to work? In this regard, do institutional 
features of design and implementation frameworks possibly 
explain the puzzle?  
While the theme of institutionalized cooperation in 
non-proliferation and these very questions acquire 
political salience against the backdrop of present-day 
failures of rules-based multilateralism, so too is the 
case scientifically. There do not exist a lot of academic 
studies on the determinants of effectiveness of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime and its sub-regimes, 
																																																						
11	 Belcher,	 “The	 Proliferation	 Security	 Initiative,”	 in	 Knopf,	 International	 Cooperation	 on	 WMD	
Nonproliferation,	 2016,	116-140.	 See,	Ogilvie-White,	 “UN	Security	Council	Resolution	1540,”	 in	Knopf,	
140-163.	 On	 GICNT,	 see	 Ërastö	 and	 Herbach,	 “Ten	 Years	 of	 the	 Global	 Initiative	 to	 Combat	 Nuclear	
Terrorism,”	 SaferGlobe	 and	 The	 Centre	 for	 Conflict	 and	 Security	 Law,	 2016.	 On	 the	 Nuclear	 Security	
Summits,	Turpen,	“The	Nuclear	Security	Summit	Experiment”	in	Knopf,	182-205.  
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especially not from a neoliberal perspective. In a recent 
overview of the political science literature on collective 
efforts to stem nuclear proliferation risks, Sagan has 
noted a lack of analyses on non-proliferation arrangements 
other than those directly stemming from the NPT and the 
IAEA and concluded by observing that these “newer 
institutions are crucial elements of the regime and should 
not be ignored.”12 This study analyzes newer multilateral 
cooperative ventures by disaggregating the traditional 
international regime into individual components to explore 
the sources of effective multilateral cooperation and 
evaluate progress or regress.  
A remarkable development in international politics 
has been a steady diffusion of cooperative undertakings, 
so that international regime building efforts have become 
a pervasive, and perhaps permanent, feature of our 
contemporary world. In this regard, it is instructive to 
observe a constant upward trend in the number of both 
inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), as well as in 
what can be called ‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’ 
agreements, that is, core umbrella treaties and post-
treaty, narrower implementation agreements, respectively. 
For example, while in 1994 there were 5,401 IGOs and 1,838 
																																																						
12	Sagan,	“The	Causes	of	Nuclear	Weapons	Proliferation,”	Annual	Review	of	Political	Science	17(14):	225-
44,	2011,	239.	On	the	effectiveness	of	the	NPT-based	regime,	Fields	and	Enia	(2009),	Grotto	(2010),	and	
Fields	(2014).	On	legitimacy,	but	still	based	on	the	NPT	regime,	see	Rathbun	(2006).	On	domestic	politics	
and	 economics,	 see	 Solingen	 (2007);	 on	 principles	 and	 norms,	 see	 Rublee	 (2009)	 and	 Müller	 and	
Wunderlich	 (2013).	Notably,	most	 of	 the	 studies	on	non-proliferation	effectiveness	 consider	 variables	
and	explanatory	accounts	that	do	not	fully	take	into	account	institutional	variables.			
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agreements, in 2014 there were 7,756 IGOs and over 2,406 
multilateral, inter-governmental treaties.13 
Unsurprisingly, the topic and the dynamics of 
multilateralism – a process by which three or more 
entities, usually states, join forces via negotiated 
agreements, typically involving the presence of 
international organizations, to solve common (in)-security 
problems within a given set of commonly shared rules and 
practices – has garnered a great deal of attention by 
students and scholars of every academic denomination.14  
The outburst of institutionalized cooperation has led 
economists to worry about the “spaghetti bowl” 
phenomenon.15 In other words, the stratification of 
multiple trade agreements, initially established with the 
aim of enhancing the welfare of the parties, tend over 
time to interlock with similar agreements struck on a 
preferential or multilateral scale (hence the image of a 
plate of noodles), thus causing incoherence and ultimately 
making parties worse off. Legal scholars are concerned 
about such phenomena as the “fragmentation of 
international law” and “treaty congestion”.16 The spread 
																																																						
13	Union	of	International	Associations,	The	Yearbook	of	International	Organizations,	2014.	
14	Thin	and	thick	definitions	of	multilateralism	are	numerous	in	the	IR	literature.	Multilateralism	can	be	
conceived	 as	 a	 form	 of	 institutionalism	 that	 commits	 all	 parties	 to	 follow	 certain	 procedural	 and	
substantive	 rules	 of	 the	 game	 that	 stabilize	 behavior	 and	 make	 it	 predictable	 (Ruggie	 1992,	 1993).	
Institutions	are	“persistent	and	connected	sets	of	rules	(formal	and	informal)	that	prescribe	behavioral	
rules,	constrain	activity,	and	shape	expectations.”	(Keohane	1988:	383).	
15	Bhagwati	et	al.	 “Trading	Preferentially:	 	Theory	and	Policy.”	Economic	 Journal	108(449):	1128-1148,	
1998.	
16	 Koskenniemi	 and	 Leino,	 “Fragmentation	 of	 International	 Law?”	 Leiden	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	
15(3):	 553-579,	 1998;	 Brown-Weiss,	 “International	 Environmental	 Law,”	Georgetown	 Law	 Journal	 81,	
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and specialization of tribunals and the intermeshing of 
agreements at multiple organizational levels is likely to 
lead to confusion in rule interpretation and application. 
Similarly, and most recently, social and political 
scientists working across the disciplinary boundaries of 
International Relations and International Law refer to 
“institutional complexity” or “regime complexity.”17 In 
other words, international regime scholars are 
investigating the causes and the implications of 
crisscrossing institutional arrangements governing a 
specific policy domain.  
What is even more puzzling, however, is that these 
are recurring and observable phenomena in a field known as 
being averse or, according to the Realist school of 
thought, immune to long-lasting cooperative endeavors. 
Using the vocabulary of IR theory, concerns about the 
distribution of material power across the international 
system, fears of relative gains (and losses), as well as 
national security considerations are seen as trumping 
moves toward the establishment of cooperative 
relationships. These stumbling blocks to long-lasting 
cooperation originate from within the Realist paradigm in 
																																																																																																																																																														
675-710.	 See	 also,	 U.N.	 International	 Law	 Commission,	 2006.	 “Fragmentation	 of	 International	 Law:	
Difficulties	arising	from	the	diversification	and	expansion	of	international	law.”		
17	One	of	the	first	scholars	in	the	political	science	literature	interested	in	exploring	questions	of	growing	
institutional	“density”	is	Young.	See,	“Institutional	Linkages	in	International	Society,”	Global	Governance	
2:	1-24,	1996.	For	recent	studies	and	refinements,	Raustiala	and	Victor,	“The	regime	complex	for	plant	
genetic	resources.”	International	Organization	58(2):	277-309,	2004;	Alter	and	Meunier,	“The	politics	of	
international	 regime	 complexity.”	 Perspectives	 on	 Politics	 7(1):	 13-24,	 2009;	 Oberthür	 and	 Stokke,	
Managing	Institutional	Complexity.	In	addition,	Keohane	and	Victor,	Ibid.	7-23.		
	 19	 	
IR, traditionally employed by political scientists to 
diagnose cooperative efforts in security affairs, and 
historically learned and applied by statesmen, diplomats 
and generals as a rational and pragmatic analytical prism. 
This point also partly explains why the theme of 
institutionalized non-proliferation is a ‘hard case’ for 
theories of international cooperation and approaches to 
the study of regimes.  
Efforts aimed at regulating the risks posed by 
nuclear weapons, sensitive materials, delivery means and 
dual-use technology constitute what is termed as ‘non-
proliferation’. These formal and informal, bilateral and 
multilateral, efforts have been conventionally subsumed 
under the concept of “international regime.”18 As such, the 
regime of nuclear non-proliferation is the sum of a myriad 
arrangements that have been set up to deal with the ‘three 
pillars’ upon which the whole regime architecture rests – 
that is, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear weapons 
disarmament and the peaceful applications of nuclear 
energy.19 No wonder why political scientists and long-term 
observers have recently described the nuclear non-
																																																						
18	Regimes	can	be	conceived	as	being	a	form	of	institutionalized	multilateralism.	However,	they	can	be	
established	bilaterally	 and	 can	 feature	no	physical	organization	overseeing	 implementation.	 The	basic	
assumptions	 undergirding	 the	 concepts	 and	 phenomena	 of	multilateralism	 and	 regimes	 are	 however	
similar	as	they	both	refer	to	shared	rules	and	practices	around	which	the	behavior	of	actors	converges.		
19	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 thesis,	 “nuclear	 non-proliferation”	means	measures	 to	 prevent	additional	
countries	(those	who	are	not	legally	entitled	to	possess	nuclear	weapons	under	the	NPT)	from	acquiring	
nuclear	weapons.	 “Nuclear	disarmament”	means	measures	 to	 reduce	 the	number	and	 role	of	nuclear	
weapons	among	countries	that	already	possess	them,	whether	legally	or	otherwise.	“Nuclear	security”	
means	measures	to	prevent	acts	of	nuclear	terrorism	and,	as	such,	nuclear	security	focuses	on	non-state	
actors	and	on	efforts	in	securing	nuclear	and	radioactive	materials,	as	well	as	associated	facilities.		
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proliferation regime as fitting the ‘regime complex’ 
terminology.20 Notably, for how to reap the benefits of the 
atom without furthering the spread of nuclear weapons and 
materials while, at the same time, paving the way for the 
reduction and eventual elimination of atomic bombs is the 
central aim, and yet the fundamental Gordian knot, of the 
whole enterprise.  
 The focus of this study is thus put on institutional 
or, to use a similar term, governance effectiveness. Under 
conditions of regime complexity, effectiveness – that is, 
the capacity to which a given arrangement induces changes 
in actors’ understanding of problem and actors’ behavior, 
which, in turn, leads to problem mitigation – becomes a 
primary objective yet remains, as it will be noted in the 
methods section, a challenging concept to operationalize 
and evaluate. Empirically, this study delves into the 
analysis of three different cases of institutionalized 
multilateral nuclear non-proliferation cooperation. The 
first case study is represented by the 1968 NPT and its 
associated implementation review process in the form of 
quinquennial Review Conferences up to 2015. The second 
case is U.N. Resolution 1540, adopted by the Security 
Council in 2004. The third and final case is epitomized by 
the Nuclear Security Summits, held between 2010 and 2016.   
																																																						
20	For	example,	a	participant	in	a	closed-door	event	at	the	American	Academy	of	Arts	and	Sciences	held	
on	 26	 May	 2016	 in	 Cambridge,	 Antonia	 Chayes,	 converged	 on	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 NPT	 regime	 has	
acquired	features	of	a	regime	complex.		
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 The importance of examining the origins of 
effectiveness by giving analytical relevance to 
institutional, endogenous factors is spurred by real-world 
developments. Cooperative multilateral efforts in 
addressing nuclear dangers gradually shifted from an 
initial emphasis on their hardware component, that is, 
physical protection measures (the so-called “guns, guards 
and gates” approach), stemming from surveillance and 
early-warning systems, to cover their software component, 
that is, security and organizational culture.21 Notably, 
the concept of security culture includes a set of 
“managerial, organizational and cognitive 
characteristics.”22 Indeed, as General Habiger, former 
Commander of the strategic nuclear forces of the United 
States, once observed, “good security is 20 percent 
equipment and 80 percent culture.”23 Similarly, though in a 
more theoretical manner, by acknowledging the concurrent 
explanatory power of both interests and ideas, this study 
brings the hardware (realist and methodologically 
rationalist) and the software (constructivist and 
methodologically reflexive) components together, so that a 
more nuanced hologram of the subject can be gained.  
																																																						
21	As	 a	matter	of	 illustration,	 the	Convention	on	 the	Physical	 Protection	of	Nuclear	Materials	 entered	
into	force	in	1980.	Nuclear	security	culture	is	still	in	its	infancy	and	the	first	multilateral	endeavors	date	
back	 to	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 21st	 century,	 actually	 in	 September	 2001	 when	 the	 IAEA	 decided	 that:	
“priority	 should	 be	 given	 to	 security	 culture.”	 (IAEA	 Nuclear	 Security	 Series	 No.	 7,	 Nuclear	 Security	
Culture:	1).		
22	Schein,	Organizational	Culture	and	Leadership,	2004.		
23	Bunn,	Securing	the	Bomb	2010.	Securing	All	Nuclear	Materials	in	Four	Years,	2010,	xiii.		
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While it is appealing to seek endogenously given 
causes of regime effectiveness, for they could be 
intentionally manipulated by actors, the history of non-
proliferation has mostly revolved around exogenous 
phenomena that, by definition, defy conscious human 
control. Major developments across the nuclear domain and 
major innovations in non-proliferation regimes occurred in 
response to attention-riveting crises and unpredictable 
events. However, the challenge that this study takes on is 
to explore ways in which change can be endangered without 
the occurrence of exogenous factors. In other words, can 
implementation monitoring architectures replace crises as 
motor for improvement?        
Are regimes favoring the powerful at the expense of 
the weak, as per Neorealism? Are they rational responses 
leading to cost-effective, efficient solutions for 
mutually profitable gains, as per Neoliberalism in its 
institutionalist form? Are they the expression of ideas 
and cognitive structures of meaning espoused by political 
leaders, diplomats and other professional groups, as per 
Constructivism? Clearly, answers to these questions differ 
substantially according to the theoretical and 
methodological approach one follows. A note of caution is, 
therefore, in order. Providing a hologram of the subject 
by seeking to be as eclectic as possible might be 
operationally desirable, but theoretically (and 
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methodologically) untenable. Indeed, this is not to say 
that one can arrive at a full-fledged synthesis of 
realist, neoliberal and constructivist approaches to 
regime effectiveness. Their respective ontologies and 
epistemologies, as well as their methodological approaches 
to questions of cooperation differ fundamentally. However, 
it should be recognized at the outset that hard-power 
considerations, interests’ configurations, as well as 
ideational and communicative patterns generally affect the 
way in which cooperation is organized and, ultimately, 
whether regimes are more or less effective. Therefore, the 
relative and aggregate relevance of each of these three 
single-factor accounts and propositions (power-based, 
interests-based and ideas-based) is a matter for empirical 
testing to dissect.  
 
1.2 Core concepts and definitions  
 
This section introduces the concepts of international 
regime, implementation and effectiveness, and touches on 
their contested definitions. Needlessly, a number of other 
important social science concepts are dealt with 
throughout the chapters. However, these three core 
concepts form the building blocks for the development of 
the analysis. Thereafter, the rationale behind the 
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selection of each of these concepts is provided and 
pondered against alternative conceptualizations.   
 
International Regimes  
 
In their simplest form, international regimes are modes of 
international multilateral cooperation.24 To begin with, 
the concept of, and ensuing scholarship on, regimes can 
offer a useful perspective into the problem of long-term 
inter-state cooperation in security matters. The concept 
was developed during the 1970s and early 1980s by IR 
scholars to understand and explain puzzles about 
cooperation between states, specifically those relating to 
the origins and the underlying conditions governing 
institutionalized cooperation writ large.  
Other fields of social inquiry, however, have been 
concerned with the subject matter and with the regime 
concept in particular. In this regard, international law 
specialists have had and continue to have a bearing on the 
understandings of this phenomenon. Needless to say, rules, 
norms and institutions, including physical organizations, 
have been longstanding subjects of legal inquiry.25 In 
																																																						
24	Regimes	are	the	inter-national	version	of	domestic	political	and	social	 institutions.	Regimes	can	also	
exist	between	two	states	as	well. 
	
25	Chayes	and	Chayes,	The	New	Sovereignty,	1995.	In	this	study,	Chayes	and	Chayes	argue,	among	other	
things,	that	there	is	a	shift	going	on	in	the	approach	to	treaty	compliance	away	from	an	enforcement,	
coercion-based	to	a	managerial,	dialogue-based	model.	Rather	 than	a	 focus	on	compliance,	 this	study	
focuses	on	implementation	of	political	and	legal	commitments	and,	as	such,	a	managerial	approach	to	
implementation	à	 la	Chayes	 is	emphasized.	For	 the	desirability	 to	 look	beyond	disciplinary	boundaries	
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other words, it can be put forth that international 
regimes are to political scientists what international law 
is to legal scholars. Interestingly, this latter strand of 
literature has contributed to the recent renaissance of 
regime-related research themes, including regime 
complexity, that lie at the intersection between the two 
disciplines.  
Right at the outset, it is important to set the 
concept against different levels of abstraction. As Oran 
Young, one of the most prolific and leading scholars 
within the international regime research program, has 
noted, regimes should be understood as standing in between 
broad political “orders” governing large swathes of 
individuals and states, and operating in a large number of 
issues, on the one side, and narrow “organizations” or 
agencies possessing physical and measureable attributes, 
and having a specific functional scope or geographical 
reach, on the other side.26 Examples of the former may be 
such political orders as democracy and the rule of law. 
Examples of the latter may be such organizations as the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. Scholarly studies that 
focus on nuclear non-proliferation have analyzed “nuclear 
orders,” “nuclear non-proliferation organizations,” as 
well as the operations of the whole “nuclear non-
																																																																																																																																																														
when	considering	issues	of	cooperation,	Burley,	“International	Law	and	International	Relations	Theory,”	
American	Journal	of	International	Law	87(2),	1993.		
26	Young,	International	Cooperation:	Building	Regimes	for	Natural	Resources	and	the	Environment,	1989,	
12-4.		
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proliferation regime.”27 Such conceptual digression is 
important because regime analysis, as opposed to a focus 
on specific international organizations, concerns itself 
by definition with norms and rules. 
The first usage of the term appeared in a 1975 
article written by Ruggie and published as special issue 
in International Organization titled “International 
Responses to Technology.” According to what will become 
known as an important figure in jumpstarting 
Constructivism, regimes are sets of “mutual expectations, 
rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and 
financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group 
of states.28 This is the first traceable definition of 
international regime. However, it is not the most widely 
used. The starting point is Krasner’s 1982 definition of 
regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations.”29 To be sure, this definition was 
reached by consensus among a methodologically diverse 
group of scholars. Again, it was the journal International 
																																																						
27	For	a	snapshot	of	research	on	the	topic,	Boulden	et	al.,	The	United	Nations	and	Nuclear	Orders,	2009.	
See	 also,	 Commission	 of	 Eminent	 Persons.	 “Reinforcing	 the	 Global	 Nuclear	 Order	 for	 Peace	 and	
Prosperity,”	2008.	On	non-proliferation	organizations	as	key	components	of	the	broader	global	nuclear	
governance,	 Findlay,	 “Unleashing	 the	 Nuclear	 Watchdog,”	 Centre	 for	 International	 Governance	
Innovation,	 2012.	 For	 studies	 on	 the	 non-proliferation	 regime,	 see	 for	 example,	 Miller,	 “Nuclear	
Collisions:	Discord,	Reform	&	the	Nuclear	Non-Proliferation	Regime”,	2012.		
28	 Ruggie,	 “International	 Responses	 to	 Technology:	 Concepts	 and	 Trends,”	 International	 Organization	
29(3):	 570,	 1975.	 See	 also,	 Finnemore	 and	Goldstein,	 “Power	 Politics	 in	 the	 Contemporary	World”	 in	
Finnemore	and	Goldstein,	Back	to	Basics:	State	Power	in	a	Contemporary,	2013,	18-27.		
29	 Krasner,	 “Structural	 Causes	 and	 Regime	 Consequences,”	 International	 Organization	 36(2):	 186.	
Notably,	the	reference	to	the	‘convergence	of	expectations’	has	been	stressed	by	Young	(1980).			
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Organization that dedicated a special issue to the project 
on regimes, to be then published as a book a year later. 
Framed in this general way, international regimes are 
ubiquitous. However, over the course of the 1980s, 
attempts at narrowing down the definition and at 
clarifying the 1982 consensus definition were made. In 
essence, three camps, closely associated with the main 
‘isms’ in IR theory, can be identified, that is, liberal 
institutionalism, social constructivism and neorealism, 
respectively.30   
First is Keohane, one of the most prominent 
representatives of the neo-liberalism school in its 
institutional variant, who has argued that regimes are 
“institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by 
governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in 
international relations.”31 Seen under this perspective, 
the regulatory nature of regimes is highlighted. 
Therefore, the sets of rules agreed upon by governments, 
usually in the form of binding treaties, are the motor of 
action and human conduct. As such, the regulatory 
																																																						
30	In	the	1982	International	Organization	special	issue	on	regimes,	three	perspectives	are	distinguished.	
The	“structural”	perspective	sees	regimes	as	irrelevant	since	they	do	not	have	any	impact	between	basic	
causal	variables,	such	as	power	or	interests,	and	related	behavior	and	outcomes.	This	view	is	associated	
with	neo-realists.	The	second	perspective	is	called	“modified	structural”,	and	sees	international	regimes	
as	having	an	impact	under	certain	restrictive	circumstances,	such	as	when	common	interests	and	when	
positive-sum	agreements	can	be	realized.	The	third	 is	called	“Grotian”	and	sees	regimes	arising	out	of	
the	social	environment,	thereby	representing	crystallized	norms,	rules	and	principles.	As	such,	regimes	
have	 a	 bigger	 role	 in	 shaping	 behavior	 and	 outcomes	 than	 the	 previous	 two	 dimensions.	 Indeed,	
regimes,	behavior	and	outcome	cannot	be	analytically	isolated	(Kranser	1982:	189-194).		
31	Keohane,	“Neoliberal	Institutionalism,”	in	International	Institutions	and	State	Power,	4.		
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conceptualization advanced by Keohane’s started to bring 
the disciplines of IR and IL closer together.  
Secondly, and conversely, Kratochwil and Ruggie, two 
prominent exponents of what later would become known as 
Constructivism, have focused their attention to the latter 
part of the 1982 definition by highlighting the convergent 
nature of expectations and by pointing to the inter-
subjective origins of international regimes.32 Seen under 
this perspective, mutual and shared understandings as well 
as the existence of a common value set or belief system 
are seen as the motor of human action. These observations 
opened the door for taking into account less positivist 
and rational (that is, cognitivist or softly 
constructivist)33 methodological approaches to the study of 
the vicissitudes of regimes.34  
Thirdly, a decade after the 1982 definition, Krasner 
distanced himself from the consensus view to argue that 
neither of the two visions are correct. For realists, 
including Krasner, the “principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge” are simply the product of the 
preferences of the powerful. Given multiple equilibriums 
along the Pareto frontier, it is the relative bargaining 
																																																						
32	 See,	 Kratochwil	 and	Ruggie,“International	Organization:	 A	 State	 of	 the	Art	 on	 an	Art	 of	 the	 State,”	
International	Organization	40(4):	753-775.		
33	 ‘Hard’	constructivism	refers	to	the	view	that	reality	 is	socially	constructed	and	that	there	 is	no	such	
thing	as	perfect,	full	rationality	in	the	actors’	behavior.	‘Soft’	constructivism	or	cognitive	approaches	aim	
to	explore	the	limits	of	rationality.		
34		Haas,	“Why	Collaborate?	Issue	Linkage	and	International	Regimes,”	World	Politics	32:	357-405.		
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power of states, more than any other characteristic, which 
determines where cooperation takes place.35  
Theoretically, it seems at first glance naive to pit 
these grand theories against each other, as each paradigm 
has both a distinct set of ontological assumptions and 
epistemological passports. Different understandings of 
regimes inevitably lead to different research and 
evaluation strategies leading to different conclusions. 
While for neo-realists and neoliberals rational choice-
based methods, including game theory, are better equipped 
to account for instances of cooperation, social 
constructivists follow interpretive methods to account for 
the causes and consequences of cooperative arrangements. 
However, scope for careful and meaningful elaboration 
between the three paradigms exists and will be explored in 
the next chapter. In the real-world, things look quite 
different. Agreements are struck, foreign policy decisions 
are made and negotiations are conducted in a manner in 
which both material and non-material, ideational and 
psychological factors play a role. Inasmuch as relative 
capabilities matter in international relations, so does 
the communicative and interactive aspect thereof, 
especially so when dealing with nuclear weapons and 
proliferation issues. This might be even truer in today’s 
																																																						
35	 Krasner,	 “Global	 Communications	 and	 National	 Power,”	World	 Politics	 43(3):	 336-366.	 Citation	 on	
page	360.		
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context, characterized by high levels of interconnectivity 
and by the 24/7/365 news cycle. The two aspects cannot be 
easily isolated. Realism and punishments, on the one hand, 
and idealism and rewards, on the other, are two sides of 
the same coin.  
While this study recognizes the importance of 
cognitive dynamics and interaction-based processes to 
understand and explain dynamics of institutional efficacy, 
it nonetheless takes state-centrism and power seriously. 
States and government actors are the salient players that 
make, implement, comply with, enforce and eventually break 
governance arrangements. This is perhaps the main reason 
why other important theoretical approaches to, and 
concepts of, multilateral cooperation, including the more 
sociologically bent global governance, are considered at 
the margins. In a nutshell, should instances of 
institutional effectiveness and innovation come up in the 
analysis, it is advanced that these are state-led or that, 
at a minimum, states and governmental actors do not oppose 
novel solutions to non-proliferation impasses.  
The emphasis on states as the fundamental, yet not 
exclusive, actor is appropriate for the analysis of 
nuclear non-proliferation regimes and, at the same time, 
does not prevent consideration of other stakeholders. 
Other reasons for taking a state-centric perspective stand 
out. States are not only salient as implementers, but also 
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and most importantly are the key players in the 
establishment of regimes and agreements in the first 
place. The formation or establishment phase is important 
because it is there where norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures are devised in the first place. In addition, 
the formation process usually takes place within processes 
of diplomatic negotiations. Hence, state-centric 
approaches are preferable and yet do not exclude a focus 
on agency, nor on interaction and cognition. The allure of 
the concept is that it provides a platform of ideas into 
which different scholars can delve. A final observation is 
on the fact that regimes are issue-specific, thus seeking 
to solve a given problem set. This latter observation 
gives the analysis a sharper focus.  
In essence, state-centrism, state-led negotiations 
and issue-specificity call for the analytical usefulness 
of sticking to the regime concept. Ultimately, the global 
governance concept and the ensuing literature as a way to 
look at contemporary world politics, especially in the 
area of nuclear (non)-proliferation, is in its infancy and 
shrouded by analytical and normative opacity.36   
 
 
 
																																																						
36	Finkelstein,	“What	 is	Global	Governance?”	Global	Governance	1(3):	367-372.	For	counterarguments,	
Pattberg,	 “Global	Governance:	 Reconstructing	 a	 Contested	 Social	 Science	Concept,”	GARNET	Working	
Paper,	2006;	see	also	Weiss	and	Wilkinson,	“Global	Governance	to	the	Rescue,”	Global	Governance	20	
(2014),	19-36.			
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Implementation 
 
The concepts of implementation and effectiveness are 
strictly interlinked. Implementation is a process through 
which governance arrangements operate and agreements are 
put into practice. Implementation is focused on those 
“norms, rules and decision-making procedures” that make up 
a regime. As such, regimes cannot be truly implemented. 
They encompass the wider institutional arrangement. 
Regimes need to be dissected into their different elements 
and understood as a set of specific working agreements. 
Only then it is possible to assess performance.  
Implementation is conceptualized as those sets of 
processes and activities, which are devised to monitor, 
assess, verify or review undertakings and cope with cases 
of poor performance or outright non-compliance. Ideally, 
these processes and activities connect states, non-state 
actors, such as the private sector and international 
organizations, and together form a working system. Another 
distinctive feature is that these are iterated, open-ended 
processes feeding into each other. The phase of 
implementation in international regime dynamics is an 
under-researched but developing topic across the non-
proliferation regime literature.   
Studies taking the role of implementation as 
important variable affecting the working system of a 
	 33	 	
multilateral non-proliferation arrangement are scarce 
within the field of IR.37 Three plausible reasons can be 
advanced for this neglect. First, this can be related to 
the static approach to capture single big, historic 
events, once at a time. This is not to say that the 
mainstream paradigms have not been concerned with shifts 
in behavior and interaction among parties. It is quite the 
contrary. However, as a proponent of evolutionary 
international relations puts it, processes are presented 
as “merely the differential outcome between particular 
moments in time, thus essentially ‘freezing’ change within 
a static framework.”38 Second, implementation is a process 
that requires the action of domestic, national actors, as 
it takes place within the domestic structure and operating 
system of each state. This is also why there is a paucity 
of studies conducted with a specific focus on the 
international level.  
To explicitly focus on international-level 
implementation, then, is to look at the supporting 
architecture or framework that is supposed to lead to the 
mitigation of a problem set or, in the same manner, of a 
security threat. Finally, implementation is sometimes 
																																																						
37	 There	 are	 notable	 exceptions.	 Besides	 empirical	 analyses	 conducted	 by	 policy	 practitioners	 and	
independent	 research	 groups	 pertaining	 to	 implementation	 challenges	 facing	 given	 non-proliferation	
organizations,	 academics	 have	 not	 devoted	 equal	 attention	 to	 questions	 of	 management	 and	
implementation	 frameworks.	However,	 implementation-centered	 hypotheses	 and	 accounts	 to	 explain	
effectiveness	 of	 a	 collaborative	 project,	 specifically	 with	 regard	 to	 “nuclear	 weapons	 project	
implementation”	at	the	domestic	level,	have	been	recently	explored	by	Hymans	(2012,	25).		
38	 See,	 Dietl,	 “Selection,	 Security	 and	 Evolutionary	 International	 Relations.”	 In	 Sagarin	 and	 Taylor,	
Natural	Security:	A	Darwinian	Approach	to	a	Dangerous	World.		
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addressed indirectly by ways of referring to other 
concepts, such as compliance. This is a concept that has 
been mostly elaborated by legal scholars.39 Yet, while 
implementation is a process that may lead concerned actors 
to act in accordance with given rules, compliance is a 
fait accompli. In other words, whereas implementation is 
dynamic, compliance is static. In this regard, a rather 
useful hologram to capture implementation at the 
international level is the “system for implementation 
review” elaborated by David Victor and, among others, 
Raustiala.40 Such a system stresses the dynamic nature of 
the enterprise. A “system for implementation review” has 
been defined as a set of “rules and procedures by which 
the parties to international agreements exchange data, 
share information on implementation, monitor activities, 
assess the adequacy of existing commitments, and handle 
problems of poor implementation.”41  As such, this thesis 
adopts the view according to which the degree of 
effectiveness is assumed to depend on the ways in which 
such implementation and post-implementation frameworks are 
designed on paper and worked out in practice. This is one 
of the reasons behind the focus on the implementation 
concept, rather than on (non)-compliance.  
																																																						
39	See,	Chayes	and	Chayes,	“On	Compliance.”	International	Organization	47(2):	175-205.		
40	See,	Victor	et	al.,	The	Implementation	and	Effectiveness	of	International	Environmental	Commitments,	
1998.	Notably,	Victor	and	Raustiala	have	long	studied	regimes	and	problems	of	cooperation	and	are	the	
first	scholars	to	coin	the	term	“regime	complexity.”	See,	Raustiala	and	Victor,	“The	Regime	Complex	for	
Plant	Genetic	Resources,”	International	Organization	58(2):	277-309.																
41	Victor	et	al.	1998,	16.		
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Effectiveness  
 
This study adopts a common-sense definition of 
effectiveness, by which it is meant the extent to which 
regimes further the goal for which they were initially 
established. This is the standard definition that has been 
mostly utilized within the regime research agenda.42  
Different taxonomies exist to conceptualize regime 
effectiveness. Though effectiveness is synonym with 
efficacy, it should not be conflated with the term 
efficiency. This latter term is concerned with economic 
impact, cost-benefit analyses. However, this study does 
not tackle cost-efficiency. For the benefits of a regime 
exceeding the costs or achieving problem solving or risk 
mitigation capacity at the lowest possible expense is not 
the main concern.  
Apart from economic approaches to effectiveness, 
there are, of course, legal understandings thereof, 
including the notion that an international regime or an 
agreement is effective if it has entered into force and is 
legally binding among the parties. As a general rule of 
thumb, if and when a rule is legally binding, then 
																																																						
42	Keohane	et	al.,	“The	Effectiveness	of	International	Environmental	Institutions.”	In	Institutions	for	the	
Earth,	Edited	Haas	et	al.,	1993,	3-27.	See	also,	Young,	“The	Effectiveness	of	International	Institutions,”	in	
Rosenau	 and	 Czempiel.	 Governance	 Without	 Government.	 See	 also,	 Young,	 “Effectiveness	 of	
International	 Environmental	 Regimes:	 Existing	 Knowledge,	 Cutting-Edge	 Themes,	 and	 Research	
Strategies.”	Proceedings	of	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences	of	the	United	States	of	America	108(50):	
19853-19860.	
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sanctions and punishments for the breaker can be foreseen. 
A fitting example of why this study does not deal with 
this formal conception is the following. Even if the CTBT 
has not entered into force for the lack of a few key 
ratifications, still practice runs counter to a strictly 
legal interpretation of effectiveness. The treaty and its 
international organization, that is, the CTBTO and its 
supporting network are in fact in operation and can 
reasonably monitor and verify whether a rule or a process 
has been violated. As such, the CTBT is ineffective de 
jure, but to some extent effective de facto, with some 
fundamental spillover CTBTO-led technological 
applications.43 
A third approach is the normative one, which links 
effectiveness with notions of legitimacy, fairness, equity 
and justice.44 In this regard, however, the daunting 
challenge is to come up with measures that are comparable 
across a number of cases. In addition, the more all-
encompassing the approach taken, the more difficult will 
be its operationalization and empirical validity across 
cases. Contrary to economic, legal and normative 
approaches to effectiveness, this study aims to continue 
the tradition of applying a problem solving or, equally, a 
proliferation risk mitigation approach. What distinguishes 
																																																						
43	See,	Cede,	“Enhance	the	Legal	Status	of	the	CTBTO	Pending	the	Treaty	Entry	into	Force,”	in	Melamud	
et	al.	Banning	the	Bang	or	The	Bomb?	227-32.		
44	See,	Young	(2011).		
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this study from other analyses is that effectiveness is so 
conceptualized as to stress its evolving nature.  
 
1.3 Case selection, methods and sources  
 
To uncover potential causes of institutional (in)-
effectiveness, two regime dynamics are analyzed. Informed 
by cooperation theories and regime approaches, thanks to 
which variables and single-factor explanatory accounts can 
be specified, the pathways and mechanisms by which 
negotiated agreements (establishment) are turned into 
deeds (implementation) via monitoring and review 
procedures are analyzed. Detecting the impact of a given 
arrangement within a number of similar ones under 
conditions of regime complexity is a daunting task to 
accomplish in the first place and partly explains the 
paucity of studies in international (nuclear non-
proliferation) regime effectiveness. What is more, 
information gathering on measurable, objective performance 
indicators, which is in and of itself difficult to come 
to, is scarce due to the sensitivity of the topic. As 
such, subjective, analytical and qualitative assessments 
by informed observers may well complement popular 
quantitative, numerical data, such as the number of 
members in a given cooperative arrangements, the number 
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and geographical location of countries hosting given 
events and associated participants.   
Two methodological remarks, followed by observations 
on case choice, sources and use of evidence, are in order. 
This investigation starts with two basic claims regarding 
the degree of efficacy of multilateral nuclear non-
proliferation governance arrangements. First, solid 
cognitive foundations seeking to undergird or reinforce 
actors’ expectations are fundamental.45 Second, frameworks 
for implementation do provide the environment whereby the 
first claim can be continuously checked. In other words, 
properly designed and implemented process-based frameworks 
are tools to investigate whether convergence takes place. 
The two claims invite different approaches and create 
distinct methodological problems.  
As regards the first, several considerations need to 
be made. The application of a cognitive approach to 
understand the behavior of actors in the analysis of 
regimes involves considerable challenges but can also 
yield interesting insights. The basic problem in need of a 
viable solution is how to interpret and decode cognitive 
processes from language, whether this comes in the form of 
oral accounts through information gathered through expert 
interviews or in the form of written statements and 
reports. In other words, how can the investigator be 
																																																						
45	To	be	sure,	 this	does	not	mean	that	common	understandings	cannot	change,	but	 that	 they	provide	
momentum	toward	problem	mitigation.		
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confident that what his interviewee means is what he says, 
and what he says is what he actually means? In this 
regard, careful attention needs to be put on the framing 
of questions to be asked, as well as on learning as much 
as possible about the interlocutor’s background.46   
In order to uncover cognitive patterns, interviewing 
a few selected decision-makers is a well-suited method. 
However, information gathered through interviews has 
implications on source availability and validity. A veil 
of confidentiality, especially during negotiations, 
usually surrounds multilateral diplomacy and key aspects 
thereof. However, a cognitive approach is appropriate for 
two important reasons. First, it is a suitable technique 
when there is the opportunity to interview negotiators and 
political orchestrators in order to uncover simplifying 
heuristics and the way they have been used. This is 
presently the only possibility given that archival 
material or published sources are scarce, especially when 
it comes to the case of the Nuclear Security Summits. 
Second, a number of scholars advance that such an approach 
is preferable under conditions of “strategic uncertainty,” 
in which solutions to complex issues cannot be known in 
advance and when issues may call for different solutions.47 
																																																						
46	 See,	 Rathbun,	 “Interviewing	 and	 qualitative	 field	 methods:	 Pragmatism	 and	 practicalities,”	Oxford	
Handbook	of	Political	Methodology,	Box-Steffensmeier	et	al.,	2008,	685-701.			
47	Across	IR,	see	Holsti,	“Foreign	Policy	Formation	Viewed	Cognitively,”	Structure	of	Decision,	1976,	18-
54;	Jervis,	Perceptions	and	Misperceptions	in	International	Politics.	1976.	In	the	field	of	negotiations,	see	
Zartman	 and	 Berman,	 The	 Practical	 Negotiator,	 1982.	 See	 also,	 Kahnemann	 et	 al.	 Judgment	 Under	
Uncertainty:	Heuristics	and	Biases,	1982,	3-22.		
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This is arguably the case in the issue area of nuclear 
non-proliferation where the three regime pillars of non-
proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful nuclear energy 
applications seem to invite complexity, compromise and 
apparent inconsistency. It is worth noting that increasing 
trends in institutional and informational diffusion, 
something which the magazine The Economist once labeled 
‘data deluge’, may well beget individuals and groups to 
rely more and more on straightforward and simplifying 
heuristics.  
As regards the second claim, the mutually reinforcing 
methods of descriptive analysis and process tracing are 
discussed.48 As to the former, the analysis seeks to 
describe how implementation is designed and how it works 
in practice by contrasting different cooperative instances 
in order to analyze the extent to which the process has 
any bearing on the behavior of actors, and thus on problem 
solving effectiveness. As to the latter, the research 
disaggregates the chain of events forming the 
implementation framework and traces the trails between 
single events that constitute the unfolding of the story 
of causal or (not so causal) mechanisms and sequences.49  
																																																						
48	However,	 the	methods	of	 semi-structured	 interviewing,	descriptive	analysis	and	process	 tracing	are	
not	mutually	exclusive,	but	they	reinforce	each	other.	In	this	regard,	see	Tansey	(2007),	“Process	tracing	
and	elite	interviewing:	A	case	for	non-probability	sampling.”	PS:	Political	Science	and	Politics	40(4):	765-
772.			
49	See,	Bennett	and	Checkel.	Process	Tracing:	From	Metaphor	to	Analytic	Tool,	2015,	74-97	and	237-259.	
See	also,	George	and	Bennett.	Case	Studies	and	Theory	Development	in	the	Social	Sciences.	Belfer	Center	
for	Science	and	International	Affairs,	2004.	
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As Mearsheimer and Walt have noted, process tracing 
seeks to prove or disprove whether a given theory’s causal 
mechanisms are actually reflected in the empirical case 
studies.50 An application of process tracing to this study 
would be the following. If implementation and its review 
lead to a change in actors’ preferences or behavior 
because of learning-, compliance-inducing factors such as 
monitoring or review mechanisms, then it should be 
possible to garner sufficient evidentiary proof to 
ascertain whether that corresponds to reality.   
The two central claims that this thesis advances are 
tested in three case studies. These cases fall within the 
same issue area – that is, nuclear non-proliferation. The 
first relates to the NPT and its associated institution of 
the implementation review process, as it is widely 
considered the epitome of traditional state-centric 
attempts in dealing with the basic nuclear dilemma – 
getting nuclear energy without proliferation risks while 
paving the way for disarmament. A review of Treaty Review 
Conferences may reveal interesting insights into whether 
and how linkages between the three fundamental pillars of 
the regime have been made and the manner in which NPT 
implementation has been worked out.  
																																																						
50	Mearsheimer	and	Walt,	“Leaving	theory	behind,”	European	Journal	of	International	Relations	19:	427-
457.		
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However, this case study is not about the so-called 
NPT regime as a whole. Rather, it focuses on the specifics 
related to the text of the NPT and its associated 
stocktaking review exercises. In so doing, an exploration 
into whether and how this first historical instance of 
nuclear non-proliferation governance has achieved its 
ambitious mandate becomes possible. The second case study 
deals with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, which 
was adopted in 2004 following Chapter VII powers as 
mandated by the U.N. Charter in order to cope with the 
emergent nexus between non-state security threats and 
nuclear weapons and materials proliferation. Its evolution 
is just as intriguing as its implementation review 
process. Security Council Resolution 1540, which is now 
more than a simple Resolution, is treated as a governance 
system on its own standing. The last case study deals with 
a third and still different nuclear non-proliferation 
arrangement, that is, the Nuclear Security Summits and 
their processes held between 2010 and 2016.   
Notwithstanding important differences between the 
cases in institutional design, problem area, standard 
operating procedures and context, all of which has to be 
addressed in the empirical sections, these three types of 
organized cooperation arguably serve the purpose of 
furthering the regime’s goals, that is, halting the spread 
of nuclear weapons to additional state and non-state 
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actors, reducing the quantitative number and qualitative 
role of nuclear weapons on the way to complete nuclear 
disarmament and facilitating peaceful cooperation on 
nuclear energy matters. Further, these arrangements are 
worth analyzing for the search of generalizable insights 
on regulatory, decisional and organizational aspects of 
non-proliferation architectures. What makes these cases 
interesting to diagnose is exactly their sheer diversity. 
In addition, the successes (and failures) of one given 
arrangement affects the other in ways that are mutually 
dependent.  
In terms of their relative effectiveness in problem-
solving or risk mitigation, one could certainly argue that 
progress is easier to make with regard to less 
comprehensive, narrower and technical policy areas, such 
as nuclear security and non-state proliferation dangers, 
while it is harder to achieve in more politicized fields, 
such as state-led proliferation, disarmament or 
safeguards. However, this is not a foregone conclusion, as 
issues of sovereignty, secrecy and national security 
equally pervade joint efforts to stem non-state 
proliferation risks.  
The study draws on two bodies of literature. The 
first strand stems from the analysis of international 
regimes. A focus will be put on teasing out core features 
related to effectiveness. This literature is useful 
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because it depicts a wealth of explanatory pathways 
through which multilateral cooperative arrangements 
succeed or fail. Though the arguments employed in this 
analysis also draw upon work that is not strictly related 
to regime analysis or, for that matter, to the field of 
IR, the discussion is placed within the broader pan-
academic debate about arrangements. Processes of 
regulation, organization and decision are isolated. At the 
same time, it is important to note that the literature on 
regimes is not the sole realm of IR scholars. Legal 
scholars have used the regime term before and have 
contributed to a renaissance in the study of regime 
complexity. A second strand of literature, sometimes 
called grey literature, is drawn upon in order to gather 
additional empirical evidence. These works include 
published books, journal articles, newspapers accounts, 
conference records and proceedings, reports, documents and 
guidelines from both governmental and non-governmental 
organizations, as well as publications from non-advocacy 
organizations that have participated in the design and 
implementation of nuclear non-proliferation regimes. In 
addition, these two literatures are supplemented by semi-
structured interviews with individuals who have been 
involved in relevant negotiations dealing with the case 
studies under analysis. Interview data form and inform the 
empirical investigation of the two cases of the Nuclear 
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Security Summit process and the 1540 arrangement. Although 
no formal survey technique was planned, the fieldwork 
provides evidence that complements (by confirming or 
disconfirming) the information gathered from written and 
publicly available materials. In this way, a variety of 
sources are used in the presentation of the empirical case 
studies. 
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Chapter Two  
 
The problem of institutionalized non-proliferation 
cooperation 
 
In seeking to explain why some non-proliferation 
arrangements sometimes contribute to successful problem 
solving and risk mitigation while others seem no longer 
‘fit for purpose’ and become stagnant, this chapter takes 
stock of the relevant scholarship on international 
regimes. In doing so, the analysis situates the research 
questions within a given set of scholarly contributions 
sitting predominantly within the field of IR. It 
highlights the critical variables and explanatory 
propositions that Realism, Neoliberalism and 
Constructivism emphasize with respect to inter-state 
cooperation and non-proliferation.51  
This chapter focuses on the theme of effectiveness by 
taking into account organizational, decisional and 
regulatory aspects of a given arrangement. This topic is 
																																																						
51	The	distinction	between	the	three	‘isms’	as	regime	theories	is	disputed.	No	consensus	on	definition,	
operationalization	and	research	methods	exists.	In	the	1982	regime	project	a	basic	distinction	is	drawn	
between	 “structural,	 modified	 structural,	 and	 Grotian	 perspectives”	 (Krasner	 1982:	 190).	 Other	
contributions	 to	 the	 research	 agenda	 adopt	 different	 angles	 of	 interpretation	 (Haggard	 and	 Simmons	
1987;	Hasenclever	et	al.	1997).	Another	project	highlights	“power,	 interest,	and	knowledge”	as	factors	
affecting	 their	 genesis,	 and	 sheds	 light	 into	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 effectiveness	 can	 be	 understood	 by	
analyzing	 the	dynamics	 taking	place	between	 the	operations	of	 a	 regime	and	 the	patterns	of	 relative	
power,	 and	 the	 patterns	 of	 (rational)	 self-interests	 (Levy	 et	 al.	 1995).	 Notably,	 the	 neoliberal-
institutional	 research	 program	 includes	 legal	 scholars	 focusing	 on	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 cooperation	
(Slaughter-Burley	1993).	Whereas	they	take	cooperation	as	a	fact,	political	scientists	are	puzzled	by	the	
phenomenon	as	such.		
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overlooked because of the scarce real-world evidence of 
cooperation in security and proliferation-related issues 
other than within military alliances. Even across more 
technical and less politicized nuclear issue areas, the 
extent and breadth of cooperation is underdeveloped or 
non-existent.52 In addition, the notion of effectiveness is 
one of the most used and abused concepts.53 It has been 
analyzed according to different definitions and across 
different dimensions. Compliance, in this regard, has been 
a critical variable driving effectiveness, and has been 
assessed against judicial decisions, the decision-making 
process, normative criteria such as legitimacy, and 
against the capacity of sates to enforce rules. This study 
instead problematizes endogenous properties of 
arrangements themselves, specifically the dynamics of 
implementation and post-implementation review procedures, 
which are thought to bear on regime effectiveness.  
The first building block in this study is that the 
evolution and interaction of tangible interests espoused 
by states and their governments and intangible ideas 
promoted by transnational networks of committed actors, 
including states themselves, command considerable heft in 
understanding and explaining variation in regime 
																																																						
52	 The	 ‘non-proliferation’	 definition	 this	 study	 employs	 encompasses	 ‘vertical’	 and	 ‘horizontal’	
proliferation.	 The	 negotiating	 history	 and	 the	 prevailing	 interpretation	 of	 the	 package	 of	 obligations	
contained	 in	 the	 1968	 NPT	 –	 quantitatively	 an	 almost	 universal	 binding	 treaty,	 but	 qualitatively	 an	
insufficient	 measure	 due	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 four	 states	 with	 nuclear	 weapons	 outside	 the	 treaty’s	
purview	–	is	as	much	about	horizontal	proliferation	as	is	about	vertical	proliferation.		
53	A	comprehensive	study	from	theoretical	and	methodological	points	of	view	is	Hagemann	et	al.	(2013).	
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effectiveness. Despite lying at the core of national 
security, the understandings and discourses around nuclear 
weapons and their risks were since the 1940s by no means 
restricted to intergovernmental relations. Scientists, 
professional groups and informed sectors of civil society 
sought to join forces together to form coalitions, raise 
awareness and shape nuclear policy. Two examples, among 
many, stand out. First, the establishment of the Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists in 1945 and its “Doomsday Clock”, 
which monitors how close humanity is at total destruction, 
should be mentioned. Second, the initiation of the Pugwash 
Conferences on Science and World Affairs in 1957, inspired 
by the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, calling on humanity to 
think outside the box to peacefully solve nuclear-related 
problems.  
At a minimum, these developments testify to the need 
to take into account both structure and agency as well as 
both interests and ideas in the formation and evolution of 
arrangements, and the nuclear non-proliferation regime in 
particular. Forces other than the rough power and the 
interests and ideas of major states shaped this issue 
area. Scientists, experts and intellectuals worked 
together to form transnational epistemic networks that 
steered the debate about nuclear risks and non-
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proliferation.54 Theoretically, it is reasonable to assume 
that rational choice-based and cognitive choice-based 
arguments equally matter to explain cooperation dynamics.   
It is also important to reflect over the fact that 
concerns raised by nuclear weapons were first addressed in 
the context of multilateral disarmament diplomacy within 
which the definition of “Weapons of Mass Destruction” as 
encompassing chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear weaponry, was developed.55 At the same time, 
contrasting patterns between the ideas of nuclear 
disarmament, the interests of governments and the 
structures of multilateral problem-solving, have produced 
deadlock at best and arms races at worst. The premise is 
that one cannot realistically analyze the evolution of 
multilateral non-proliferation cooperation without 
considering the role of tangible interests and intangible 
ideas, the interplay between structure and agency, and the 
interaction between rational and cognitive dimensions.  
The first section of this chapter extrapolates the 
insights that the three IR theories and narrower 
international regime approaches, such as hegemonic 
stability, functionalism and cognitivism, reveal about 
institutional effectiveness. It is indeed a sort of 
																																																						
54	An	illustrative	example	is	the	Russell-Einstein	Manifesto,	which	gave	birth	to	the	Pugwash	movement	
to	 “seek	the	 elimination	 of	 all	WMD	 and	 discuss	 new	 scientific	 and	 technological	 developments	 that	
may	bring	more	instability	and	heighten	the	risk	of	conflicts.”		
55	U.N.	General	Assembly	Resolution	1(I),	January	24,	1946.	For	a	historical	analysis	of	WMD,	see	Carus	
(2012).	 The	 proposals	 for	 several	 cooperative	 non-proliferation	 arrangements	 have	 been	 filtered	
through	the	U.N.,	especially	the	General	Assembly	and	the	Security	Council.		
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exploratory operation because regime approaches and 
empirical studies have to some extent omitted to 
problematize this theme, focusing instead on issues of 
regime formation, compliance and enforcement. Less 
attention has been put on questions related to 
institutional effectiveness, and even less on possible 
internal sources and mechanisms of regime effectiveness. 
The final section operationalizes the respective variables 
and arguments identified so that hypotheses can be 
formulated and each theoretical alternative tested in the 
case studies.   
To begin with, a terminological clarification is in 
order. What does ‘institutionalized multilateral security 
cooperation’ mean and why is it a problem for IR theory? 
To do so requires first proceeding by disaggregating the 
expression into its components. ‘Multilateral’ 
quantitatively defines the minimum number of participants 
(states and governments in the first place) involved in 
‘security cooperation’, usually starting at three.56 There 
seems to be consensus on this numerical definition. For 
example, both Keohane and Ruggie agree on that number as 
the minimum quantitative threshold for talking about 
multilateralism.57 This seems to be corroborated by the 
																																																						
56	As	mentioned,	a	qualitative	dimension	of	the	adjective	 ‘multilateral’	exists	as	multilateralism	means	
more	 than	 the	 number	 of	 participants.	 The	 qualitative	 dimension	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 the	 ways	 in	 which	
cooperative	 activities	 are	 organized.	 It	 follows	 an	 ideal	 continuum	 spanning	 from	 formal	 to	 informal	
initiatives.			
57	 Terminological	 and	 substantive	 agreement	 ends	 there.	 See,	 Keohane	 (1990),	 “Multilateralism:	 An	
Agenda	for	Research,”	 International	Journal	45(4):	731-64,	731;	Ruggie,	“Multilateralism:	The	Anatomy	
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evolution of diplomacy at the operational level. Bilateral 
inter-state relationships have lost relative salience, 
increasingly after World War II, the creation of the U.N. 
and the ensuing network of multilateral organizations, the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the 
division of the world into two blocs, new globalization 
onslaughts and the emergence of malevolent actors.58  
Can multilateral cooperation exist between two 
entities? The short answer is yes. As long as the two 
cooperating entities, such as states or professional 
groups, working on a particular problem set are assisted, 
supported or otherwise monitored by a third entity, we are 
able to speak of a multilateral cooperative instance. The 
opposite of multilateralism is unilateralism. Whereas 
unilateralism is the pursuit of goals through go-it-alone 
action and does not involve compromise, multilateralism is 
the pursuit of goals through concerted action and entails 
a good deal of compromise, usually through interactions 
and negotiations.  
The term ‘security cooperation’ can be defined as 
repeated exercises on the part of the participants to work 
together to mitigate a common risk. Accordingly, security 
cooperation is not to be judged statically. Security 
																																																																																																																																																														
of	 an	 Institution,”	 International	 Organization	 46(3):	 561-98,	 1992;	 and	 Ikenberry,	 “Is	 American	
Multilateralism	in	Decline?”	Perspectives	on	Politics	1(3):	533-50,	2003.	
58	See,	Laqueur,	The	New	Terrorism,	2000;	Romano,	“Diplomazia,”	1992;	Di	Nolfo,	Storia	della	Relazioni	
Internazionali,	2008.				
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cooperation means more than successfully negotiating and 
ratifying a treaty or complying with its terms. 
Cooperation and collaboration in this regard indicate 
ongoing activities and not a one-time, single-shot event. 
So conceptualized, ‘security cooperation’ can be conceived 
of as a process of adjusting means to reach an agreed-upon 
end. Yet, it should be pointed out that ends or common 
goals can also change for better or worse as a matter of 
practice, technology evolution and knowledge dynamics 
(accumulation or disintegration). In addition, even 
problems can be redefined and reframed accordingly. The 
basic point is that the nature of problems, the 
availability of mechanisms to address them and the 
constellation of interests and expectations that 
participants entertain in cooperative arrangements are not 
fixed. The question is then also about the medium through 
which processes of policy evolution and governance 
innovation occur. ‘Security cooperation’ ought to be 
disaggregated, as both uses and understandings of security 
and cooperation have changed. As to the former term, post-
Cold War, post-9/11 meanings of what actually constitutes 
‘security’ have expanded to cover more than military 
threats. Security threats do not come solely and 
preeminently from states’ military apparatuses, nor is it 
just a matter left to the military to deal with.59  
																																																						
59	For	example,	the	traditional	military	dimension	of	national	security,	with	which	both	academics	and	
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To illustrate this point, it is useful to draw a 
lesson from across the nuclear domain. As noted, the 
security of nuclear materials started on the premises of 
physical protection (“guns, guards, and gates”) to 
gradually become embedded in a cultural security 
environment.60 Further, ever since the 21st century, nuclear 
risks have ranked high and continue to be one of the top 
policy priorities of governments around the world. 
Focusing on this issue puts increased attention to 
regulatory aspects and management practices involving 
those nuclear components that are most vulnerable in 
scenarios in which terrorists or other malevolent actors 
are involved. However, nuclear components such as 
materials are to be seen as simply more than just a 
narrowly framed security concern. The issue of nuclear 
materials can be formulated along several dimensions.  
Besides having a security dimension in light of non-
state and cybernetic risks, nuclear materials can be 
understood, framed and their respective risks assessed as 
an energy issue (source of electricity), as an economic 
issue (demand and supply, commercial trade), as an 
environmental and public health issue (radiation, use and 
																																																																																																																																																														
decision-makers	 have	 been	 concerned,	 has	 been	 “overshadowed”	 by	 such	 phenomena	 as	 the	 rise	 of	
non-state	 actors	 as	 important	 enablers,	 but	 also	 disablers,	 of	 security	 threats,	 rapid	 scientific	 and	
technological	developments,	 and	multi-polarity	 (Caves	and	Carus	2014).	 The	 literature	has	elaborated	
complementary	conceptions	of	security,	including	human,	environmental,	water,	food	security,	thereby	
highlighting	 different	 sources	 of	 conflict	 than	 those	 emanating	 from	 state-led	militaries	 (Cavelty	 and	
Mauer	2010).		
60	Whereas	a	binding	treaty	on	the	physical	protection	of	nuclear	materials	is	in	force	since	1987,	as	well	
as	a	2005	Amendment,	no	binding	regulation	exists	at	 to	nuclear	security	culture.	However,	 this	 issue	
has	recently	received	widespread	high-level	support.		
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weapon detonation), as a development issue (peaceful 
applications in agriculture, medicine and so on), as a 
scientific one (space missions), as well as a moral and 
ethical concern (humanitarian consequences of nuclear 
weapons use). ‘Complexity’ carries the idea of divergence, 
leading inevitably to discord.61 One has to bear in mind 
these diverging and converging dimensions as well. As 
such, the complexity of the issue area under consideration 
and the many dimensions it can acquire makes an ideal 
international nuclear security regime, as traditionally 
understood, so elusive to build.62   
The term ‘cooperation’ has also experienced a 
terminological reassessment or, to put it better, a 
deepening of its understanding, both in theory and 
practice. Building upon the game-theoretically-oriented 
contribution by Stein to the 1982 regime project, 
cooperation can be differentiated between the two 
qualitatively different situations of “collaboration” and 
“coordination.”63 The former case resembles a simple binary 
choice between outright defection and outright cooperation 
(game-theoretically represented as Prisoners’ Dilemma 
scenarios, while practically represented by the creation 
																																																						
61	On	the	complexities	of	nuclear	negotiations,	see	Avenhaus,	et	al.	Containing	the	Atom,	2002.			
62	As	noted,	there	are	currently	no	binding	laws,	even	though	a	model	Nuclear	Security	Convention	has	
been	proposed.	The	absence	of	legal	formality	however	does	not	impede	progress.	For	example,	efforts	
to	streamline	nuclear	operations	and	strengthen	safety	and	security	are	underway.	Some	working-level	
relationships	engaging	nuclear	 industry	(operators,	managers,	and	owners),	police	and	private	security	
firms,	as	well	as	policymakers	have	been	established.		
63	 Stein,	 “Coordination	 and	 Collaboration:	 Regimes	 in	 an	 Anarchic	World,”	 International	 Organization	
36(2):	299-324,	1982.	Similarly,	other	game-theoretical	contributions	exist	that	address	the	dynamics	of	
the	interests	of	the	actors	engaged	in	interactive	decision-making	processes.	See	Martin	(1992).	
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of the building blocks of an international regime, such as 
multilateral treaties).64 The latter approximates to a 
situation in which players agree to a common project (or 
have already done so) but disagree over the means to carry 
out the project (game-theoretically represented as Battle 
of the Sexes scenarios, while practically represented by 
implementation dynamics).65 Following Stein’s insights, it 
is suggested that the structure of cooperation in non-
proliferation has moved from a type of single-shot 
collaboration (for example, the signing/ratification of 
treaties) to a type of ongoing coordinated sets of 
activities (for example, implementation of first-and 
second-order agreements).  
The fourth aspect relates to the issue of 
‘institutionalization’. Regimes are routinized and 
patterned instances of the broader phenomenon of inter-
state cooperation. Different regimes and different lower-
level cooperative arrangements within them espouse 
different degrees of institutionalization. Institutional 
aspects are not to be conflated with organizational 
aspects. While the former deals with types of rules and 
policy-making procedures – for example, the presence or 
																																																						
64	 The	 Prisoner’s	 Dilemma	 refers	 to	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 two	 players	 each	 have	 two	 options	 whose	
outcome	 depends	 on	 the	 choice	 made	 by	 the	 other.	 In	 nuclear	 arms	 control	 and	 disarmament,	 the	
absence	of	effective	verification	and	monitoring	 through	which	parties	 can	minimize	 free-riding	while	
maximizing	 trust	 is	 taken	 to	bear	on	explanations	of	 the	 arms	 races	 from	 the	 late	1940s	 through	 the	
1980s.	While	 the	most	 congenial	 outcome	 from	 a	 collective	 perspective	would	 have	 been	 to	 reduce	
tensions	 by	 mutually	 disarming,	 the	 absence	 of	 trust	 explains	 the	 rational	 decisions	 to	 increase	 the	
number	of	nuclear	weapons	(Hopmann	1996:	73-5).		
65	In	non-zero-sum	games,	both	sides	want	to	cooperate	but	each	has	slightly	different	preferences,	so	
they	still	have	to	coordinate	on	which	activity	they	choose.		
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absence of binding provisions, scheduled meetings of the 
participants, routinized reviews and other monitoring 
practices, the presence, function and steering power of 
experts – the latter focuses on a related, yet separate, 
feature that deals with the presence, form and function of 
administrative and bureaucratic structures. What is more, 
institutionalization can sometimes constitute a stumbling 
block to effectiveness and adaptation to changing 
circumstances. When something gets institutionalized, it 
can mean that that something has become repetitive to the 
point of remaining unchangeable. Relatedly, the preeminent 
regime actors, such as political leaders, diplomats, 
lawyers and the military, tend to follow their routines by 
the letter and stick to their own conventions. Public 
organizations as such are the least flexible and the most 
change-averse professional groups. However, even these 
actors and their organizations can surely be prone to 
change, provided that proper mechanisms are used. Inertia 
and complacency may well be mitigated through interactive 
and iterative procedures that institutionalize multi-
source information and ensure a two-way, bottom-up and 
top-down flow. Be as it may, a survey of the IR 
scholarships on the meanings and dynamics of 
institutionalized multilateral security cooperation is 
next.  
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Pathways to regime effectiveness: the propulsive role of 
relative power, common interests and knowledge  
 
An enduring debate in IR theory revolves around the extent 
to which anarchy can be tamed, the role played by 
institutions and physical organizations, and whether and 
how arrangements affect state behavior.  
According to Realism, and particularly neo-realists 
or structural realists, three mechanisms exist through 
which states can accommodate their differences with one 
another. Unsurprisingly, none of them refers to 
international regimes and narrower international 
organizations. These are self-help, (military) alliances 
and the balance of power. Self-help is by definition a 
unilateral response and is the opposite of concerted 
action. Alliances are agreements among like-minded states 
in which parties jointly define threats and agree to 
counter them accordingly.66 The balance of power is a 
process according to which states counter threats that are 
likely to override the status quo.67 No matter the 
mechanism and the issue at stake, cooperation is viewed as 
a zero-sum game, in which gains acquired by one party 
translate into losses by the other party. This is the 
inescapable result of the security dilemma in an anarchic 
																																																						
66	Waltz,	Theory	of	International	Politics,	1979;	Walt,	The	Origins	of	Alliances,	1987;	Jervis,	“Cooperation	
under	the	Security	Dilemma,”	in	Betts,	Conflict	After	the	Cold	War,	2008.		
67	Mearsheimer,	The	Tragedy	of	Great	Power	Politics,	2001.		
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international system of unitary states.68 Anarchy means 
that there is no such thing as an entity having a monopoly 
on the use of force, nor there is such thing as an entity 
having the capacity to enforce agreements. In such an 
environment where states are the lone wolves in the forest 
of international politics, uncertainty and mistrust reign 
supreme.69 Another basic assumption refers to the notion of 
states as unitary actors and it acquires particular 
significance with respect to negotiation approaches. In 
essence, the preferences and the interests of states are 
both exogenous to interaction, that is, unchangeable by 
the iteration of contacts, and formally predictable. In 
addition, unity also refers to the gate-keeping capacity 
of states for the reason that no other player or actor can 
reach out to or affect the formation of interests and the 
processes of multilateral bargaining and decision-making.     
These forces induce (rational) states to compete 
rather than cooperate.70 Whatever form of cooperative 
engagement takes place, this is just a matter of time-
bound and short-term convenience and, therefore, is ad-
																																																						
68	Grieco,	 “Anarchy	and	 the	 Limits	of	Cooperation”	 International	Organization	 42(3):	 485-507;	Grieco,	
Cooperation	 Among	 Nations,	 1990;	 Jervis,	 “Cooperation	 Under	 the	 Security	 Dilemma,”	World	 Politics	
30(2):	167-214.	Notably,	the	origins	of	the	security	dilemma	are	situated	within	the	realm	of	cognition	
and	divergent	beliefs.	Security	dilemma	situations	arise	out	of	misunderstandings	by	one	party	vis-à-vis	
the	other,	which,	in	turn,	reacts	by	resort	to	threat	escalation.	Finding	a	way	out	requires	building	and	
sustaining	 a	 framework	 for	 confidence	 enhancement	 through	 information	 sharing	 and	 transparency	
measures	while	at	the	same	time	balancing	the	need	to	share.		
69	 That	 is	 why	 challenges	 related	 to	 progress	 monitoring	 and	 to	 the	 verification	 of	 cases	 of	 non-
compliance	are	so	important	in	non-proliferation.	Former	U.S.	President	Reagan	once	advised	to	‘trust	
but	verify’.	Former	President	Obama	stated	that	the	JCPOA	is	not	based	on	trust,	but	on	verification	(see	
Obama’s	 speech	 at	 American	University,	 5	 August	 2015).	 Former	U.S.	 lead	 negotiator	 for	 the	 JCPOA,	
Wendy	Sherman,	reiterated	that	concept	at	a	conference	in	October	2015	(Harvard	Forum).		
70	Mearsheimer,	“The	False	Promise	of	International	Institutions,”	International	Security	19(3):	5-49.	
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hoc, short-lived and based on a case-by-case basis and on 
a narrow calculation of incentives and disincentives. As 
such, the neorealist literature naturally neglects the 
significance of institutionalized cooperation in security 
matters. In a nutshell, institutionalized cooperation is 
seen as either insignificant or merely a function of the 
underlying power relations. Moreover, (military) alliances 
are forms of cooperation meant to exclude, rather than 
include, participants. Given the focus on multilateral 
security management arrangements, this study bypasses the 
literatures on alliances.   
So what accounts for the sustained cooperation in 
post-Cold War, post-9/11 security politics? Realists hark 
back to the theory of hegemonic stability to explain the 
causes and consequences of long-term cooperation. 
According to the neorealist version of the hegemonic 
stability theory, it is the presence of, and willingness 
to, act on the part of the most powerful state(s) and to 
bear the costs of establishing and maintaining systems of 
managed response that explains the existence and endurance 
of arrangements.71 When the most powerful loses its 
relative primacy, then regimes are likely to weaken and 
eventually fade away. As a consequence, effectiveness is 
then a function of the (short-termed and relatively 
																																																						
71	 Krasner,	 “Structural	 Causes	 and	 Regime	Consequences,”	 International	Organization	 36(2):	 185-205;	
Keohane,	After	 Hegemony,	 1984;	 Stein,	 “Coordination	 and	 Collaboration,”	 International	 Organization	
36(2):	299-324.		
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assessed) national interests of the hegemon. It then 
becomes reasonable to assume that the (in)effectiveness of 
regimes is thus associated with the rise and decline of 
the hegemon. In addition, vocalized, tangible interests 
are defined in terms of material power and remain fixed 
throughout interaction. Common interests, if any, are 
arguably pursued inasmuch and as long as they reflect the 
preferences of the hegemon. In essence, power defined 
according to military means and economic capabilities and 
the distribution thereof at the systemic level determines 
the success or failure of any form of multilateral 
cooperation. International binding law and independent 
international organizations are epiphenomena that arise 
out of the will of the powerful. These forces do not 
causally impact the efficacy of regimes. As a consequence, 
effectiveness is brought by hegemony.  
Neoliberals agree with realists over the anarchical 
nature of the international system and the nature of human 
action depicted as self-interested, rational and 
utilitarian. Yet, power is more widespread than neo-
realists depict it to be. The forces of economic and 
financial interdependence – or what can be called 
globalization – take the upper hand.72 This strand of 
literature does not black-box states as unitary actors but 
																																																						
72	See,	for	example,	Keohane’s	and	Nye’s	Power	and	Interdependence.	By	the	same	authors,	see	“Power	
and	Interdependence	Revisited.”		
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takes individuals and groups as the unit of analysis.73 
Whereas the realist theory takes power conceptualized at 
the systemic level as the variable influencing regimes, 
neoliberals take interests conceptualized at the unit-
level of analysis as a key determinant. Individuals, 
national leaders and their rational choices shape the 
contours within which international politics develop. 
However, both realism and neoliberalism have their origins 
in a utilitarian view of the world where actors act out of 
rational self-interest and seek to maximize their utility. 
In essence, actors act as “rational egoists.”74   
As the most prominent neoliberal-institutional 
scholar has put it, cooperative arrangements are created 
and maintained through institutions (and physical 
organizations) that provide efficiencies of scale and 
minimize transaction costs by making it cheaper for actors 
“to get together to negotiate an agreement” and “to get 
incentives to reveal information and their own preferences 
fully to one another.”75 This theory is embedded in 
microeconomics somewhat following the logics of 
methodological individualism and rational choice.76 
Moreover, besides reducing both uncertainty and costs, as 
well as increasing transparency, regimes serve another 
																																																						
73	Keohane,	International	Institutions	and	State	Power,	1989.		
74	Keohane,	1984,	27	and	110.		
75	Keohane,	1984,	90;	see,	“The	Demand	for	International	Regimes,”	International	Organization	36:	325-
55.		
76	Notably,	 in	much	the	same	way	as	the	“industrial	districts”	studied	by	Marshall	operate,	 institutions	
act	 as	 a	 catalyst	 for	 the	 maximization	 of	 benefits	 deriving,	 among	 other	 things,	 from	 information	
exchange,	for	the	minimization	of	costs	and	the	reduction	of	uncertainty. 
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important function, which is a key distinguishing feature 
in the realist-liberal debate. They can stabilize 
expectations and can alter conceptions of self-interest in 
the long run.77 This observation wards off realist 
scenarios in which pessimistic, worst-case assumptions 
spur states to thinking in terms of relatively assessed 
gains instead of seeking common interests, thereby 
engendering conflict and preventing cooperation.  
It is however important to note that states and 
governments are the gatekeepers. Regimes do not have 
independent power of their own. More precisely, regimes 
help states to advance their self-interests through 
cooperation and, in turn, cooperation is fostered by the 
presence of regimes themselves. The key driving force is 
to be traced to the configurations of interests that 
parties entertain. In order for cooperation to take place, 
the configuration of state interests should be neither 
mutually divergent (state of dissonance) nor perfectly 
congruent (state of harmony). It is the interaction 
between competitive and cooperative interests that has the 
potential to produce agreement; in other words, 
“cooperation can only takes place in situations that 
contain a mixture of conflicting and complementary 
interests.”78 This is what Schelling has referred to as 
																																																						
77	In	a	nutshell,	this	thesis	wants	to	prove	or	disprove	that	it	is	in	part	due	to	the	design	and	operation	of	
implementation	frameworks	that	has	the	potential	to	alter	states’	interests	and	perceptions.		
78	Axelrod	and	Keohane,	“Achieving	Cooperation	under	Anarchy,”	World	Politics	38(1),	226.		
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“mixed-motive” situations in which both converging and 
diverging interests are present for negotiations to take 
place.79 In essence, common and overlapping interests then 
replace hegemonic power as the driving factor.80 As the 
expression configurations of interests indicate, there is 
theoretically an infinite number of ways in which 
interests can be structured and clustered together. In 
this regard, game-theoretical models have been developed 
to account for these variances.  
For the purposes of this thesis, it is not necessary 
to illustrate the variety of formal models. Nonetheless, 
it should be highlighted that what really matters is the 
presence of disparities among parties in interests which 
act as the principal catalyst for regime success or 
failure. Disparities of interests can be adjusted through 
the processes of negotiation by adopting both distributive 
(zero-sum or value-claiming) and integrative (positive-sum 
or value-creating) bargaining tactics, or a mix thereof. 
To be sure, the reference to negotiations may be 
misplaced, as, apart from few notable exceptions, this 
parallel has not received attention by regime scholars, 
whether they may be falling within the neorealist or 
institutional camps.81 Similarly, these theories do not 
explain how multilateral convergence and adjustment of 
																																																						
79	Schelling,	The	Strategy	of	Conflict,	1960.	See	also	Keohane,	1984,	67-8.		
80	Keohane’s	book	title	“After	Hegemony”	stands	to	indicate	that	cooperation	was	still	possible	at	a	time	
when	the	U.S.	was	losing	its	predominant	position.	
81	 Young	was	 one	 of	 the	 first	 scholars	 to	 place	 importance	 on	 negotiations	 and	 bargaining	 in	 regime	
dynamics,	especially	during	the	formation	stage	(Hasenclever	et	al.	1997;	Young	1989).		
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interests is obtained in the process, given that one of 
the theoretical assumptions undergirding rational choice-
based approaches (and hence, both realist and liberal) is 
that interests are predetermined, predictable and fixed 
throughout interaction. Hence, strategies and processes of 
negotiations gain relevance.  
In addition, irreconcilable disparities of interests 
may produce “political market failures” for which everyone 
has an interest in avoiding.82 Therefore, institutionalized 
multilateral cooperation is a self-interested response to 
problems of information scarcity and considerable 
transaction costs as a result of the anarchical nature of 
the international system. As such, regimes provide a 
modicum of stability in actors’ expectations about others’ 
patterns of (expected) behavior that ultimately permit the 
development of working relationships. Recursive 
negotiations, the presence of physical organizations, 
monitoring and verification mechanisms are established and 
maintained to ameliorate the tragedy of self-sufficiency.    
In sum, concerns about ‘relative gains’ are 
underplayed and substituted with an emphasis on absolute 
gains deriving from mutually beneficial cooperation and 
emerging from appropriate processes of negotiation. 
Strategies that are geared toward the quest for ‘absolute 
																																																						
82	Keohane,	1984,	85.		
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gains’ are called ‘integrative bargaining’.83 Anarchy is 
still the overarching concern, though it can be mitigated 
by mutually beneficial cooperation in a world where 
increasing levels of interdependence make it more 
difficult to ‘go it alone’. One key distinguishing factors 
between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism may be 
found at the level of temporality. The latter paradigm 
disregards the reality of short-term disparities in 
interests to focus instead on the benefits of achieving 
long-term objectives, whereas the former starts with just 
the opposite standpoint.84  
The third IR paradigm is social constructivism. This 
strand emphasizes that actors behave not only in response 
to their self-interested motivations, as both neo-realism 
and neoliberal institutionalism have it, but more 
importantly, according to shared values and common 
understandings. To be sure, shared values and common 
understandings come first in the causal chain of 
explanation and, accordingly, they enable individual 
interests to take shape. In explaining the causes of 
inter-state cooperation, scholars of international regimes 
started to make reference to the term cognition. The term 
comes from the Latin word for ‘thinking’ and refers to the 
																																																						
83	 The	 integrative	 problem-solving	 approach	 changes	 the	 zone	 of	 possible	 agreement	 by	 creating	 a	
different	 range	 of	 options	 for	 convergence.	 Integrative	 bargaining	 treats	 interests	 as	 dynamic	 factors	
shaped	by	knowledge,	norms	and	ideas	(Hopmann	1996;	Walton	and	McKersie	1965;	Pruitt	2002).	It	is	
therefore	associated	with	cognitive	strategies.	Walton	and	McKersie	are	credited	with	coining	the	term	
integrative	bargaining	in	their	1965	Behavioral	Theory	of	Labor	Negotiations.		
84	Jervis	(2013)	refers	to	problems	of	chronology.	See	also	Hopmann,	1995.			
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ways in which people make judgments and decisions, and the 
way in which they interpret, or misinterpret, judgments 
and decisions made by others.85 Within the regime 
scholarship, Haggard and Simmons coined the term 
“cognitivism” to distinguish two versions within the 
constructivist school of thought, that is, “weakly’ and 
strongly cognitivist approaches” to regimes.86 The 
distinction between the two accounts is crucial and 
analytically important. Cognitive analysis draws analysts’ 
attention to what is going on in the reasoning processes 
of decision-makers, the linkages between problems and 
solutions, means-to-end relations and the disparities in 
the perceptions of interest. Cognitive approaches engage 
with research in psychology and the human mind. It was 
only in the aftermath of the ‘behavioral turn’ in the 
study of IR in the 1960s that it began to be acknowledged 
that there is a psychological dimension of international 
relations, both in theory and in practice.87  
In a nutshell, this strand of approaches points to 
the fact that what really counts is the manner in which 
ideas, having the potential to gain heuristic power, are 
framed. Cognitive approaches transpose reasoning 
processes, which operate at the individual level of 
analysis, to problems of cooperation. In doing so, they 
																																																						
85	See,	the	chapters	by	Rubin	and	Jönsson	on	cognitive	theory,	in	Kremenyuk,	International	Negotiation:	
Analysis,	Approaches,	and	Issues,	2002.		
86	 Haggard	 and	 Simmons,	 “Theories	 of	 International	 Regimes.”	 International	 Organization	 41(3):	 491-
517.		
87	For	a	discussion	of	cognitive	theory,	Little	and	Smith,	Belief	Systems	and	International	Relations,	1988.		
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argue that not only individuals, but also complex systems 
can learn and redefine their interests and operative 
practices. Even classic realists concede on this point. 
Psychological and cognitive factors play a role. It is to 
note that, for example, Morgenthau’s Politics Among 
Nations states that the true nature of foreign policy 
decisions is “concealed by ideological justifications and 
rationalizations.”88 It was acknowledged that reality could 
be defined in radically different ways and that these 
contrasting definitions of reality had important 
consequences. Instead of describing policy decisions as 
irrational, it was essential to start problematizing the 
belief systems of decision-makers and develop a better 
understanding of the linkages between beliefs and 
behavior. In so doing, more successful policy courses 
could be taken and dangerous misinterpretations avoided. 
In “The Cybernetic Theory of Decision”, Steinbruner 
states: “when we speak of such things as organizational 
process, political bargaining, and rational calculations, 
we tacitly know that in the final analysis the phenomena 
involved are based on human mental operations. He then 
goes on and argues that “the critical propositions of 
cognitive theory concern themselves with the structure of 
beliefs; that is, with the ways in which the relationships 
between beliefs are organized and with the manner in which 
																																																						
88	Morgenthau,	Politics	Among	Nations,	1973,	88.		
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information is processed in reference to existing 
beliefs.”89 
Policy propositions that are heuristically framed are 
more likely to gain political salience and get the 
attention of the higher spheres of governments. Ernst Haas 
has been of the preeminent scholars that took into account 
cognitive factors in understanding and explaining the 
evolution of regimes by focusing on “the possibility of 
choice based on perception and cognition.”90 Paraphrasing 
one of the leading advocates of constructivism as applied 
to regime analysis, Peter Haas, the establishment and 
maintenance of effective arrangements is only likely when 
states share a basic appreciation of the problem at 
stake.91  
Moreover, the author refers to a key assumption that 
is relevant to effectiveness. As he has put it, “before 
states can agree on whether and how to deal collectively 
with a specific problem, they must reach some consensus 
about the nature and scope of the problem and also about 
the manner in which the problem relates to other concerns 
in the same and additional issue areas.”92 If both problem-
solution and issue-linkages are decoupled, then 
effectiveness becomes harder to achieve. Cognitivist 
scholars criticize realist and neoliberal accounts of 
																																																						
89	Steinbruner.	The	Cybernetic	Theory	of	Decision,	1974,	95.			
90	Haas,	“Why	Collaborate?”	World	Politics	32(3):	357-405,	360.		
91	 Haas,	 “Do	 Regimes	 Matter?”	 International	 Organization	 43(3):	 377-403;	 Haas,	 “Introduction:	
Epistemic	Communities	and	International	Policy	Coordination,”	International	Organization	46,	1-35.			
92	Haas,	1992,	29.		
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regime vicissitudes for disregarding the ambiguity and 
multidimensionality of reality, as well as such 
(intangible) cognitive factors as learning and knowledge.  
Within constructivist regime theory, the distinction 
between a ‘weak’ and a ‘strong’ analytical version enables 
the distinction between different explanatory pathways to 
institutional effectiveness. Weakly cognitivist approaches 
comfortably complement rationalist approaches. Hasenclever 
underlines that weakly cognitivist approaches “attempt to 
fill a gap in interest-based theorizing by adding a theory 
of preference formation.”93 As stated above, rationalist 
approaches take interests for granted, and regard them as 
immutable during multiparty interaction such as 
negotiations. This line of inquiry centers instead on 
understanding and explaining changes in actors’ interests. 
They take (expert) knowledge as the relevant single-factor 
account for the assessment of interest dynamics. They 
highlight the importance of mutually agreed-upon knowledge 
that may be produced through different channels.94  
Two additional points deserve consideration. First, 
common knowledge, in order for it to become relevant, 
needs to be contested and needs to be brought to the 
attention of decision-makers so that they will redefine 
the national interest in light of the new scientific and 
																																																						
93	Hasenclever	 et	 al.,	 “Integration	 Theories	 of	 International	 Regimes,”	Review	of	 International	 Studies	
26(1):	3-33,	5.		
94	A	catalyst	for	interest	change	is	through	networks	of	experts	--	“epistemic	communities”	(Haas	1992).		
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technical knowledge. As such, one important provision of 
weakly cognitivist political scientists is that they still 
depict states, or decision-makers, as the gatekeepers. 
Therefore, the first take-away point is that cognitivist 
approaches of the ‘soft’ kind and state-centrism can go 
hand in hand. The second lesson is that knowledge building 
and interests change are spurred by learning – on the part 
of governments and political leaders in the first place – 
and persuasion about the salience of novel means-to-end 
relationships. New knowledge brought by learning is 
necessary for a redefinition of interests. In this regard, 
learning should not be interpreted as intrinsically 
positive, but can operate in the opposite way. For 
example, actors can draw right or wrong analogies from 
past experience.  
Further, Nye distinguishes between “simple” and 
“complex” learning. In his words, “simple learning uses 
new information to adapt the means […]. The actor simply 
uses a different instrument to attain the same goal. 
Complex learning involves recognition of conflicts among 
means and goals […] and leads to new priorities and trade-
offs.”95 Similarly, Haas and Haas use the terms 
“adaptation” and “learning” to refer to the two 
situations, respectively. In their words, “to adapt is to 
																																																						
95	Nye,	“Nuclear	Learning	and	U.S.-Soviet	Security	Regimes.”	International	Organization	41(3):	371-402,	
380.	As	 the	 author	 remarks,	 a	 pathway	 along	which	 interests	 and	preferences	 can	 change	 is	 through	
“learning”	understood	as	“cognitive	change”	(Nye,	378).			
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change routines of problem solving without bothering to 
reexamine one’s beliefs about cause and effect;” moreover, 
“Learning is rare. To learn is to put consensual knowledge 
to work defining and solving problems seen as 
interconnected.”96     
‘Strong’ cognitivists sit in the orthodox camp of 
constructivism in that they take norms, consensual 
knowledge and inter-subjectively shared expectations a 
step of abstraction further. This is exactly where 
methodologically positivist theories give way to 
methodologically interpretive sociological theories. In 
other words, ‘strong’ cognitivists understand norms and 
mutual understandings as existing prior to 
institutionalized cooperation and prior to states 
themselves. State behavior and regime outcomes are a 
product of mutually reinforcing ideas and understandings 
of the self and the other. Put briefly, regimes are as 
much effective as are collectively held beliefs and 
identities.  
There are at least two differences that render this 
account more resistant to analytical cross-fertilization 
than ‘weak’ cognitivism or ‘soft’ constructivism. The 
first roadblock is epistemological. Positivists in both 
realist and liberal traditions are concerned with ‘causal’ 
relationships or at least correlations between one or more 
																																																						
96	 Haas	 and	 Haas,	 “Learning	 to	 Learn:	 Improving	 International	 Governance,”	Global	 Governance	 1(3):	
255-84,	262.		
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factors, as well as a separation between subject and 
object of analysis. Constructivists, as the very term 
implies, are more concerned with ‘constitutive’ 
relationships between subject and object. According to 
Wendt, regimes and states co-constitute each other. For 
Wendt, “an institution is a relatively stable set or 
structure of identities and interests”, and they are 
“fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart 
from actors’ ideas about how the world works.”97 
Consequently, concepts such as anarchy, interests and, 
indeed, regimes are socially constructed. The second 
impediment is of ontological nature. The nature of state 
actors and their underlying motivations differ markedly. 
For ‘strong’ constructivists, not only are states and non-
state actors equally relevant but, and more importantly, 
factors and dynamics related to actors, norms and ideas 
have equal weight. What is more, ‘strong’ cognitivists 
challenge the foundation of the rationalist mode of 
analysis by positing that actors cannot and should not be 
depicted as self-interested utility boosters, but rather 
as role-players.98  
A useful heuristic for making sense of this latter 
difference between utility-maximizing actors versus role-
players is provided by the dichotomy between the “logic of 
																																																						
97	Wendt,	“Anarchy	is	What	States	Make	of	It”	International	Organization	46(2):	391-425,	399.		
98	Hasenclever,et	al.	Theories	of	International	Regimes,	1997,	137.		
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consequence” and the “logic of appropriateness”.99 Whereas 
rationalists understand actors’ behavior as largely 
determined by moves and decision-making based on cost-
benefit analyses and the national interest, 
constructivists understand actors’ behavior as largely 
determined by moral obligations and discourses. A third 
roadblock is methodological, concerning the methods and 
sources employed to gather evidence across real-world 
cases and is thus a consequence of the epistemological and 
ontological assumptions.100 
Before coming up with a dynamic model linking 
neorealist, neoliberal and soft, or thin, constructivist 
approaches, it is worth briefly overviewing the most 
recent works on regimes.101 The latest strand of regime 
analyses – those studies that no longer problematize 
“cooperation under anarchy” or collective action as 
phenomena worth analyzing – has been motivated by the 
outburst of agreements and organizations managing a given 
problem set or mitigating a given security threat. To be 
sure, these works may not be as groundbreaking compared to 
those carried out between the 1970s and the 1990s. The 
main reason is that recent regime-centered analyses do not 
depart from compartmentalized thinking and theorizing that 
																																																						
99	 Hasenclever	 et	 al.,	 1997.	 See	 also,	 March	 and	 Olsen,	 “The	 Institutional	 Dynamics	 of	 International	
Political	Orders,”	International	Organization	52,	943-69.			
100	 In	 comparing	 the	 three	 “grand	 theories”	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 Constructivism	 as	 applied	 to	 the	
regime	research	agenda	is	the	least	straightforward	when	it	comes	to	clarity.	At	first	glance,	terms	such	
as	knowledge,	learning	and	ideas	seem	to	be	conflated	and	used	interchangeably.		
101	The	 first	 scholar	 to	point	 to	new	regime-related	research	agendas	by	arguing	 for	 the	usefulness	 to	
analyze	regimes	in	association	with	other	regimes	has	been	Young	(1996).		
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accompany the main (realist, institutional and 
cognitivist) approaches. However, such studies are 
important in that they point to increasingly complex 
coordination problems associated with regulating and 
managing contemporary challenges, the solutions of which 
will be fundamental for human survival.  
The renaissance of academic interest in regime 
analyses is primarily concerned with the consequences, not 
the causes, arising from the presence of a multitude of 
arrangements (treaties, agreements, regulations and 
physical organizations) aimed to address and solve given 
problems. Scholars like Raustiala and Victor have coined 
the term “regime complex” to describe “an array of 
partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions 
governing a particular issue area”, and instances of 
regime complexes have been found in numerous policy 
sectors, including but not limited to climate change, 
energy, the environment, trade and finance.102 Most 
recently, instances of regime complexity have been 
observed in global cyber activities and Internet 
regulations.103 Similarly, other scholars define “regime 
complexity” as situations in which there are “nested, 
partially overlapping, and parallel international regimes 
																																																						
102	 Raustiala	 and	 Victor,	 2004,	 279;	 see	 also	 Keohane	 and	 Victor,	 2011;	 Colgan	 et	 al.,	 “Punctuated	
Equilibrium	in	the	Energy	Regime	Complex,”	The	Review	of	International	Organizations	7,	117-43.		
103	Nye,	“The	Regime	Complex	for	Managing	Global	Cyber	Activities,”	2014.		
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that are not hierarchically ordered.”104  While first-
generation regime literatures conclude that regimes can be 
established and can remain effective as long as there is 
an identifiable common interest and as long as they 
provide actors with opportunities to converge and reach 
agreement (situations of harmony),105 complexes of regimes 
are established around the assumption that there is 
interest divergence among actors because they disagree 
over the means-end connections (situations of 
contestation). However, whether complexes of regimes are 
more or less effective than traditional ones remain 
underexplored. According to the literatures reviewed, the 
consequences arising from institutional overcrowding are 
three. First, regime complexes can provide states with 
“forum shopping” opportunities, that is, the ability to 
change venues within a single regime in order to advance 
their own interests.106 Second, regime complexes can provide 
states with “regime shifting” opportunities, that is, the 
ability to select a forum in a different yet overlapping 
regime so as to redefine a policy.107 Third, the creation of 
regime complexes provides states with more leverage 
options or exist strategies when it comes to deciding 
																																																						
104	Alter	and	Meunier,	“The	Politics	of	International	Regime	Complexity,”	Perspectives	on	Politics	7,	13-
24,	13.			
105	 In	 this	 regard,	 it	 is	 understood	 that	 interests	 can	 emerge	 from	 considerations	 of	 power,	
considerations	 of	 cost-efficiency	 and	 beliefs.	 In	 other	 words,	 interests	 can	 derive	 from	 power	 (neo-
realists),	 wealth	 (neoliberals/institutionalists)	 and	 beliefs	 system	 (cognitivists/constructivists).	 In	
practice,	interests	can	also	derive	from	and	be	influenced	by	a	combination	of	these	factors.		
106	Raustiala	and	Victor,	2004,	298-300.		
107	Morse	and	Keohane	,	“Contested	Multilateralism,”	The	Review	of	International	Organizations	9(1).			
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which rules to follow, thereby leading to situations of 
“strategic inconsistency.”108   
Scholars from the rational choice-based tradition 
have welcomed the creation of multiple and partially 
overlapping arrangements. Realists conclude that regime 
complexes favor the most powerful states as they have more 
resources at their disposal and are able to select their 
preferred courses of action without caring too much about 
others’ reactions.109 Neoliberals analyze institutional 
overcrowding from micromanagement and microeconomic 
standpoints and conclude that the more competition, the 
better the outcome. In a way or the other, regime 
complexes lead to specialization and to an efficient 
division of labor.110 Within this debate, constructivists 
have remained largely silent. Cognitivist contributions on 
the topic of regime complexes are rare, practically 
nonexistent. However, one could anticipate that the real-
world rise of a multitude overlapping instruments and 
organizations has also responded to psychological or 
cognitive dissonances and lack of consensual knowledge in 
means-end relations, as well as problem framing 
ineffectiveness. Be as is may be, the devil really lurks 
in the details. Measuring the relative intensity of each 
of these three grand factors becomes problematic. 
																																																						
108	Raustiala	and	Victor,	2004,	298.		
109	Drezner,	“The	Tragedy	of	the	Global	Institutional	Commons,”	in	Finnemore,	Back	to	Basics,	2012.		
110	 Gehring	 and	 Faude,	 “A	 theory	 of	 emerging	 order	 within	 institutional	 complexes,”	 The	 Review	 of	
International	Organizations	9:	471-98.						
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Nonetheless, the challenge of combining the realist, 
neoliberal and constructivist angles of vision in order to 
provide a pragmatic hologram of the matter is worth the 
effort. There is a wide gap between IR theory and the 
extant practice.  
The logic of material versus ideational factors that 
structures the traditional approach to studying 
international politics largely misses the point. This is 
even more relevant when it comes to assessing the 
performance of non-proliferation regimes, which is an 
inherently dynamic process, by using parsimonious, yet 
static, theoretical lenses. The regime term itself already 
encompasses both formal agreements as well as informal 
procedures and understandings. After all, “none of these 
schools of thought alone is capable of capturing all 
essential dimensions of regimes.”111 As it happens, a 
compromise needs to be worked out between the simplicity 
and straightforwardness of theory, on the one hand, and 
the complexity of the real world, on the other.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
111	Hasenclever	et	al.,	212.		
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Table 1: The Study of Regimes across IR theories   
 
 Realism Neoliberalism Cognitivism 
Central 
explanatory 
variable 
Power Interests Knowledge 
Epistemology Rationalist, 
positivist 
Rationalist, 
positivist 
Sociological, 
reflexive 
Ontological 
givens 
State-
centric, 
anarchic 
system, self-
interested, 
coercion 
State-
centric, 
anarchic, 
self-
interested, 
cooperation 
Social 
context, 
norms and 
ideas 
Level of 
analysis  
Inter-state Domestic 
level 
Individual, 
also domestic 
level 
Role of 
institutions  
Non-existent 
or very low 
Medium High 
 
 
Bridging disciplinary divides 
 
This section starts by touching on those studies that have 
explored disciplinary cross-pollination in regime analysis 
and on those that have advanced causal mechanisms by which 
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conceptions of self-interest can be shaped. It then 
proceeds by advancing the feasibility of incorporating a 
different, yet complementary, explanatory framework.  
Pioneering attempts to come up with a synthesis 
between neorealism and neo-liberal institutionalism, and 
subsequently, between the two methodologically rational 
theories, on the one side, and interpretive/constructivist 
studies, on the other, date back to the 1990s. Haggard and 
Simmons first warned about the dangers of theoretical 
integration by arguing that the “resolution of the debate 
between structuralists and cognitivists will depend on 
tests that allow for a confrontation between the two 
approaches without violating the epistemological tenets of 
either.”112 In their remarks on the ways ahead for regime-
oriented analysis, the authors disregarded the possibility 
of theoretical cross-fertilization, and favored instead 
the development of models linking the domestic and the 
international levels of analysis.  
In 1988, Keohane differentiated between two mutually 
exclusive analytical constructs, that is, rationalistic 
and reflective approaches to understanding institutions 
and, as a consequence, regimes. This thesis seeks to prove 
that room for synthesis between the rational and the 
reflexive orientations is desirable and possible as they 
both complement and do not detract from each other. Most 
																																																						
112	Haggard	and	Simmons,	1987,	513.		
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importantly, and building on the work of Haggard and 
Simmons, Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger in both their 
1997 and 2000 publications advanced the possibility of 
integrating the two approaches, including the analytical 
feasibility of using what they termed ‘weakly’ cognitivist 
variables to supplement rationalist theories.  
In this regard, ‘weak’ cognitivists or, by the same 
token, ‘soft constructivists’ start from the assumptions 
that knowledge shapes actors’ behavior and expectations 
and that some degrees of shared understandings of problems 
and their solutions need to be present for regimes to 
continue to be valuable and worth preserving. Collective 
understandings of end-means linkages are at the core of 
the explanation. Changes in causal beliefs help to explain 
variation in actors’ behavior and/or around a given 
phenomenon. Causal beliefs can influence the choice of 
means and objective, they can create focal points for 
seeking solutions and grant institutions power to prolong 
ideas. These assumptions do not violate explanatory tenets 
of both neorealist and neoliberal approaches to regime 
dynamics. On the contrary, they are embedded in 
methodological rationalism. Ideas as framed by ‘weakly-
oriented’ cognitivists continue to respond to a 
rationalist “logic of consequentiality” based on an 
intergovernmental form of interest formation and 
evolution, rather than to a reflexive “logic of 
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appropriateness” based on roles and strategies actors 
other than states play and pursue.113  
The weakly cognitivist literature has developed two 
causal mechanisms by which both individual and collective 
state interests can be shaped. There are two existing 
approaches to theoretical synthesis. These are the 
knowledge-inducing epistemic community framework and 
theories on learning. As for the latter, changes in 
beliefs occur through learning, thereby leading to the 
development of new strategies (simple learning) or brand-
new state interests (complex learning).114 Learning means 
“to alter one’s beliefs as a result of new information, 
and to develop knowledge or skill by study or 
experience.”115 Learning occurs internationally when “new 
knowledge is used to redefine the content of the national 
interest. Awareness of newly understood causes of unwanted 
effects often results in the adoption of different means 
to attain one’s end.116 As to the former, knowledge may be 
transmitted to policy-makers and between countries through 
the medium of “epistemic communities,” that is, networks 
of qualified professionals with expert knowledge relevant 
																																																						
113	 The	need	 to	 integrate	 realist	 and	 liberal	 approaches	 is	 reiterated	by	Garrett	and	Weingast	as	 they	
argue	that	the	dichotomous	separation	between	“rationalists”	and	“reflectivists”	 is	misleading.	Shared	
causal	 beliefs	 act	 as	 “focal	 points”	 around	which	 actors’	 behavior	 converge.	 Ideas,	 norms	 and	 shared	
expectations	may	influence	both	the	ways	actors	select	a	given	arrangement	as	well	as	the	stability,	and	
hence	the	effectiveness,	of	such	arrangements.	See,	Garrett	and	Weingast	(1993)	and	Garrett	(1992).	As	
far	as	the	expressions	“logic	of	consequences”	and	“logic	of	appropriateness”	are	concerned,	March	and	
Olsen	coined	these	terms	and	transposed	them	into	the	IR	literature.	See,	March	and	Olsen	(1998).		
114	Nye	(1987).	See	also,	Keohane	and	Nye	(1987).		
115	Keohane	and	Nye,	“Power	and	Interdependence	Revisited,”	International	Organization	41,	749,	1987.		
116	Haas,	1980,	390.		
	 82	 	
to policy choices.117 In this regard, knowledge can be 
understood as the “sum of technical information and of 
theories about that information which commands sufficient 
consensus at a given time among interested actors to serve 
as a guide to public policy designed to achieve some 
social goal.”118 
What is missing in these accounts is an explicit 
attempt to link the main single factor explanations of 
regime effectiveness into an integrated model, as well as 
a deeper understanding and analysis of the dynamic 
mechanisms by which knowledge and learning occur. As noted 
above, roadblocks to a full integration to the analysis of 
institutional effectiveness are well founded.  
Attempts at analytical synthesis made so far are few 
and are – though empirically rich – at risk of downgrading 
the principle of theoretical parsimony and simplicity 
according to which theories are useful so long as they are 
able to explain as much as possible about a phenomenon 
with as few variables as possible. Nonetheless, issues and 
problems are complex, interlinked and multidimensional, as 
the case of nuclear non-proliferation demonstrates. Case 
study analysis as a research method helps accommodate 
complex interactions. Explaining why multilateral 
cooperation in nuclear non-proliferation seems effective 
																																																						
117	The	“epistemic	community”	framework	was	introduced	by	Peter	Haas	to	analyze	the	role	and	impact	
of	ideas	in	policy	coordination	(1989,	1992).	Ruggie	also	focused	on	epistemic	communities	in	his	1975	
article.	 According	 to	 him,	 epistemic	 communities	 create	 a	 discourse	 that	 carries	 out	 standards	 of	
“normal”	behavior	(see	Ruggie	1975,	570).		
118	Haas,	1980,	67-8.		
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in some instances but not in others on the basis of 
single-factor accounts alone is not sufficient. As much as 
this thesis focuses on the forms and substance of 
multilateral cooperation in nuclear non-proliferation in 
areas in which recourse to conflict or military force is 
abstracted away, so too binary choices between the power 
of interests and the power of ideas should be allowed to 
interact with each other.  
A pragmatic framework can thus be constructed in two 
steps. First, there is a need to acknowledge the full 
complementarity of neorealism and neo-liberal 
institutionalism. Second, there is a need to combine 
rationalist and cognitive approaches. One way of 
proceeding is to treat absolute and relative gains as part 
of the same equation. Indeed, the concomitant presence of 
cooperation (common interests) and competition (individual 
interests) is what actually brings people to the 
negotiating table. The literature on negotiation analysis 
helps in this regard, as this is what actually “mixed 
motive” situations mean: successful negotiations represent 
just that. Second, and following from the first step, 
interests that both the above-mentioned theories regard as 
exogenously given and fixed are redefined via 
negotiations.  
Whether this can also be seen with regard to 
endogenous institutional properties, such as 
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implementation and post-implementation reviews, is the 
crux of this study. Negotiation strategies to increase the 
odds of getting to a compromise can be recast as a form or 
strategy to seek cognitive convergence among the parties. 
Since one of the main goals of negotiation is to find 
compromise by changing beliefs and interests in such a way 
as to expand the prospects for agreement, it follows that 
beliefs and interests cannot be regarded in practice as 
exogenous to interaction. The same argument should hold 
true not only for negotiation processes, on which most 
attention has been put, but also for previously neglected 
implementation review processes.  
 
Framework of analysis  
 
This section defines what this study is about and presents 
the phenomenon to be explained. It then proceeds to the 
phase of operationalization to come up with comparable 
features for, and indicators of, the three explanatory 
variables that cooperation theories and regime approaches 
single out as having the most impact on institutional 
effectiveness, that is, power, interest and knowledge. In 
doing so and based on an appraisal of both secondary 
literatures dealing with the three selected case studies 
as well as on an assessment of interviews, ‘measuring’ 
becomes empirically possible. Finally, this section 
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touches on a number of methodological questions, including 
the challenge of tracing causality in rather complex and 
long-term patterns. It also tackles some controversial 
points that such an examination entails, including the 
level-of-analysis problem and the use of elite interviews 
as information gathering method.119  
This thesis explores why institutionalized 
cooperative relationships sometimes succeed, whereas 
others fail to deliver expected objectives. In doing so, 
it seeks plausible explanations rooted in endogenous, 
institutional features pertaining to the arrangement or 
regime under analysis. It problematizes institutional 
features as possibly being relevant stepping-stones or 
impediments to effective cooperation. In other words, can 
we explain variation in institutional effectiveness in 
terms of variation in endogenous regime properties? What 
sets this study apart is the approach to inquiry and 
diagnosis. As regards inquiry, it does not dismiss but 
rather seeks to embed the key single-factor propositions 
that regime approaches have advanced to explain the 
formation of cooperative initiatives in a multidimensional 
framework in order. This requires going back and forth 
across different levels of analysis and combining realist 
and constructivist perspectives. As regards diagnosis, 
this study takes a step further by considering previously 
																																																						
119	On	theory	testing,	Van	Evera	(1997);	on	case-study	research	methods	and	within-case	methods	like	
process	tracing,	George	and	Bennett	(2005)	and	Bennett	and	Checkel	(2014).	
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under-investigated features of implementation and post-
implementation reviews. This study advances the 
proposition that institutional factors carry considerable 
explanatory weight. Specifically, it is advanced that the 
configuration of implementation and post-implementation 
reviews is critical in explaining variation in 
effectiveness.  
As stressed by neorealist literature, power and 
material capabilities are depicted to have the greatest 
explanatory power at the systemic level. It is thus 
important not to discount the macro-level factors that can 
impact on non-proliferation agreements. Economic 
approaches to nuclear energy and the imperatives of a 
safe, secure and safeguarded development of nuclear energy 
play a role in an increasingly globalized, interconnected 
and computerized market. Moreover, hegemony is exemplified 
by the U.S. preeminent position in the system as not only 
the first inventor and user of nuclear technology, but 
also as a commercial nuclear power world competitor, a 
donor country in cooperative nuclear projects, one of the 
world’s most important nuclear and dual-use technology 
suppliers. Definitions and case study analyses have 
portrayed hegemony as a case of military, economic and 
social domination exerted on the part of a single state or 
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group. Hegemony is understood as a preponderant influence 
or authority over others.120  
The constellation of interests that actors entertain 
as highlighted by the neoliberal scholarship is centered 
at the inter-state level as regards bargaining and 
decision-making and at the domestic level as regards 
preference formation. Even though nuclear negotiations 
have not been the main subject in neoliberal research 
inquiry, studies go beyond single treatments of the NPT by 
exploring and explaining a series of other multilateral 
diplomatic negotiations on arms control, non-proliferation 
and disarmament. International cooperation in nuclear 
safety, security and safeguards entails negotiations among 
different countries and different professional groups 
across different countries. Therefore, the strategies and 
processes of getting self-interested actors to cooperate 
gain traction.  
When it comes to the implementation of negotiated 
agreements, states officials and several national 
departments are tasked with overseeing nuclear policies. 
This point does not however imply that states do not seek 
input, advice and informed opinions from other qualified 
sources. Studies on the nexus between nuclear non-
proliferation and law are scarce and they focus analytical 
																																																						
120	Yet	hegemonic	 leadership	comes	not	only	from	the	country	spearheading	the	cooperative	initiative	
but	also	from	the	ideals	and	the	allure	of	leaders	and	personalities.	This	is,	however,	not	under	the	radar	
of	neorealism.			
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attention to legal aspects.121 The nature and content of 
agreements and the obligations states and other actors 
entertain is an important (institutional) characteristic.  
Cognitive aspects are located at lower levels of 
analytical abstraction. Even if it is challenging to 
specify beliefs, principles and norms, and even if it is 
more challenging to isolate their impact, theoretical and 
empirical studies address domestic politics, knowledge-
enhancing transnational networks, epistemic communities, 
exchanges between scientists and other experts, engagement 
in multinational nuclear research collaborative, lab-to-
lab projects in the science technology and political 
realms through academia and NGOs.  
If institutional effectiveness is the explanandum, 
then factors and dynamics rooted both in the dimension of 
operating procedures (implementation, reporting and 
evaluation) can yield important insights. The policy realm 
in which the puzzle takes shape is nuclear non-
proliferation. The objective is to find out why and 
especially how institutionalized cooperation proves more 
or less effective. The topic matters for both theoretical 
and practical reasons.  
Theoretically, there has been a dearth of analyses on 
cooperation once cooperation has been achieved. Studies 
have focused both on the first step or what can be called 
																																																						
121	See,	Joyner,	International	Law	and	the	Proliferation	of	Weapons	of	Mass	Destruction,	2009.		
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the ‘front-end’ of the cooperation loop, that is, the 
achievement of a compromise, as well as on the final step 
or what can be called the ‘back-end’ of the cooperation 
loop by examining compliance as enforcement. However, what 
goes on in between has been mostly neglected, particularly 
with regard to high-stakes security issues where the pull 
of sovereignty is extremely difficult to shake off, 
thereby making sustained cooperation elusive. Past works 
have paid relatively less attention to the stages and 
operational processes of implementation and post-
implementation reviews at the level of the multilateral 
arrangement. In other words, past studies have been skewed 
toward the analysis of the causes leading to the formation 
of cooperative arrangements. Moreover, attention has 
focused on questions of forms by examining whether 
cooperation as regimes can be seen in diverse issue areas, 
rather than on questions investigating the substance and 
characteristics of arrangements. Previous analyses have 
been carried out in a compartmentalized manner by focusing 
on single institutional arrangements.122 What is more, 
institutionalized multilateral effectiveness – when it has 
been addressed as a topic connected to the regime research 
agenda – has been exogenously assessed in terms of 
enforcement capabilities (the ‘back-end’ of the 
																																																						
122	 Studies	 carried	 out	 on	 single	 nuclear	 non-proliferation	 cooperative	 activities	 are	 numerous.	 For	
example,	with	regard	to	the	Proliferation	Security	Initiative,	see	Belcher	(2011);	for	Cooperative	Threat	
Reduction	programs,	see	Shields	and	Potter	(1997);	for	Resolution	1540,	see	Bosch	and	Van	Ham	(2007),	
and	Scheinman	(2008).	Yet,	there	is	no	analysis	aimed	at	contrasting	different	regime	components.		
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cooperation loop) or endogenously examined in terms of the 
parties’ compliance with established rules and 
regulations. These “frozen-in-times” characteristics in 
the study of regimes point to a gap in the appreciation of 
the nature of arrangements as evolving dynamics. 
Operationally, the prospects of institutionalized 
cooperation are today more pressing than it has ever been. 
When it comes to the practice of nuclear non-
proliferation, controversies are all the rage. On the one 
hand, it is interesting to note that multilateral 
arrangements, such as Security Council Resolution 1540 and 
the Nuclear Security Summits, are proving successful in 
mitigating nuclear risks. On the other, multilateral 
cooperative venues and mechanisms aimed at securing 
nuclear weapons and materials, and therefore directly 
touch upon the same policy areas, such as the reviews of 
the NPT and the old-fashioned diplomatic groupings within 
which states interact, the impasses over a FMCT at the 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and the CTBT, are 
stalemated.  
In this regard, the empirical part makes the case for 
the variation in effectiveness between these two sets of 
cooperative arrangements and, most importantly, back up 
these claims. It is central to support contested claims as 
to why the NPT arrangement is not as effective as other 
similar cooperative endeavors. Examining what makes 
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arrangements work well is crucial and is likely to have 
far-reaching implications, especially when it comes to the 
design of future multilateral treaties, their 
implementation and post-implementation review mechanisms.  
It is advanced that whether an issue has been 
successfully dealt with is the product of the interaction 
of two streams or sources of effectiveness, that is, the 
cognitive ends-mean dimension and the institutional 
(implementation-management) dimension. Specifically, 
cognitive convergence or divergence between problems to be 
tackled and solutions to be pursued, coupled with process-
based institutional frameworks, are two central 
exploratory and explanatory grand variables. Observable 
proxy indicators of cognitive convergence or dissonance 
include, but are not limited to, vocalized and written 
conceptions of problem-to-solution links, as well as 
issue-linkages across a number of representative states, 
individual decision-makers, negotiators and organizations. 
It is claimed that the investigation of linkages between 
problems and solutions, as well as between issues, is a 
way of investigating cognitive dynamics.  
A hypothesis to take into account is that if no 
empirical evidence supports the existence of high degrees 
of mutual knowledge and issue linkages, then the given 
multilateral arrangement will be less likely to be 
effective in the short time and sustainable over time. 
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Operationally, cognitive dynamics are understood as 
comprising the two dimensions of issue-specific knowledge 
and issue area linkages. For example, questions include 
whether observable attempts are being made at making 
relationships and linkages between nuclear security and 
the disarmament-non-proliferation-peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy pillars. What is the status and how is the presence 
of nuclear weapons and materials perceived by states at 
aggregate levels?  
When it comes to defining and measuring effectiveness 
of multilateral frameworks, the dimension of 
implementation-management gains traction and is therefore 
isolated. In nuclear non-proliferation, a recurrent 
concern is the fear of being cheated that can be fueled by 
lack of transparency, distrust and information 
confidentiality. Therefore, monitoring-related factors 
gain the upper spot. The institutional dimension includes, 
but is certainly not limited to, such activities as 
periodic revisions of the operations, other more or less 
routinized activities and awareness-raising efforts, the 
participating actors as well as transparency- and 
confidence-building measures. In addition, a hypothesis to 
test is that the extent to which a given cooperative 
arrangement is effective is correlated to the structure 
and organization of implementation and how progress, or 
lack thereof, is monitored through reporting and similar 
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accountability-related requirements. In other words, the 
degree of institutional effectiveness is contingent on the 
ease with which progress can be monitored. How can 
implementation success be measured?  
In assessing problem-solving effectiveness, a number 
of factors and questions are worth considering. Factors 
include the degree of comprehensiveness in terms of 
actors’ participation in the cooperative program and the 
extent to which that given type of cooperation spurred the 
intended effort. Operationally, what are the objectives 
and key purpose each cooperative effort aims at? What are 
the most visible contributions and drawbacks that a host 
of different activities and initiatives has achieved? How 
have cases of non-compliance been dealt with? Assessing 
the effectiveness of non-proliferation arrangements 
requires a multidimensional and interactive analytical 
framework. The framework should be able to first isolate 
the pathways to effectiveness, which this study 
hypothesizes in operating procedures of implementation and 
post-implementation. Beliefs are operationalized in the 
cognitive dimension as, among other indicators, issue-
linkages. This follows past and recent attempts to 
pinpoint sources of variance across regimes. Practices are 
operationalized in the institutional dimension as, among 
other proxy indicators, implementation review mechanisms. 
Schematically, the following table synthetizes the sources 
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of change by highlighting the dimensions, the specific 
aspects and the propositions that each of the three case 
studies takes into account. 
 
Dimensions Features  Analysis  
Cognitive Stream Issue-linkages What if any are 
relationships/dynamics of 
nuclear security and 
disarmament, non-proliferation, 
peaceful uses, safety and 
safeguards? What if any are 
relationships/dynamics of 
nuclear security and 
development, environment, 
economics? 
   
 Underlying norms Are they widely shared or 
contested? 
 Nascent norms Are there any normative shifts? 
Can they be easily incorporated 
into existing institutional 
structures? 
 Epistemic communities Are there any present? If so, 
who, why, what and how do they 
influence the cooperative 
arrangement? How are they 
perceived officially?  
 Influential actors  Presence or absence of 
influential actors?  
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Institutional Stream Scope What is the objective of the 
arrangement? What specific 
issues are covered? 
 Institutionalization 
level 
What is the nature and content 
of the rules and regulations 
governing the arrangement? 
Formal, informal or a mix? Are 
there periodic meetings? 
 Organizational setup Presence or absence of 
secretariats and support units 
 Membership Who participates and in what 
capacities? Who is out? Is 
insider-outsider relationship 
difficult?  
 Implementation  Actors and tools 
 Post-Implementation 
Review 
Actors and tools. What is the 
quantity and quality of 
reporting? Reporting & 
monitoring  
 
 
Data uncovering cognitive patterns are extrapolated from 
interviews and conversations with key negotiators and 
experts. In order to analyze implementation dynamics, data 
are extrapolated from publicly available reports, official 
government statements and evaluation materials scanned 
through descriptive analysis and within-case process 
tracing.     
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 A general methodological issue that must be clarified 
at the outset relates to the nature of relationships 
between variables under investigation. Considering the 
number of interlocking variables, endogenous and exogenous 
factors that come into play, this study does not attempt 
to uncover causal relationships between cognitive 
convergence and institutional effectiveness or between 
given implementation frameworks and institutional 
effectiveness. Despite the use of terms such as variables, 
measures and operationalization issues, this study claims 
that single-factor relationships in this case cannot be 
proven. It follows that the relationships tested and 
substantiated in this study are modest correlations, not 
real causations.  
 Despite the difficulty of reliably analyzing whether 
and how intangible belief systems have an impact on the 
dependent variable, studies that address cognitive 
dynamics and ideational factors in general have been 
carried out since the 1960s.123 There are four major 
methodological problems that arise when seeking to analyze 
beliefs, and they relate to the fact that the sources for 
establishing beliefs are written and vocalized official 
statements and positions. First, vocalized beliefs may be 
stated in a general manner and may thus leave too much 
																																																						
123	 For	 a	 comprehensive	 discussion	 of	 the	 theoretical	 dimension	 of	 ideational	 factors	 in	 the	 study	 of	
international	politics,	for	methodological	challenges	associated	with	tracing	causality,	as	well	as	for	ways	
to	overcome	the	difficulty	of	analyzing	intangible	factors,	Little	and	Smith	(1988).		
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room for subjective interpretation. Second, vocalized 
beliefs may be deliberately false or may not reflect 
reality. In this regard, messages by government officials 
may be targeted to specific audiences. Third, vocalized 
beliefs may differ from one sector of the government to 
the other, and from one official to the other. Finally, 
dynamics of beliefs and ideas have been studied separately 
as they can happen individually in anybody’s mind or 
within groups. These methodological problems 
notwithstanding, there are some reasons to remain 
confident that an analysis of beliefs can yield 
interesting results quite accurately. A strategy to 
minimize the above methodological challenges is to 
structure and conduct interviews and formulate questions 
that serve to elicit information. This study is carried 
out through expert-level interviewing. Interviews are 
conducted with senior-level government officials from 
different government departments and with negotiators.  
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Chapter III 
 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons  
 
Introduction  
 
Concepts and communicative patterns are extremely 
important in international multilateral settings and 
highly complex issue areas, such as in those existing 
across the nuclear domain. The meaning of words, the 
interactions among them and the cognitive structures of 
meaning espoused by political leaders, diplomats, lawyers, 
generals and other professional groups should never be 
discounted as petty stuff. On the contrary, such 
constantly evolving features are thought to affect the 
rise and evolution of institutionalized cooperation and, 
therefore, should be taken seriously as a matter of 
empirical investigation. Following IR’s socially 
constructivist and legally positivist understandings of 
politics, as much as structure and agents interact to 
produce reality, so too written and verbal communication 
nest inside one another to produce the constraining, 
‘binding’ meaning of reality.124 As this case study shows, 
																																																						
124	 See	 studies	 on	 the	 interactions	 of	 structure	 and	 agent	 by	 Wendt,	 Social	 Theory	 of	 International	
Politics,	1999;	Risse,	“Let’s	Argue:	Communicative	Action	 in	World	Politics,”	 International	Organization	
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interpretation dynamics are highly relevant to 
crosscutting non-proliferation matters, not only within 
the (con)-text of the 1968 NPT, but most notably within 
NPT Review Conferences.  
Historically, the central method of cooperation 
between states for dealing with military-civilian, dual-
use nuclear technology has been through the negotiation of 
agreements and the implementation of ensuing obligations. 
Ideally, negotiated agreements bind their (states) parties 
to pursue common objectives, implement specific courses of 
policy actions and review performance. The NPT is hailed 
as representing the foundations of the international 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is based on a 
fundamental common interest in the security threats posed 
by proliferation and is also the first instance among 
analogous treaty-based approaches to managing and 
regulating “Weapons of Mass Destruction” – i.e., classes 
of weapons deemed so materially destructive and morally 
despicable as to require strengthened oversight and 
verifiable dismantlement, if not outright disarmament 
efforts.125 The 1968 NPT is the evolution of multilateral 
																																																																																																																																																														
54:	1-39;	Müller,	“Arguing,	Bargaining	and	All	That:	Communicative	Action,	Rationalist	Theory	and	the	
Logic	of	Appropriateness,”	European	Journal	of	International	Relations	10:	395-435.	For	a	stock-tacking	
theory	assessment,	Holzscheiter,	“Between	Communicative	Interaction	and	Structures	of	Signification,”	
International	Studies	Perspectives	15:	142-62.			
125	As	is	ultimately	the	case	with	both	the	Biological	and	Chemical	Weapons	Conventions,	entered	into	
force	in	1972	and	1993,	respectively.	Indeed,	while	there	is	an	unambiguous	obligation	to	chemical	and	
biological	disarmament,	this	is	not	the	case	with	the	NPT.	Since	2010,	attempts	to	fill	the	legal	gap	are	in	
resurgence.	Notably,	by	a	vote	of	123	states	in	favor,	38	against	and	16	abstaining,	in	October	2016	the	
First	Committee	of	the	General	Assembly	passed	a	resolution	in	which	it	decided	“to	convene	in	2017	a	
United	 Nations	 conference	 to	 negotiate	 a	 legally	 binding	 instrument	 to	 prohibit	 nuclear	 weapons,	
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efforts undertaken since the first gathering of the U.N. 
General Assembly in 1946 and is centered on tackling 
nuclear problems in the most resolute and holistic manner 
as conceivable at that historical conjuncture.126  
However, in marked contrast with the original master 
plan elaborated in 1946, the NPT’s title runs the risk of 
failing to convey in the minds and in the actions of 
states and other groups the magnitude of its provisions. 
While in the historic U.N. General Assembly Resolution 
1(I) of 1946 “non-proliferation” was understood as the 
complete elimination of all atomic weapons (i.e., 
effective nuclear disarmament), NPT negotiations did 
crystallize this notion into something different, 
controversial and potentially dangerous, which raised and 
continue to raise recurring, deep-seated controversies 
between NPT states parties. By the letter of the NPT, yet 
certainly not by its spirit, ‘non-proliferation’ was meant 
as the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons to all states 
except for a restricted and special group thereof, thereby 
making their possession legal and legitimate in the eyes 
of others, as well as in the eyes of the possessors 
themselves.  
																																																																																																																																																														
leading	 towards	 their	 total	 elimination.”	 See:	
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-
fora/1com/1com16/resolutions/L41.pdf.		
126	 Despite	 being	 one	 of	 the	 world’s	 most	 widely	 ratified	 treaties,	 universality	 ambitions	 are	 heavily	
challenged	by	the	presence	(and	influence)	of	four	nuclear-armed	states	that	are	not	parties	to	the	NPT,	
specifically	India,	Pakistan,	Israel	and	North	Korea.	Repeated	calls	to	NPT	universality	and	attempts	to	let	
the	 four	 remaining	 nuclear	 weapons	 possessor	 states	 join	 the	 NPT	 as	 Non-Nuclear-Weapons	 States	
(NNWS)	are	based	on	idealism	rather	than	on	pragmatism.		
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Even though NPT negotiators had to take into account 
real-world developments that had been occurring across the 
nuclear domain between the start of negotiations in 1961 
and the signing of the treaty in 1968, and specifically 
those ‘crises or external events’ resulting from the 
acquisition of atomic weapons by the Soviet Union in 1949, 
Great Britain in 1952, France in 1960 and China in 1964, 
the argument according to which “context matters” 
nonetheless provides no grounds for the way in which the 
NPT discriminates between two classes of states with 
perceived and real differing and unbalanced rights and 
obligations, which are nowadays being exacerbated by an 
increasing disconnects between text and declaratory 
statements delivered at NPT Review Conferences, on the one 
hand, and context and operative activities, on the other. 
As the first section of this chapter documents, the ‘non-
proliferation’ treaty is intrinsically linked to, and 
cannot be fully understood separately from, nuclear 
‘disarmament’.  
A further point to underline at the outset concerns 
the extent to which the NPT and its arrangement fit into 
the phenomenon under analysis. In other words, how does 
the NPT relate to multilateral nuclear non-proliferation 
cooperation or, conversely, how do new and emergent 
nuclear non-proliferation threats, including terrorism, 
correlate with the NPT context? As a matter of fact, 
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books, journal articles, policy and media accounts, along 
with the conduct, management and actual outcomes of 
multilateral nuclear diplomacy, describe the NPT as 
consisting of a series of negotiated bargains in the 
“three pillars” of ‘non-proliferation’, ‘disarmament’, and 
the ‘peaceful use of nuclear energy’. Further, another 
taken-for-granted point in use by policymakers, scholars, 
experts and the media describes the NPT as ‘the 
cornerstone of the regime for nuclear non-proliferation.’ 
While novel cooperative mechanisms in this field mostly 
relate to non-state proliferation, as is the case for 
example with Security Council Resolution 1540 or with the 
Nuclear Security Summits, the NPT is preeminently 
concerned with state-centered proliferation. What is more, 
there is no explicit reference to nuclear security or 
nuclear terrorism in the treaty’s text, nor any direct 
mentioning thereof in the Statute of the IAEA, the 
foremost organization devoted to the promotion and 
development of peaceful nuclear activities under specific 
monitoring and verification arrangements. 
While some pundits have advanced arguments according 
to which non-state nuclear threats or the issue of nuclear 
security in general should be considered as a “fourth 
pillar” of the NPT-based regime – given also the 
heightened attention on the threats posed by terrorist 
organizations, non-state actors, drones and cyber-attacks 
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–, other observers have argued against this 
interpretation, maintaining that this characterization may 
lead to an even more pronounced polarization among NPT 
parties.127 Still some other experts cogently argue that the 
security of all things nuclear is already by itself the 
essential foundation of, and necessary precondition for, 
the existing NPT’s three-pillar structure.128  
Be as it may, it is here advanced that both the NPT 
and its arrangement made up of recursive implementation 
review exercises in the form of quinquennial NPT Review 
Conferences are extremely relevant to the phenomenon under 
study. In other words, while much has been written about 
the linkages across the three NPT pillars, yet not 
exclusively on ‘non-proliferation’ and ‘disarmament’, what 
has been left unaccounted for is the potential role and 
impact that a transformed, reimagined nuclear non-
proliferation debate can have on NPT dynamics.129 
Specifically, the ways in which novel managerial aspects 
that have emerged from similar cooperative engagements, 
such as the Nuclear Security Summits and the U.N. Security 
Council’s 1540 arrangement, may contribute to the 
																																																						
127	For	sources	arguing	for	the	consideration	of	nuclear	security	as	a	fourth	NPT	pillar,	see	the	report	by	
U.K.	Cabinet	Office,	“The	Road	to	2010:	Addressing	the	Nuclear	Question	in	the	Twenty-First	Century,”	
2009.	 Document	 available	 at:	
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/238560/7675.pdf.	 For	
sources	arguing	against,	 see	“Tacking	Stock	of	 the	NPT:	An	 Interview	with	U.S.	Special	Representative	
Susan	Burk,”	at:	https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_03/Burk.		
128	 Bowen	 and	 Van	 Dassen,	 “Nuclear	 Security	 and	 the	 Three	 Pillars	 of	 the	 NPT:	 Identifying	 a	 Lasting	
Relationship,”	 2014.	 See	 also,	 Bunn,	 “Nuclear	 Security	 is	 the	 Foundations	 for	 the	 Three	 Pillars	 of	 the	
Nonproliferation	Treaty,”	Nuclear	Security	Matters,	2014.			
129	 A	 notable	 recent	 exception	 exists.	 See,	 the	 report	 by	 Choubey,	 “Towards	 Disarmament	 Securely:	
Clarifying	the	Nuclear	Security	and	Disarmament	Link,”	Foreign	Policy	Institute,	2015.		
	 104	 	
consolidation of the NPT itself and to the effectiveness 
of future NPT review cycles is the subject of 
investigation of this chapter.130  
Recently, there has been a healthy debate among 
scholars and nuclear policy practitioners about how 
progress in the NPT should be ‘measured’ and about what 
that progress actually entails.131 However, scant or no 
attention has been paid so far to intra-NPT 
characteristics under which this improvement can come 
about. These endogenous features – potentially conducive 
to better performing institutional practices – are, for 
example, treaty review conferences, implementation 
monitoring arrangements, as well as recursive reporting. 
It is on those unique, yet periodic, occasions that 
concepts and communicative patterns take pride of place 
and evolve.  
As a consequence, a critical analysis of the 
negotiations that led to the signature of the NPT in 1968 
and its prompt operative beginning, entry into force in 
1970, as well as an evaluation of its cyclical Review 
Conferences can shed new lights on procedural and 
substantive stumbling blocks and stepping-stones to 
																																																						
130	 These	 are,	 for	 example,	 the	 establishments	 of	 regional	 and	 national	 ‘contact	 groups’	 or	 ‘points	 of	
contact’	 along	 with	 several	 knowledge	 and	 capacity-building	 activities,	 such	 as	 the	 ‘centers	 of	
excellence’	 initiatives,	 coupled	with	 the	experimentation	of	alternative	 interactive	processes	aimed	at	
reaching	 consensus.	 These	 endogenous	 transformations	 are	 evidence	 of	 new	multilateral	 governance	
approaches	being	pursued	across	one	of	the	most	sensitive	political	domains	in	existence.	
131	Several	studies	by	NGOs	and	university-affiliated	research	centers	attempt	to	gauge	progress,	or	lack	
thereof,	 in	 NPT	 implementation.	 Chief	 among	 them	 are	 periodic	 reports	 issued	 by	 the	 Center	 for	
Nonproliferation	Studies,	the	Arms	Control	Association	and	Reaching	Critical	Will.		
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effective and sustainable nuclear multilateralism. By 
relying on primary sources and authoritative written 
accounts of the NPT,132 as well as by drawing upon my 
personal exposure to multilateral nuclear diplomacy, 
particularly the momentous133 2012 Preparatory Committee 
meetings at the IAEA for the 2015 NPT’s Review Conference, 
as well as numerous conferences and seminars on NPT-
related issues over the years,134 this chapter focuses on 
the treaty’s formation and explores its evolution. It 
unfolds into four sections.  
The first section gives a brief review of the early, 
pre-NPT approaches to non-proliferation, the treaty’s 
negotiating history and, by also taking into account 
organizational and IAEA matters, provides a critical 
reflection on the major developments in the nuclear non-
proliferation domain that led to the NPT and its entry 
into force in 1970. While a lot of in-depth analyses have 
scrutinized the origins of the NPT, there still is a 
																																																						
132	 See	 the	 three-volume	 study	 by	 Shaker,	 The	 Nuclear	 Non-Proliferation	 Treaty:	 Origins	 and	
Implementation,	 1959-1979	 available	 online	 at:	 http://www.nonproliferation.org/the-nuclear-non-
proliferation-treaty-origins-and-implementation-1959-1979/.	See	also	 the	 legal	 inquiry	by	Willrich,	The	
Non-Proliferation	Treaty:	Framework	for	Nuclear	Arms	Control,	1969.	In	addition,	Dhanapala	with	Rydell,	
Multilateral	 Diplomacy	 and	 the	 NPT:	 An	 Insider’s	 Account,	 provides	 additional	 primary	 information.	
Johnson,	 director	 of	 the	 Acronym	 Institute	 for	 Disarmament	 Diplomacy,	 and	 several	 other	 reporters	
provide	regular	and	comprehensive	assessments.		
133	It	was	indeed	a	momentous	time	in	NPT	history,	as	16	states,	led	by	Norway	and	Switzerland,	issued	
the	first	joint	statement	on	the	humanitarian	dimension	of	nuclear	disarmament,	calling	on	NPT’s	NWS	
“to	 give	 increasing	 attention	 to	 their	 commitment	 to	 comply	with	 international	 law	and	 international	
humanitarian	 law”	and	calling	on	all	 “[NPT]	 states	 to	 intensify	efforts	 to	outlaw	nuclear	weapons	and	
achieve	 a	 world	 without	 nuclear	 weapons.”	 This	 led	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	 movement	 led	 by	 an	
overwhelming	majority	of	NPT’s	states	parties	(over	110	states)	to	ban	nuclear	weapons	and,	ultimately,	
to	the	2017	nuclear	ban	treaty	negotiations.		
134	 In	 particular,	 the	 four	 International	 Nuclear	 Policy	 Conferences	 organized	 by	 the	 Carnegie	
Endowment	for	 International	Peace	between	2011	and	2017	as	well	as	the	 ISODARCO	Winter	Courses	
organized	by	the	Italian	Pugwash	Group	in	2011,	2014	and	2015.		
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paucity of studies dealing with the treaty’s review 
process, its organization and management. The second 
section seeks to remedy this shortcoming and, thus, shifts 
focus from the establishment to the implementation review 
stage. In particular, it delves into an examination of the 
NPT’s review process, and looks at its modus operandi, 
objectives and tasks. The third section looks at the 1995 
and 2000 Review Conferences, a period that can be duly 
described as a ‘non-proliferation’ renaissance and in 
which significant intra-regime and intra-NPT 
modernizations were brought about. The fourth section 
examines the Review Conferences held in 2005, 2010 and 
2015 by taking into account both procedural and 
substantive developments. Finally, the conclusion 
evaluates the findings in light of the explanatory factors 
that cooperation theories and regime approaches consider 
as having the most impact on institutional effectiveness.  
 
Crafting nuclear non-proliferation: early approaches on 
the path to the treaty  
 
Though the first resolution of the first session of the 
U.N. General Assembly in 1946 is widely considered to be 
the first example of common action on nuclear 
proliferation, the Declaration on Nuclear Energy of 
November 1945 issued by the U.S., Canada and the U.K., as 
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the world’s holders of nuclear knowledge and masters of 
atomic energy of the time, can be regarded as the earliest 
manifestation of nuclear multilateralism and direct 
forerunner to General Assembly Resolution 1(I).135 Indeed, 
the latter heavily borrows from the language contained in 
the tripartite document, in particular when it comes to 
stressing the need of working together in the development 
of atomic energy and in the elimination of nuclear 
weapons. 
As such, a basic truth under the guise of a complex 
dilemma was realized right at the dawn of the nuclear age. 
The seemingly intractable problem consists in the 
recognition of the supposedly unbreakable overlap between 
peaceful and military applications of atomic power and in 
the ensuing challenges of drawing boundaries between the 
two. It was and still to this day is extremely difficult 
to firewall commercial nuclear technologies from military 
technologies. Most crucially, it is extremely challenging 
to verify that these technologies are not diverted to 
undeclared and potentially malicious purposes.136  
Recently, following documented cases of non-
compliance with nuclear safeguards agreements by NPT’s 
NNWS, including in the context of the longstanding, 
																																																						
135	 The	 text	 of	 the	 1945	 Declaration	 is	 available	 at:	 http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-
issues/nuclear-energy/history/dec-truma-atlee-king_1945-11-15.htm.	 The	 text	 of	 the	 first-ever	 UN	
General	 Assembly	 Resolution	 of	 1946	 is	 available	 at:	
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/1/ares1.htm.		
136	 For	example,	 the	 same	gas	 centrifuge	used	 to	enrich	uranium	 for	nuclear	 fuel	used	 in	 commercial	
reactors	can	also	be	used	to	enrich	to	weapons-grade	uranium.		
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decade-long controversy related to the possible military 
dimensions of the Iranian nuclear program as well as in 
the context of the 2015 JCPOA negotiated by Iran, the 
permanent members of the Security Council and NPT-
sanctioned NWS, along with Germany and the European Union, 
outstanding puzzles and shortcomings related to the 
interpretation and application of the NPT need to be 
clearly spelled out. For example, the NPT is silent on 
science and technology, uranium enrichment and plutonium 
reprocessing, research and development, as well as on a 
string of dual-use applications of nuclear energy. So far, 
the Preparatory Meetings of NPT States Parties and the 
Review Conferences themselves have not approached these 
NPT-based deficiencies heads-on, and most of problem-
solving efforts in these areas have occurred outside the 
NPT framework.   
One of the earliest and most remarkable steps taken 
in the con-text of ‘non-proliferation’ comes from the 
Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, the 
so-called Acheson-Lilienthal Report of March 1946.137 As the 
Report indicates, nuclear technology was seen as 
fundamentally interchangeable and interdependent. Notably, 
the Report is one the first historical in-depth analyses 
dwelling on nuclear secrecy – the U.S. was at the time of 
																																																						
137	The	Report	is	often	referred	to	as	the	Baruch	Plan,	named	after	an	American	businessman	from	Wall	
Street	who	was	appointed	by	U.S.	President	Truman	as	delegate	to	the	U.N.	Atomic	Energy	Commission.	
The	full	report	is	available	at:	http://www.atomicheritage.org/key-documents/acheson-lilienthal-report.		
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the report, yet for just a short period of time, the 
single possessor of nuclear weapons. It maintained that 
the only sure way to approach the double-edge sword of 
atomic energy was to have an international oversight and 
verification arrangement. In short, multilateral 
cooperation was necessary to prevent any potential misuse.  
Envisaging what will become the key strategic 
approach preached and practiced by the U.S. and the West 
in the Cold War, so too nuclear matters followed at the 
very beginning a strategy of containment. Despite calls 
for the internationalization of all nuclear-related 
activities, in the immediate aftermath of the Second World 
War, U.S. non-proliferation policy was straightforward: 
the objective was to stop, yet not reverse, the 
dissemination of nuclear weapons and related dual-use 
technology through the use and application of national 
technical means of control. As time went by, especially 
after the shocks brought by the crossing of the nuclear 
Rubicon by the Soviet Union in 1949, the U.S. acknowledged 
that the policy of nuclear containment was backfiring, 
particularly so in light of new competitive dynamics 
between the Western and the Eastern blocs and between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union.  
A year after the (successful) nuclear testing by the 
U.K., in 1953 the U.S. reversed the overall approach to 
non-proliferation and launched the “Atoms for Peace” 
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initiative in order to spread atomic technology worldwide. 
The U.S. motivated this choice as a combination of 
idealism based on the potential benefits of nuclear energy 
as a limitless source of energy and on political 
calculations to use (nuclear) science and technology to 
increase a competitive edge.138 Specifically, this non-
proliferation policy turnaround originates from U.S. 
President Eisenhower’s address to the eight session of the 
General Assembly in December 1953, at a time when the 
nuclear arms race was getting into full swing. His “Atoms-
for-Peace” speech represented a compromise between the two 
extremes of nuclear secrecy and autarchy, on the one side, 
and nuclear openness and multilateralism, on the other 
side. One of the most remarkable innovations in 
Eisenhower’s proposal concerns the creation of an U.N.-
centered international organization that would facilitate 
the spread of peaceful nuclear technology under some sort 
of monitoring and verification arrangements. As such, 
while paving the way for U.S. leadership over worldwide 
transactions and laying the groundwork for the creation of 
the IAEA in 1957 and the NPT as well, the 1953’s Atoms-
for-Peace initiative contributed not only to additional 
proliferation, but also to the build-up of modern-day non-
proliferation architecture. As the introduction by 
																																																						
138	See,	for	example,	the	Policy	Roundtables	of	the	IAEA	Statute	at	Sixty	organized	by	the	International	
Security	Studies	Forum	at:	https://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-3-iaea.	See	also	Goldschimdt,	The	
Atomic	Complex,	1982.	By	the	same	author,	who	had	also	been	the	French	delegate	at	 the	 IAEA	from	
1957	 to	 1980,	 see	 “When	 the	 IAEA	 was	 born.”	 Document	 available	 at:	
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/magazines/bulletin/bull48-1/48101280610.pdf.		
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Röhrlich to the International Security Studies Forum’s 
Roundtable to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the 
IAEA Statute elucidates, “To this day, historians are 
divided on whether Atoms for Peace was merely an act of 
Cold-War propaganda or an honest attempt to reduce the 
nuclear threat.”139 Most likely, the allure of the proposal 
and the actual large buy-in it enjoyed by states, 
including the Soviet Union, lies in both explanations.   
It is within the framework built around U.S. 
President Eisenhower’s proposal that the IAEA was 
conceived. After three years of multi-party negotiations 
within a selected and small group of states over its 
Statute and ever since its establishment in 1957, the IAEA 
assists its member states and national authorities with 
research and development in nuclear energy by fostering 
the exchange of scientific and technical information and 
by offering sector-specific training.140 In addition, the 
tasks of the IAEA include making (binding and non-legally 
binding) provisions for nuclear materials, equipment and 
associated installations and, with the entry into force of 
the NPT in 1970, the U.N.-specialized Agency administers 
so-called “safeguards” or special controls designed to 
ensure that materials, equipment and associated 
technologies, such as uranium enrichment and plutonium 
																																																						
139	See	https://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-3-iaea#_Toc467064763,	no	page	number	is	given.		
140	 Less	appreciated	peaceful	applications	are	geared	 toward	 the	protection	of	human	health	and	 the	
environment,	water	sanitation,	the	fight	against	cancer	and	several	other	industrial	and	agriculture	uses.	
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reprocessing, are not used in such a way as to further 
undeclared, potentially military purposes. Compounding 
matters, it is to note that there are IAEA member states 
that are non-NPT parties, that possess nuclear weapons 
(enjoying virtual NPT’s NWS status) and that sometimes are 
in a position to reportedly influence deliberations in 
NPT-related settings.141  
A related question worth pondering is the extent to 
which a technical organization, such as the IAEA, 
interacts with a political product, such as the NPT. 
Practically, the IAEA contributes a great deal to the 
implementation of a number of, yet not all, NPT 
obligations. However, the IAEA should not be conflated 
with the NPT. In contrast with similar implementation 
review arrangements in operation in the chemical and 
biological fields, the IAEA is not a proper NPT-focused 
implementation monitoring and verification organization. 
For example, while the NPT deals with both civilian and 
military aspects of nuclear weapons, the IAEA’s remit and 
expertise does not cover weapons dismantlement and 
disarmament. Nowhere in Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” 
speech and nowhere in the IAEA Statute is nuclear 
disarmament or, for that matter, nuclear security, 
																																																						
141	 An	 example	 is	 that	 almost	 the	 entirety	 of	 expert	 accounts	 concerning	 the	 2015	 NPT	 Review	
Conference	attributes	its	failure	to	reach	consensus	agreement	on	a	Final	Document	over,	among	other	
factors,	the	close	ties	between	the	U.S.	and	Israel,	a	non-NPT	state	party	possessing	nuclear	weapons.		
See,	for	example,	Rauf,	“Assessing	the	2015	NPT	Review	Conference,”	in	Reflections	on	the	Treaty	on	the	
Non-Proliferation	of	Nuclear	Weapons,	2016,	206.	See	also	Baklitskiy,	“The	2015	NPT	Review	Conference	
and	the	Future	of	the	Nonproliferation	Regime,”	Arms	Control	Today,	2015.		
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explicitly emphasized. While in the 1940s proposals were 
put forth that aimed at the direct abolition of nuclear 
weapons, in the 1950s and 1960s the non-proliferation 
approach followed a different, indirect course of action. 
As such, Eisenhower’s speech and, relatedly, the 
establishment of the IAEA can be at best regarded as an 
indirect, if at all genuinely existent, approach to 
nuclear disarmament through the development and sharing of 
‘peaceful’ nuclear technology.  
Contrary to the original 1946 master plan, the 
international community opted to follow a dual-track 
strategy, which demarcated efforts aimed at limiting the 
wider and deeper proliferation of nuclear weapons from 
efforts aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament. This is 
evidenced in the creation of a specially-designated 
multilateral disarmament arrangement, that is, the Ten-
Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1960, which preceded 
the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) in 
operation from 1962 to 1969 and within which multilateral 
treaties such as the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and, 
puzzlingly enough, the NPT were negotiated, and the 
contemporary Conference on Disarmament, established in 
1979. Yet, similar to General Assembly Resolution 1(I), it 
was not only recognized that the methods with which to 
pursue non-proliferation and disarmament objectives were 
cooperative in nature, but also that an institutional 
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framework fostering control and cooperation on 
implementation was a needed and necessary component.  
The first known iteration of a proposal for a treaty-
based approach dates to 1959 when Ireland tabled a 
resolution to the U.N. General Assembly titled “Prevention 
of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.”142 Notably, 
by following the text of the resolution, the General 
Assembly was “convinced” that consideration of the dangers 
posed by proliferation was “appropriate within the 
framework of deliberations on disarmament.” As a 
consequence, paragraph 1 “suggested that the Ten-Nation 
Disarmament Committee should consider appropriate means 
whereby this danger may be averted, including the 
feasibility of an international agreement, subject to 
inspection and control, whereby the Powers producing 
nuclear weapons would refrain from handing over the 
control of such weapons to any nation not possessing them 
and whereby the Powers not possessing such weapons would 
refrain from manufacturing them.”143   
Two years later in 1961, another Irish resolution 
carrying the same title was unanimously adopted at the 
U.N. General Assembly.144 This time, a treaty-based approach 
in the form of an agreement under some sort of inspection 
																																																						
142	 See,	 General	 Assembly	 Resolution	 A/RES/1380(XIV).	 Document	 available	 at:	
http://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/14.			
143	 General	 Assembly	 Resolution	 A/RES/1380(XIV).	 Document	 available	 at:	
http://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/14.			
144	 General	 Assembly	 Resolution	 A/RES/1665(XVI).	 Document	 retrievable	 at:	
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1665(XVI).		
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and verification arrangement, whereby the nuclear-armed 
would refrain from providing nuclear weapons to the non-
nuclear-armed, was considered a necessity. The Irish-
sponsored resolution of 1961 represents the genesis of 
what will become the NPT. Further, in the same year, 
following the conclusion of the McCloy-Zorin accord 
between the U.S. and the USSR, the ENDC was established, 
with both superpowers chairing its meetings and 
deliberations.  
Notably, the transition from the Ten-Nation to the 
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee as a negotiating 
forum was dictated by the need to seek to break the 
decisional impasse caused by the fact that the structure 
of the former venue was composed of five Western states 
belonging to NATO and five Eastern states belonging to the 
Warsaw Pact, thereby making it complicated to reach common 
views and advance the nuclear agenda, as each bloc had 
opposed long-term objectives and short-term interests. As 
such, in 1962 membership in the ENDC was enlarged to 
encompass eight so-called and remarkably so still to this 
day “non-aligned” countries, including Brazil, Egypt, 
India and Sweden. While the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
progressively learned that they had a significant 
overlapping interest in halting proliferation to 
additional states, the non-aligned countries had different 
objectives in mind. For example, they sought to spur 
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discussion related to a test ban of atomic bombs 
(partially reached a year later with the 1963 Partial or 
Limited Test Ban Treaty), as well as those related to a 
treaty aimed at stopping the production of weapons-grade 
materials.145 Both these noble objectives are still in 
limbo. Not only is the 1996 CTBT not yet in force, but 
also are FMCT negotiations.  
In addition, the creation of the ENDC meant that an 
increased and more diffuse interest across the membership 
of the U.N. was materializing. However, as Shaker and 
Johnson, the text was to a great extent the result of 
negotiations conducted bilaterally between the U.S. and 
the USSR.146 Consequently, the NPT text as such is skewed 
toward the preservation of the privileges of the so-called 
five legally recognized NPT’s NWS. The final version of 
the NPT came to a compromise in which the five countries, 
which at the time possessed nuclear weapons, would sign as 
NWS and be allowed to keep their arsenals, while the rest 
of the world would sign as NNWS. NPT’s Article IX solemnly 
declares that no other countries will be allowed to join 
the NPT as NWS, thereby permanently capping the number of 
NWS at five. In essence, in the establishment phase of the 
NPT regime the self-interest of the two most influential 
																																																						
145	Potter	and	Mukhatzhanova,	Nuclear	Politics	and	the	Non-Aligned	Movement,	2012,	40-2.	For	article-
length	overviews	of	the	negotiating	history	of	the	NPT,	see	Bunn,	“The	Nuclear	Nonproliferation	Treaty:	
History	 and	 Current	 Problems,”	 Arms	 Control	 Today,	 available	 at:	
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/Bunn.	See	also,	Bourantonis,	 “The	Negotiation	of	 the	Non-
Proliferation	Treaty”	International	History	Review	19(2):	347-57.			
146	See,	Shaker,	82.	See	also	Johnson,	“The	NPT	and	Early	Review	Conferences,”	Acronym	Report	3.		
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stakeholders, as well as the traction exercised by them 
over other parties in NPT negotiations, prevailed over 
normative considerations based on disarmament aspirations. 
While the majority if not the entirety of the 
historical accounts of the NPT negotiations that have been 
consulted fail to consider issues surrounding the 
negotiations of the title of the treaty, it can be 
reasonably argued that the title offers the strongest 
evidence of its core objective. In other words, the 
central issue at stake was non-proliferation, not 
disarmament. Semantics and the language of the short NPT 
text – composed of 12 preambular paragraphs and 11 
articles – lend support to this view. NPT’s Article I 
requires NWS not “to transfer to any recipient whatsoever” 
and not “in any way to assist” any NNWS “to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire” nuclear weapons. Likewise, Article II 
makes clear that NNWS cannot “receive the transfer from 
any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or of control 
over such weapons directly or indirectly,” “manufacture or 
otherwise acquire” such devices or “receive any assistance 
in their manufacture.” Similarly, Article III uses 
explicit language with regard to nuclear safeguards and 
controls exercised by the IAEA over the nuclear activities 
of NNWS, using unequivocal terms such as “shall, 
“undertake,” or “require.” Compare this sharp use of 
semantics with NPT’s Articles IV and VI. NPT’s Article IV 
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proclaims “all parties undertake to facilitate, and have 
the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange 
of equipment, materials and scientific and technological 
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also 
co-operate in contributing alone or together with other 
States or international organizations to the further 
development of the applications of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of 
the developing areas of the world.” The term “facilitate” 
is clearly far weaker than the term “shall”. Moreover, as 
much as the terminology “fullest possible” is rather vague 
and unclear as to what is actually in the realm of 
“possibilities”, “due consideration for the needs” of the 
developing world is equally nebulous. Article VI calls on 
all parties “to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to the cessation of the 
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international 
control.” “Pursue negotiations,” “effective measures,” “at 
an early date” as well as “in good faith” are all elusive 
modes of expression, unlike language such as “shall 
conclude agreements by” a given date or language spelling 
out precisely what effective measures are or, even better, 
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what effective measures should look like.147 In essence, 
contrary to the non-proliferation articles I and II, the 
peaceful nuclear energy and disarmament articles IV and 
VI, respectively, contain substantial ambiguity, which 
only exacerbated animosity between NPT states and made the 
peaceful resolution of nuclear conflicts even more 
challenging to achieve.  
Besides Article VII, which enshrines the right of any 
group of states to conclude regional treaties to assure 
the absence of nuclear weapons in their respective 
territories (nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties), the 
remaining articles are not substantive in nature, as they 
deal with procedural matters. In this regard, the most 
interesting provisions on which the next two sections will 
dwell are contained in Article VIII and X. Although the 
nature of these two latter articles is bureaucratic, at a 
closer look they both establish a link between non-
proliferation and disarmament obligations. Article VIII, 
paragraph 3, provided for a Conference of (States) Parties 
to the Treaty to be held in Geneva “in order to review the 
operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the 
purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty 
are being realized.”  
Notably, further strengthening the non-proliferation–
disarmament link is softly evidenced in the provision of 
																																																						
147	 The	 text	 of	 the	 NPT	 can	 be	 found	 online	 at:	
https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/treaties/npt.		
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having the Review Conference take place in Geneva where 
multilateral disarmament matters were and are 
conventionally discussed and negotiated. Article X set the 
NPT’s duration at 25 years, with a further decision to be 
taken to determine for how long it should be extended. 
According to Dhanapala and others, this latter provision 
was strongly advocated by West Germany and Italy along 
with several other non-nuclear-armed, yet technologically 
advanced, states which were not only skeptical about the 
efficacy of the NPT regime in halting proliferation, but 
also did not want to tie their hands ad infinitum if 
others were to develop weapons capabilities with 
impunity.148  
Likewise, article VIII should also be viewed under a 
similar perspective. In other words, as noted by Ozga in 
one of the very few studies in existence on the NPT review 
process, and specifically on the history of Article VIII, 
“the [1975] Review Conference was strongly yet not 
exclusively linked with providing assurances on compliance 
with NPT’s disarmament obligations,”149 as mandated in both 
the Preamble and in Article VI of the NPT. In addition, 
																																																						
148	 See,	 Dhanapala,	 “Planning	 for	 the	 2010	 NPT	 Review	 Conference:	 A	 Practitioner’s	 overview,”	 in.	
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the concept of treaty reviews and the possibility 
envisioned in the text of the treaty of having periodic 
exercises was a distinctive innovation. Article VIII was 
not only meant to help ease the imbalance between the 
majority of states parties who had to do something right 
away, i.e. accept IAEA safeguards and inspections to prove 
non-proliferation, and the small minority who made a 
rather abstract and long-term promise to disarmament, but 
also was designed to present a way for the majority of 
states to see how the NPT was operating, express 
themselves on what they found and produce joint 
recommendations for action.  
In spite of its unambiguous title, the NPT would have 
not entered in force in 1970 if preambular references and 
treaty-text provisions related to civilian energy 
cooperation and nuclear disarmament were not included and 
given apparent equal status. The (winning) narrative of 
the NPT’s three-pillar structure of non-proliferation, 
disarmament and peaceful uses was thus born. However, as 
we shall see next, matters of interpretation are not 
static but constantly moving, thereby ultimately affecting 
implementation trajectories. With this in mind, the next 
section evaluates the status and development of 
implementation as evidenced in the Review Conferences that 
have been held, as a matter of practice, every five years 
since the first NPT Review Conference in 1975.  
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Implementation review process: Review Conferences in the 
first age of the NPT, 1975-1990  
 
While a considerable number of studies exist on the 
origins and history of the NPT, there still are few 
dealing with the NPT review process, its management and 
evolution. After analyzing key features of the institution 
of treaty review conferences, this section delves into an 
examination of the NPT’s implementation review process and 
looks at its modus operandi from the first NPT Review 
Conference, held in Geneva in 1975, to the most recent 
one, held in New York in 2015. In doing so, an analytical 
line is drawn to separate what can be called a first era 
of NPT implementation (1975-1995) from a second age (1995-
2015).  
 In international public law, review conferences of 
agreements are to be distinguished from those diplomatic 
events devoted to amend specific treaty provisions. While 
the latter are negotiations to revise or adjust treaty 
provisions and need specific, enhanced decision-making 
quorums in order for amendments to pass, the former 
institution deals with interpretation and implementation 
review matters.150 The two are thus distinct phenomena and 
the text of the NPT makes this evident. Indeed, while the 
first two paragraphs of NPT’s Article VIII relate to 
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	 123	 	
amendment procedures, paragraph 3 is about actual review 
conferences. 
 Historically, the first-ever post-World War II 
agreement to provide for periodic meetings of (states) 
parties is the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which also includes 
provisions prohibiting nuclear testing and the disposal of 
radioactive wastes in the territory of Antarctica, and the 
first-ever such conference took place in 1961. In one of 
the few studies on NPT Review Conferences, Sanders notes 
that the innovative idea of holding periodic conferences 
to review what and how states parties were performing 
arose in connection with the NPT.151 However, Antarctic 
Treaty-based conferences actually predate the adoption and 
even the genesis of the NPT. To be sure, in contrast with 
NPT-based provisions, Antarctic Treaty conferences are 
hybrids in the sense that they can not only be used to 
review implementation, but also to amend provisions. What 
is more, while states parties to the Antarctic Treaty have 
established an ad-hoc Secretariat with the aim of 
supporting the smooth conduct of meetings, facilitating 
communication and disseminating information, no such thing 
exists in the NPT. The U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs 
based in New York and its recently-established Vienna-
based Office, as well as the IAEA Secretariat do provide 
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similar services, but technically speaking are not 
implementation review bodies.  
NPT Review Conferences are therefore the only 
monitoring mechanisms in existence. Reports in the form of 
Final Documents produced at such month-long diplomatic 
gathering are the simplest and most straightforward way to 
gauge non-proliferation and disarmament progress or lack 
thereof. The IAEA cannot be truly considered the NPT 
monitoring organization for a straightforward reason: it 
cannot provide for a cradle-to-grave coverage against the 
full spectrum of potential cases of non-compliance with 
NPT provisions. As paradoxical as it may sound, while the 
primary objective of the NPT is the prevention of the 
spread of nuclear weapons, the primary objective of the 
IAEA is to promote peaceful applications of nuclear 
energy. For these reasons, it cannot properly oversee the 
implementation of the NPT. A full-fledged, standing 
bureaucracy does not serve NPT Review Conferences. Each is 
to be organized on an ad-hoc basis. As each NPT Final 
Documents or Declarations attests, the first procedural 
step is the acquisition of a resolution by the General 
Assembly requesting the Secretariat to provide 
administrative and logistical services for the proposed 
event. States parties then arrange for the meetings of a 
Preparatory Committee to set timelines, draft a 
provisional agenda and rules of procedures, recommend a 
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structure, nominate a president and other members of the 
bureau, including the Chairpersons of the Main Committees.  
In contrast with amendment conferences, there are no 
prescribed rules for the adoption of decisions at review 
conferences. Decisions are customarily adopted by 
consensus, which is sometimes not the same as the approval 
of decisions by unanimity. As regards issues of substance, 
“every effort should be made to reach agreement by means 
of consensus.”152 Even though it is usually thought that 
procedural matters are less important and less challenged 
than those related to substance, as also evidenced in the 
different voting system, sometimes procedures have acted 
as stumbling blocks to the achievement of conference 
outcomes. Therefore, producers including elected personnel 
and associated personalities matter as they could act as 
driving forces for either successful or unsuccessful 
conference outcomes.  
Another observation regarding the organization of 
diplomatic gatherings concerns the nature of the documents 
that may be adopted. Review conferences usually end up 
with the adoption of a Final Document or Declaration that 
state, article by article or in a thematic fashion, the 
conference’s conclusions on the operations of the 
agreement under review. Consensus based final declarations 
have not always been possible to achieve. Even though such 
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declarations are not legally binding per se, they 
certainly possess juridical importance, particularly as a 
source of interpretations of a treaty. Their legal import 
is suggested by Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which lists a number of 
factors that need to be considered in treaty 
interpretation: “(a) any subsequent agreement between the 
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice 
in the application of the treaty which established the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”153 
Notably, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
accords a higher status to subsequent agreements and 
diplomatic practice than to the “preparatory work” and 
negotiating history, which is considered, under Article 
32, a “supplementary means of interpretation.”  
 Moving on to focus on the NPT arrangement, no guidance 
is provided in the text of the treaty as to how review 
conferences should unfold. Article VIII provides for one 
single of such evaluation exercises after five years of 
the treaty’s entry into force. Paragraph 3 declares “At 
intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the 
Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal 
to this effect to the Depositary Governments [the U.S., 
the USSR/Russia, and the U.K.] the convening of further 
																																																						
153	 Vienna	 Convention	 on	 the	 Law	 of	 Treaties,	 available	 at:	
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	 127	 	
conferences with the same objective of reviewing the 
operation of the Treaty.” It is coincidental that the NPT 
unleashed its binding effects in 1970, thereby making the 
treaty-mandated Review Conference take place in 1975 and, 
as a matter of ongoing diplomatic practice, every five 
years thereafter.  
 Notably, the NPT’s duration was limited to 25 years. 
1995 was not only to “review the operation of the Treaty,” 
but most importantly to “decide whether the Treaty shall 
continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an 
additional fixed period or periods.” Therefore, the 1995 
event acquires special meaning and unique political and 
legal significance for the regime and, as we shall see, 
for the review process itself. Before that time, the 
monitoring and implementation review process was at best 
unstructured and at worst non-existent. Surely, before 
then the preparatory work was not institutionalized.  
The first NPT Review Conference was preceded by three 
sessions of the Preparatory Committee held in Geneva to 
devise an agenda, make technical arrangements and decide 
on rules of procedure. This latter task proved to be the 
most divisive in the negotiations between the two classes 
of states parties. While non-nuclear-armed states wanted 
the Review Conference to reach decisions by majority 
voting on procedural matters and by two-thirds majority 
voting on substantive issues, the three nuclear weapons 
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states (the U.S., the USSR and the U.K.) wanted consensus 
and no voting. At the end, according to common practice 
followed in other treaties, a compromise was found 
according to which every effort should be made toward 
achieving consensus (not unanimity). Resort to voting 
would be allowed as last resort.  
By the time the first NPT Review Conference kicked 
off, there were 91 states parties. However, only 57 were 
in attendance, with surprisingly only one Foreign Minister 
as state representative, that of Canada. Notably, three 
nuclear-armed states, France, China and India, plus 
Pakistan, were the most important non-signatory states not 
to attend. There were two main committees to review the 
operations of the NPT and to prepare proposals, which 
would be then assembled together by a Drafting Committee 
for potential approval of a Final Document. Committee I 
was assigned to review implementation of the provisions 
relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
disarmament, while Committee II was tasked to do the same 
with respect to the issue of peaceful applications of 
nuclear energy. A consensus-based Final Document proved 
impossible to negotiate because of disagreement on every 
issue of substance. Major areas of controversy related to 
the interpretation of Article VI and nuclear disarmament, 
the ending of nuclear tests and the nuclear arms race and, 
correspondingly, to appropriate language over a CTBT. 
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Despite unbridgeable divergences in the interests and 
power relationships among the parties and coalitions 
thereof, the President of the Review Conference (Swedish 
diplomat Thorsson) circulated her own draft, reaffirming 
the support of all parties for the NPT as the cornerstone 
of international peace and security and reflecting their 
agreement on the vital objective of averting the further 
spread of nuclear weapons. Remarkably, because of non-
material qualities epitomized by the assertive personality 
and strong leadership of the Swedish President, a Final 
Document was eventually adopted in 1975.154 That Final 
Document was not generated through genuine negotiations, 
but rather the President of the Conference by and large 
forced it. It however set the precedent for future NPT 
Review Conferences to produce documents detailing measures 
to further the NPT.  
On the issue of Final Documents, it is to note that 
according to conventional wisdom, Review Conferences are 
assessed as successful if a Final Document ultimately gets 
approved. Likewise, if a Conference fails to do so, it is 
considered a fiasco. Should then 1975 or for that matter 
any other Review Conference judged as a success? The 
answer is no. Generally, this evaluative metric is 
insufficient. Historical evidence shows that there have 
been positive outcomes when no Final Document was approved 
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and, correspondingly, that there have been rather meager 
results when a consensus Final Document was adopted. An 
example of the former could be the 1995 NPT Review 
Conference and an example of the latter could indeed be 
1975. However, 1995 represents a case in its own right and 
might not be considered as appropriate or representative. 
Others can however be advanced. For instance, while the 
most recent 2015 Review Conference ended “in failure”, 
states parties and specifically the NWS were able to work 
on and complete a first edition of a glossary of key 
nuclear terms that could ideally form the basis for future 
multilateral, 5-plus nuclear disarmament negotiations. 
This is no small step. On the contrary, the 2010 NPT 
Review Conference was heralded as a striking success with 
the adoption of a consensus report and a further agreement 
on a 64-point NPT Implementation Action Plan, identifying 
steps states should take across the three pillars of the 
NPT to advance its goals. However, more than five years 
into its adoption, states have not followed through its 
prescriptions and, according to an overwhelming majority 
of views, the NPT’s Action Plan cannot be considered 
adequately implemented. Notwithstanding the above, whether 
or not a Review Conference ends with a Final Document 
still goes a long way to explain the status across the 
non-proliferation domain.  
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As noted by Epstein with reference to the 1975 Review 
Conference and the Final Document in particular, “It is 
doubtful whether the final declaration will do anything to 
help the NPT survive. It contains nothing that could 
provide any incentive to the near-nuclear holdouts to give 
up their option to go nuclear. On the contrary, it can 
provide arguments and pretexts for them to go nuclear.”155 
However, the lesson was that by the time of the first 
Conference a precedent was set by which, in cases of 
stalemate on seemingly intractable issues, possible 
institutional, organizational and decisional remedies to 
break the impasse and save a Review Conference from 
failure could be experimented by its President and 
associated collaborators, including the Chairpersons of 
Main Committees and the Chairperson of the final session 
of the Preparatory Committee.   
Five years later, the second Review Conference took 
place in Geneva, the global capital of multilateral 
(nuclear) disarmament negotiations. Apart from a 
membership increase from 91 to 112 states parties to the 
NPT, of which 75 actually participated, nothing much was 
to be observed during the diplomatic gathering. As in 
1975, major rifts between the parties concerned the 
disparities in the implementation of NPT obligations, 
those related to safeguarding nuclear technologies and 
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those related to Article VI and nuclear disarmament. As 
noted by a former SIPRI director and direct observer to 
the 1980 Conference, “my general impression of the Review 
Conference was that there was disarray among the Western 
powers, unwillingness on the part of the superpowers to 
give any concessions on nuclear arms control, and 
inflexibility in the demands of the non-aligned.”156 In 
addition, besides the absence of political will by both 
NWS and NNWS, the inability of this Conference to agree on 
a Final Document may well be correlated to a lack of 
management and problem-solving skills on the part of the 
conference bureau. Notably, most of the subject-matter 
sources consulted fail to state the name of the President 
of the Conference.  
 By the time the 1985 NPT Review Conference kicked off, 
ten additional NNWS entered the club. Notable 
institutional innovations included the agreement to make 
the Preparatory Committee open-ended so that any state, 
independently from its status vis-à-vis the NPT, could 
participate. Further, in addition to the General, the 
Drafting and the Credentials Committees, the number of 
Main Committees increased to three. Main Committee I was 
to review the provisions on non-proliferation, disarmament 
and security. The Chairperson elected was Ambassador 
Dhanapala of Sri Lanka who led the work of the third and 
																																																						
156	 Barnaby,	 “The	NPT	 review	 conference	 –	much	 talk,	 few	 results,”	Bulletin	 of	 the	 Atomic	 Scientists,	
1980,	8.		
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final session of the Preparatory Committee. To Main 
Committee II fell the task of reviewing those provisions 
relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones and Main 
Committee III was devoted to deal with peaceful uses. This 
structure has remained like this ever since.  
 As in 1975 and 1980, the majority of states expressed 
in their statements disappointment over the lack of 
progress to, if not regress from nuclear disarmament. 
Questions of compliance with Article VI in light of the 
increased threats posed by the arms race – since the NPT’s 
entry into force in 1970, the number of weapons rose from 
6,000 to over 20,000, dominated the substance of the 
statements delivered. The final result of the third Review 
Conference was far more productive and less contentious 
than its antecedent in 1980. This raises a question worth 
asking. Why is that that this time around states parties 
adopted a real consensus-based Final Document despite 
facing the same nuclear dilemmas and substantive 
conundrums as in 1975 and 1980? The answers may well rest 
in the different procedures followed. Indeed, the 
President of the Conference, Egyptian diplomat Shaker, who 
will later be the author of one of the most authoritative 
accounts and certainly the most voluminous report of NPT 
negotiations, made use of a small, voluntary contingent of 
consultants involving the three Chairpersons of the Main 
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Committees, representatives of regional NPT groupings, 
such as the Non-Aligned Movement, and the three depositary 
states, along with various heads of delegations, members 
of the Secretariat and others who possessed expert 
knowledge of the review process. As noted by Sanders, this 
procedural innovation “facilitated the President to 
intervene whenever problems arose and to seek to achieve 
compromises — which in turn prompted delegations to make 
concessions and arrive at consensus language.”157 Similarly, 
the Committee Chairpersons followed analogous modus 
operandi in their respective areas of competence and, in 
the end, compromises could be achieved. As in 1975 and 
even more than 1975, leadership, personalities and perhaps 
even the ensuing chemistry developed between and among 
participants explain why, in the face of recurring and 
seemingly intractable problems, compromises could be 
achieved.  
 By 1990, the NPT had 140 states parties, of which 84 
participated. Once more, divergences in the evaluation of 
the implementation of Article VI, especially those 
regarding a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests, could not 
be resolved. As such, no agreed final declaration emerged. 
According to Dhanapala, “the bad personal rapport among 
some delegates — even within the same regional group —
contributed to an atmosphere that was scarcely conducive 
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to the success of the Conference.”158 Further, Sanders noted 
how the Main Committees were not capable of fine-tuning 
their work and produce cohesiveness. A lack of “conference 
management” skills contributed to the inability of 
arriving at a consensus declaration. In Sander’s own 
words, “The three Main Committees worked in different 
ways. Main Committee I set up subcommittees, which came up 
with papers that reflected both agreement and disagreement 
and were then sent to the Drafting Committee in that form. 
Main Committee II worked in plenary, agreed on much but 
disagreed over a proposal to start preparing for the 1995 
Conference right away. Main Committee III agreed on almost 
everything on its agenda.”159  
What is to point out is that conference management 
skills, working methodologies, decision-making processes 
and personalities can sometimes serve to obstruct progress 
rather than being conducive to progress. Whereas in 1975 
and in 1985 procedural dynamics and personalities worked, 
thereby indicating a considerable role played by 
endogenous factors in the extent of cooperation and 
further progress, in 1980 and in 1990 they simply did not 
deliver. Participating states can sometimes hide behind 
procedural issues if this serves their short-term 
interests and own agendas. The challenge is then to 
reconcile procedures with politics and processes with 
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outcome. While definitely not a panacea for all the ills 
affecting the Treaty, intra-NPT innovations procedures can 
certainly contribute to leveling off genuine conflicts, 
which are embedded in the NPT text. Such recurring 
divergences mostly relate to issue complexity, rule 
ambiguity and information asymmetry among and between NPT 
states parties. The momentous 1995 NPT Review Conference 
sought to do just that by searching for an equilibrium 
between contemporary political realities on the ground and 
deep-seated political aspirations transpiring from the 
letter and the spirit of the NPT. In other words, states 
parties worked together and non-governmental organizations 
endeavored to simplify complexity surrounding NPT-based 
nuclear issues, clarify NPT-based principles and provide a 
more productive review.  
 
Review Conferences in the second age of the NPT, 1995-2015   
 
Focus on 1995 
 
1995 signaled the end of adolescence and the beginning of 
adulthood for the NPT arrangement. The Treaty reached the 
end of puberty in 1995, 25 years after its entry into 
force. According to Article X, paragraph 2, a conference 
was to be convened to decide on its future and, precisely, 
on whether to extend it indefinitely, for fixed periods of 
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time or for a fixed period after which the NPT would cease 
to exist.  
Underlying the importance attached by states to the 
NPT in the maintenance of nuclear peace and security and 
predictability, the option to let the NPT decay in 1995 
was not seriously taken into consideration.160 Quite the 
contrary, as former President of the 1995 Conference, 
Dhanapala, has observed, there was alignment of opinion 
regarding the treaty’s extension. In his own words, “By 
the end of the last session of the PrepCom [Preparatory 
Committee], it was quite apparent that the NPT would be 
extended, though it was not entirely certain that the 
extension would be indefinite or without conditions.”161    
 It is to bear in mind that the environment within 
which these instruments and institutions operate should 
not be taken for granted. 1995 differs greatly from 1990, 
not only in terms of geopolitics and bilateral U.S.-
Russian relations, but also across the nuclear domain 
itself. Between 1991 and 1992 France followed by China – 
the two NPT’s NWS that had shied away from the Treaty’s 
remit since the very beginning, negotiations included, 
because of the NPT’s built-in inequities – proclaimed 
their intention to join the club. The equation according 
to which the permanent members of the U.N. Security 
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Council are those that legally possess nuclear weapons was 
thus finalized. Between 1990 and 1995, former Soviet and 
Yugoslav Republics, former nuclear-armed South Africa and 
other important nuclear holdout players acceded. Perhaps 
even more fundamentally, negotiations started at the 
Conference on Disarmament in 1994 over a CTBT were showing 
signs of progress. Coupled with moratoria on weapons 
testing by Russia, France and the U.S., along with 
reductions in nuclear weapons following bilateral U.S.-
Russian negotiations, the NNWS had good reasons to feel 
hopeful about the pace of disarmament.   
 It is also then within this broader context that 
parties approached the sessions of the Preparatory 
Committee with a willingness to compromise and reach 
consensus that was largely unseen on previous occasions. 
Preparations for the 1995 Conference witnessed a total of 
four preparatory meetings, after which most procedural 
issues, such as a provisional agenda, the organization of 
work within the three Main Committees and their respective 
chairpersons, a timeframe and the admittance of non-
governmental organizations and other stakeholders, were 
agreed. The organizational framework and decision-making 
procedures by which the extension decision was eventually 
reached was one area where creativity and logic proved, 
again, indispensable. In addition, while traditionally 
denied a participatory role in the preparatory process, 
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NGOs were given access to the final sessions of the 
Preparatory Committee. This constitutes a welcome 
addition, not least by making NPT review processes more 
transparent.  
 By the time the 1995 gathering kicked off in New York, 
178 states were NPT parties. 175 thereof, along with over 
190 NGOs participated in the Conference. While Dhanapala 
notes that the decision to hold the Conference at the U.N. 
headquarters was dictated by the fact that smaller 
diplomatic missions had a harder time to organize 
themselves and assemble in Geneva, it may be added that 
the choice had also political meaning.162 It is noteworthy 
that by the letter of the NPT, the exercise of reviewing 
the implementation of the NPT at a five-years interval and 
the extension conference are to be seen as two distinct 
sets of undertakings. However, the 1995 Review Conference 
has gone down in history as the 1995 NPT Review and 
Extension Conference. Therefore, it was expected that the 
outcome of the former process would affect the decision on 
the latter, as was ultimately the case. Following three 
sets of hard-fought measures regarding an 
institutionalized implementation review process in order 
to make NWS more accountable vis-à-vis NNWS and to create 
a deeper sense of responsibility toward NPT implementation 
by NWS and NNWS alike (Decision I on Strengthening the 
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Review Process for the Treaty); stronger and clearer 
commitments to nuclear disarmament, mostly falling on the 
shoulders of NWS (Decision II on Principles and Objectives 
for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament); and, 
finally, the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons in 
the Middle East (Resolution on the Middle East), the 
Conference was then able to reach Decision III on the 
indefinite extension.  
Remarkably, the three far-reaching decisions and the 
resolution were all adopted on a single occasion, by 
consensus and without recourse to voting. This achievement 
was to a great extent possible because of the reportedly 
creative negotiating tactics carried out by the President 
of the Conference, South Africa and Canada, among others – 
who were able to pool together a group of heterogeneous 
countries with which to seek to achieve a better 
equilibrium in the negotiations – as well as thanks to the 
inspired communication and committed leadership showed by 
those who presided over the whole review process from the 
beginning in 1993 to the very end in 1995.163 In spite of 
the so-called “1995 package,” which consists of a legally 
binding decision (NPT’s indefinite extension) and two 
political decisions (the Strengthened Review Process along 
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with the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament) plus a resolution on the 
Middle East, the Conference did not produce a consensus-
based Final Document. As mentioned above with regard to 
the Review Conferences during the first age of the NPT, 
this serves as a reminder that judging a Review Conference 
in terms of whether or not an agreed Final Document has 
been issued is only one way of measuring success and, 
sometimes, a rather poor yardstick.  
Shifting attention to the analysis of the highlights 
contained in the package of decisions taken in 1995, 
several observations can be made. To begin with Decision 
I, titled “Strengthening the Review Process for the 
Treaty,” it should be noted that it consists of only seven 
paragraphs. Its text is concise, straightforward and 
rather unambiguous. While paragraph 1 reminds states 
parties that the objective of the review process is to 
make sure “that the purposes of the Preamble and the 
provisions of the Treaty are being realized,” paragraph 2 
innovates the NPT arrangement and, indirectly, the 
interpretation of the NPT, by declaring that “Review 
Conferences should continue to be held every five years,” 
thereby institutionalizing the review process. As regard 
the Preparatory Committee, states parties decided that 
there should be meetings held for 10 working days in the 
three years prior to the Conference, with the possibility 
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of holding a fourth session in the year of the Conference 
to seek to resolve all procedural issues prior to the 
beginning of the Conference itself.  
What is more to point out is that the Preparatory 
Committee, especially at its final session, was also given 
the mandate of producing substantive outcomes in the form 
of recommendations. Paragraph 4 states that “The purpose 
of Preparatory Committee meetings would be to consider 
principles, objectives and ways to promote the 
implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, 
and to make recommendations thereon to the Review 
Conference." Under Paragraph 5, these principles, 
objectives and ways “include those identified in the 
decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament.“ Notably, it follows then 
that any agreed documents that might be adopted at future 
Conferences that further specify the “principles, 
objectives and ways” to promote implementation would be 
taken to bear. Finally, it was agreed to preserve the 
structure based on three main committees and add subject-
matter subsidiary bodies, when and if appropriate. 
Paragraph 7 concludes by declaring that Review Conferences 
“should look forward as well as back. They should evaluate 
the results of the period they are reviewing, including 
the implementation of undertakings of the States parties 
under the Treaty, and identify the areas in which, and the 
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means through which further progress should be sought in 
the future.“ The role of the implementation review process 
was thus strengthened.  
Decision I is closely linked with Decision II, which 
specifies the obligations states parties have to fulfill. 
Unlike Decision I, Decision II is more structured and 
looks akin to a U.N. resolution, with a set of preambular 
paragraphs and a series of underlined principles and 
objectives. After reiterating in the Preamble the two 
fundamental objectives of the NPT, that is to say, “the 
complete elimination of nuclear weapons” and “a treaty on 
general and complete disarmament under strict and 
effective international control,” Decision II contains a 
list of 20 principles and objectives, though the 
distinction between the two is unclear, dealing with seven 
areas of universality, non-proliferation, disarmament, 
nuclear weapons free-zones, security assurances, 
safeguards and peaceful uses. Of these seven areas, the 
most trivial to implement are those related to 
universality and to nuclear weapon free zones, with 
particular regard to Middle East. Recurrent calls to NPT 
universality are frivolous and rather paradoxical as the 
only states that are not parties to the NPT, such as 
India, Pakistan and Israel, possess nuclear weapons and 
are virtual NWS.   
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At the conclusion of Conference, President Dhanapala 
noted that “there were no winners or losers” and that the 
only actual winner was the treaty itself. More 
importantly, he emphasized that “The permanence of the 
Treaty does not represent a permanence of unbalanced 
obligations, nor does it represent the permanence of 
nuclear apartheid between nuclear haves and have-nots. 
What it does represent is our collective dedication to the 
permanence of an international legal barrier against 
nuclear proliferation so that we can forge ahead in our 
tasks towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.”164 If there is 
one catch-all phrase to sum up the work and the overall 
outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, this 
undoubtedly is the one coined by Canada: “permanence with 
accountability” and that accountability stemmed from a 
political and, to a lesser extent, legal commitment to 
strengthen the review process, which focused on the 
institutionalization of periodic sessions of the 
Preparatory Committee and Review Conferences themselves.165  
Leaving aside unrealistic expectations, 1995 marked a 
watershed in the existence of the NPT for two reasons. The 
first and most straightforward has to do with the 
provision in the text of the 1968 NPT of a momentous 
‘fact-checking and stock-tacking’ conference of the 
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parties after 25 years since the entry into force of the 
NPT. The second reason why 1995 has been a historic moment 
is that 1995 began a process by which states could further 
clarify nebulous NPT commitments, in particular those 
regarding disarmament, and lower informational barriers 
through interaction fostered by the expertise, knowledge 
and fresh ideas by NGOs and research centers. It is highly 
significant for both theoretical implications and 
practical effects that the last words uttered by Dhanapala 
before the closing of the Conference were devoted to 
applaud the work of non-state actors and encourage further 
collaboration.  
 
The 2000 Review Conference 
 
The 2000 Review Conference took place against a series of 
negative intra-NPT precedents and unfavorable extra-NPT 
developments. Despite an enhanced institutional and 
organizational setting in place for the preparatory 
process, both the second and third, final Preparatory 
Committee sessions ended without agreement and no report 
containing recommendations was transmitted to the 
Conference. Further, a set of extra-NPT events in the form 
of crises, and in particular the first series of Indian 
nuclear weapons and missiles tests rapidly followed by a 
series of nuclear weapons and missiles tests by Pakistan 
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in 1998, played their role in making for a tenser-than-
usual atmosphere.  
Paradoxically, the 158 states parties in attendance, 
observed by over 140 research institutes and NGOs, were 
able to produce a far-reaching, consensus-based and 
strongly-worded Final Document. As a matter of fact, 
included in the agreed-upon document there was a set of 
so-called “practical steps for the systematic and 
progressive efforts to implement Article VI and paragraphs 
3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on Principles and 
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament.”166 This rather exhaustive list of objectives, 
now known as the Thirteen Practical Steps and worked out 
by a newly institutionalized political grouping within the 
NPT Review Conference, further specifies what NWS, in 
cooperation with NNWS, are expected to achieve and 
provides a useful framework of goals against which Article 
VI implementation can be evaluated. Besides repeated calls 
for ratification and entry into force of the 1996 CTBT and 
for a FMCT, rather new disarmament objectives contained in 
the document are: a reduction in the reliance on nuclear 
weapons in military doctrines and security policies, 
unilateral reductions of nuclear weapons, increased 
transparency of nuclear weapons capabilities and reduction 
of their operational status.   
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Another instance of the achievements reached at the 
2000 Review Conference comes when the Final Document 
references Article VI. In it, there is explicitly written 
"an unequivocal undertaking by the NWS to accomplish the 
total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to 
nuclear disarmament, to which all States are committed." 
This is by far the strongest political statement on 
nuclear disarmament ever. The statement further states: 
"the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only 
absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of 
nuclear weapons." In addition, for the first time in the 
NPT’s history, the Final Document calls for "increased 
transparency by the NWS with regard to their nuclear 
weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements 
pursuant to Article VI..." Although there are no specific 
examples of how NWS are to fulfill this obligation, a 
clear precedent was set for states parties, and NNWS in 
particular, to demand for such endeavors.   
Further, the 158 states parties in attendance also 
agreed on measures designed to “improving the 
effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the 
Treaty.” On the whole, this document recalls past 
obligations agreed in 1995, but makes it explicit that 
both Preparatory Committee sessions and the Conference 
itself should consider "specific matters of substance 
relating to the implementation" not only of the text of 
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the NPT itself, but also and more importantly the two 1995 
Decisions, including the resolution on the Middle East, as 
well as "the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences, 
including developments affecting the operation and purpose 
of the Treaty." This is a demonstration of the legal value 
and political significance of consensus documents agreed 
at Review Conferences.  
In addition, what is to underline is that the section 
related to the ‘further strengthening’ of the strengthened 
review process contained in the 2000 Final Document 
further reinforces the procedural bases by which 
substantive outcomes can more easily be achieved. In this 
regard, paragraph 6 declares that: “The States parties 
also agreed that the Chairpersons of the sessions of the 
Preparatory Committee should carry out consultations with 
the States parties to prepare the ground for the outcome 
of the sessions as well as their agenda.” Similarly, 
paragraph 7 goes on to state that: “The consideration of 
the issues at each session of the Preparatory Committee 
should be factually summarized and its results transmitted 
in a report to the next session... the Preparatory 
Committee, taking into account the deliberations and 
results of its previous sessions should make every effort 
to produce a consensus report containing recommendations 
to the Review Conference.”    
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Without a doubt, the major takeaway that emerged from 
the 2000 Review Conference relates to the agreed 
commitment to enhance accountability through comprehensive 
facts-based reporting. As mentioned, the 2000 Final 
Document included a list of 13 Practical Steps toward the 
full implementation of disarmament obligations contained 
in the NPT. Specifically, Step 12 commits all states 
parties to produce “regular reports on the implementation 
of article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on 
‘Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
and Disarmament,’ and recalling the advisory opinion of 
the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996” in 
which the Court found unanimously that “there exists an 
obligation to … bring to a conclusion the negotiations 
leading to nuclear disarmament.” Clearly, regular 
reporting by all states serves as a mechanism to increase 
transparency and reduce distrust among states. Having 
added a reporting obligation, accountability by all NPT 
states parties and responsibility of NWS to follow through 
their treaty-based obligations were enhanced, at least on 
paper.  
Across the nuclear domain, and when it comes to 
nuclear disarmament and, by the same token, in the sphere 
of nuclear security – areas in which fundamental aspects 
of national sovereignty, state security and even survival 
are at stake – even minimalist approaches to reporting 
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should be seen as welcome initial confidence building 
measures, especially if reporting is as widespread and as 
recursive as possible.   
As noted by several NPT expert analysts, the 
successful outcome of the 2000 Review Conference, that is, 
a consensus-based Final Document further clarifying what 
to be expected by states parties in terms of nuclear 
disarmament and the treaty review process, can be 
attributed, once again and to a great extent, to the 
skills and perseverance of the President of the Conference 
and the Chairpersons of the Main Committees and the two 
subsidiary bodies in working out compromises by which each 
and every (reluctant) delegation could benefit in some 
way. As a matter of fact,, Dhanapala writes that “the 2000 
Review Conference illustrated the merit of good 
‘conference management’ — especially the importance of 
confidential small-group negotiations, pre-Conference 
preparations and early resolution of procedural matters.”167 
In noting how “some of the best outcomes have been 
achieved when Chairs, Presidents and [Conference] 
officials have had had to be creative and brave,” long-
time NPT observer and one of the most prolific writers on 
NPT issues, Johnson, equally underlines the importance of 
these negotiating tactics and management abilities.168 
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Clearly, in multilateral settings soft-power skills such 
as the use of persuasion, argumentation, transparent 
methods as well as the possession of unbiased knowledge 
are necessary, yet not sufficient, requisites for reaching 
successful outcomes.  
What is also to stress is that at the 2000 NPT Review 
Conference, just as in 1995, the linkage between non-
proliferation and disarmament issues was strengthened. All 
states agreed on the 13 Practical Steps for the systematic 
and progressive efforts to implement NPT’s Article VI, 
backed by the “unequivocal undertaking” by the NWS to 
accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals 
leading to disarmament. 
 
The 2005 Review Conference    
 
As was the case with the lead-up to the 2000 Review 
Conference, Preparatory Committee meetings showcased a 
dismal procedural performance, which in the end prevented 
the final preparatory session from adopting consensus 
recommendations for the 2005 Review Conference. As a 
consequence of the failure to agree on a draft provisional 
agenda, a program of work and related key procedural 
matters, regrettably most of the time at the Review 
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Conference was devoted to accomplish the work that 
Preparatory Committees should have carried out in advance, 
thus leaving the three Main Committees with no time to 
complete their tasks of reviewing the preceding five years 
of NPT implementation and identifying future actionable 
steps that could be taken to advance the treaty’s goals.  
While challenges to the achievement of consensus or 
at least some sort of progress in the three pillars of the 
NPT have remained more or less constant throughout time, 
the dismal 2005 performance was the result of a poisonous 
combination between a backtracking on disarmament 
commitments as agreed to in 1968, 1995 and 2000 by NWS, as 
well as a reduction in non-proliferation barriers as made 
clear by the cases of North Korea, Iran and a broad swathe 
of NNWS in relation to the notorious Khan network, all of 
which also impacted on the peaceful nuclear energy pillar 
of the NPT. Paradoxically, it can be advanced that the 
working procedures of the strengthened review process 
agreed to in 1995 and further enhanced in 2000 were used 
by states parties to reach the opposite result, and thus 
weaken the NPT.    
Observers and analysts have duly assessed the 2005 
event against both external dynamics and internal 
circumstances that have ultimately led to the negative 
	 153	 	
outcome.169 What is more, it can be well advanced that the 
2005 Review Conference that went on stage at the U.N. 
headquarters was one if not the single worst experience in 
the history of the NPT review process, mainly because 
states parties refused to acknowledge the results achieved 
1995 and 2000, so that one can speak of actual back-
tracking rather than status-quo maintainability. As 
regards the consequences of the 2005 failure, what 
transpires to be a common theme across experts’ 
assessments concerns the lack of political will displayed 
by officials and diplomats – a lack of political will 
caused by a degeneration of historical conscience and NPT-
related knowledge on the part of a wide cross-section of 
national delegation attending the 2005 Conference.  In his 
evaluation of the outcome, the President of the 
Conference, Ambassador Sergio Duarte of Brazil, remarked 
that “At stake is confidence in the ability of the NPT to 
face old as well as new challenges to the regime it 
instituted. Several member states came out of the 
Conference unconvinced that the Treaty can still provide 
reasonable assurance that proliferation has been checked 
and that progress in nuclear disarmament can be achieved …  
Concern over the credibility and resilience of the NPT 
increased in the last decade of the 1990s and particularly 
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Why	the	2005	NPT	Review	Conference	Failed,”	Acronym	Institute	for	Disarmament	Diplomacy	1,	2005.	
See,	Simpson	and	Nielsen,	“The	2005	NPT	Review	Conference,”	Nonproliferation	Review	12(2):	271-301,	
2005.	See	also,	Granoff,	“The	Nuclear	Nonproliferation	Treaty	and	Its	2005	Review	Conference:	A	Legal	
and	Political	Analysis,”	26	2007,	at:	http://nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/39.4-Granoff.pdf.		
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in the first few years of the 21st century. In many 
capitals and in academic circles, much thought was devoted 
to devise ways and means to strengthen the regime in order 
to face the challenges of today's world.”170 
In the words of one of the most acute and long-time 
observers of NPT Review Conferences, Potter, “few of these 
individuals [referring to Conference officials] had ever 
attended a Review Conference. Like their counterparts on 
most delegations to the 2005 Review Conference, they had 
very little institutional memory or first-hand 
recollection of the significance of crucial bargains that 
had been struck at prior conferences, crises that had been 
narrowly averted, and lessons – both positive and negative 
– that should have been learned. Indeed, by far the most 
experienced delegates at the 2005 Review Conference were 
those from the NGO community.”171 Similar evaluations by 
eyewitnesses to the 2005 debacle pervade their analyses 
and, as such, they speak volumes to the significance of 
knowledge-related factors and their impact on achieving a 
workable balance between nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament.  
 
 
 
																																																						
170	Duarte,	 “A	President’s	Assessment	of	 the	2005	NPT	Review	Conference,”	Acronym	 Institute,	2005.	
Document	available	at:		http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/dd/dd81/81npt.htm		
171	 Potter,	 “The	 NPT	 Review	 Conference:	 188	 States	 in	 Search	 of	 Consensus,”	 The	 International	
Spectator,	3/2005,	22.		
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The 2010 Review Conference  
 
In marked contrast to the preceding Conference, the 2010 
NPT Review Conference had been a substantive success and a 
procedural accomplishment. The Conference adopted a 
forward-looking Final Document with references not only to 
prior results achieved in 1995 and 2000, and in particular 
the “unequivocal undertaking of the NWS to accomplish the 
total elimination of their nuclear arsenals” and the 
obligations by both NWS and NNWS to regular reporting 
within the review process, but also to future specific 
steps to further the NPT’s goals. In this latter sense, 
the second part of the Final Document – formally known as 
“Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” 
and conventionally known as the “NPT Action Plan” - was 
adopted by consensus.172 Similar to the 1995 Decision 2 on 
Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
and Disarmament and to the 2000’s 13 Practical Steps, the 
NPT Action Plan further specifies what states parties are 
expected to accomplish with respect to the three NPT 
pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful 
applications of nuclear energy.  
As such, the Action Plan provides yet another 
yardstick against which to evaluate NPT implementation 
																																																						
172	Whereas	 the	 second	 part	 of	 the	 Final	 Document	was	 agreed	 by	 consensus,	 the	 first	 section	 titled	
“Review	of	the	operation	of	the	Treaty,	taking	into	account	the	decisions	and	the	resolution	adopted	by	
the	1995	Review	and	Extension	Conference	and	 the	Final	Document	of	 the	2000	Review	Conference”	
only	reflects	the	Chair’s	views,	as	it	was	made	clear	in	a	footnote.	In	this	regard,	see	the	2010	NPT	Final	
Document	at:	http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/.		
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progress or lack thereof. An additional reason why the 
2010 Review Conference succeeded is because key players, 
including the U.S. and Egypt, among others, agreed over 
language concerning the implementation of the 1995 
Resolution on the Middle East, and in particular the 
proposal of convening a Conference in 2012 on the 
establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. This had 
been the first time that a specific timeline was ever 
given, thereby easing frictions and paving the way for 
compromises related to other clusters and issues.173  
On the whole, it is not controversial to state that - 
though multilateral diplomacy is by nature a rather slow, 
complex and time-consuming process - 2010 witnessed the 
most successful negotiations since the 1995 Review and 
Extension Conference, with positive repercussions on 
global security. With the complicity of favorable 
external, extra-NPT circumstances, such as the election of 
a U.S. President Obama in 2009 determined to break away 
from previous unilateralist foreign and security policies, 
as well as thanks to positive developments within the 
nuclear domain itself, such as renewed attempts to break 
the U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reduction stalemate with the 
new START treaty of 2010 and the Nuclear Security Summit 
																																																						
173	However,	 the	1995	Middle	East	Resolution	and	ensuing	 implementation	steps	would	prove	at	best	
challenging	 and	 at	 worst	 detrimental	 to	 the	 whole	 NPT	 review	 process.	 Indeed,	 as	 much	 as	 this	
controversial	 issue	 provoked	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 1998	 Preparatory	 Committee	 under	 the	 strengthened	
review	process,	so	too	had	been	the	fate	of	the	latest	NPT	Review	Conference	in	2015.	
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process, enthusiasm in the vitality of the NPT-based 
regime reached a zenith.  
For the first time since the establishment of the NPT 
review process, states parties agreed to have the 
conventional three Preparatory Committee meetings held in 
Vienna, Geneva and New York, respectively. Though this 
might be interpreted as a rather toothless and merely 
procedural move – the Vienna-based IAEA devoted to such 
NPT issues as safeguards and peaceful nuclear energy, the 
Conference on Disarmament represents the go-to 
multilateral disarmament forum and the U.N. headquarters 
where multilateral high-level political and media 
attention is usually concentrated), symbolism matters, 
especially so when it comes to history and diplomacy.  
On the institutional and procedural fronts, the 2010 
Review Conference enhanced the NPT review process. 
Building on the dismal failure of the 2005 Conference and 
recognizing the role of NPT-related institutional 
knowledge, governments agreed on ways to utilize and 
sustain such expertise by organizing, on a voluntary 
basis, a group of “past and incumbent Presidents and 
Chairs … available for consultations with the incoming 
President and Chairs.” In addition, the Conference 
“recommended that a dedicated staff officer to support the 
Treaty’s review cycle should be added to the Office for 
Disarmament Affairs of the UN Secretariat” to monitor NPT 
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matters on a recursive basis. An additional far-reaching 
innovation brought by the Final Document relates to 
explicit references to the importance of disarmament and 
non-proliferation education and knowledge-building made in 
both the review part of the Final Document and in the 
Action Plan. Action item 22 calls all states to implement 
the recommendations of the U.N. Study on Non-Proliferation 
and Disarmament Education to help further the NPT-based 
regime in order to achieve a world without nuclear 
weapons.174  
On the substantive front, the Conference achieved a 
strengthening of the normative and legal dimensions of the 
NPT. Indeed, both non-proliferation and disarmament norms 
found renewed impetus, albeit of a rhetorical and 
declaratory nature. With regard to the former normative 
category, the Final Document further improves the norm of 
non-use of nuclear weapons. When combined with the 
practice of non-use since the U.S. atomic bombings on 
Japan in 1945, it can be claimed that a customary legal 
obligation prescribing non-use of nuclear weapons or at 
least non-first-use thereof has crystallized.  
With respect to the latter normative category, the 
Final Document not only reiterates past commitments to the 
achievement of a world without nuclear weapons, but also 
																																																						
174	See	the	Final	Document	of	the	2010	NPT	Review	Conference,	NPT.CONF.2010/50.	Vol.	 I.	Action	22.	
See	 also	 the	 2002	U.N.	 Study	 on	Non-Proliferation	 and	Disarmament	 Education,	 in	General	 Assembly	
Resolution	A/57/124.	Document	available	at:	http://undocs.org/A/57/124.		
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references for the first time the catastrophic 
humanitarian consequences of any nuclear weapons use, 
thereby reinforcing the moral opprobrium and illegality of 
any such use. Significantly, greater emphasis was placed 
on proposals to stigmatize nuclear weapons and reduce 
their salience; opposition to weapons modernization and 
the need for comprehensive negotiations on some kind of 
nuclear ban treaty similar to what has been achieved 
through the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions.  
Be as it may, Johnson concluded her assessment as 
follows: “Despite the more constructive context and the 
substantial proposals and debates on all aspects of 
nuclear disarmament, security, and proliferation, the 
final document was unable to go much beyond 
reaffirmations, exhortations, and language agreed in 1995 
or 2000.“175 Clearly, while it is true that non-
proliferation and disarmament norms, as well as the NPT 
review process itself, had been somewhat strengthened on 
paper, the litmus test for NPT effectiveness does not lie 
in rhetorical and declaratory positions, but rather in 
routinized and good-faith implementation. As such, the 
timeframe between the conclusion of a Review Conference 
and the beginning of a new one can reveal whether and to 
what extent states parties feel committed to implementing 
agreed commitments.  
																																																						
175	Johnson,	“Assessing	the	2010	NPT	Review	Conference,”	Bulletin	of	the	Atomic	Scientists,	2010,	8.		
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As in previous post-Cold War Review Conferences that 
ended with a consensus Final Document, so-called 
“conference management” skills and problem-solving tactics 
exercised by the President and Main Committee’s Chairs 
proved fundamental in leveling off polarized policy 
positions among key states and groups thereof. All in all, 
coupled with the political willingness of the U.S. toward 
a positive outcome that would reinforce President Obama’s 
all-inclusive strategy of a world without nuclear weapons, 
the 2010 Review Conference met the expectations of all the 
states parties involved, including – albeit to a lesser 
extent – those of the NGO community.      
 
The 2015 Review Conference  
 
By the time of the review cycle for the 2015 Review 
Conference, the tone of enthusiasm and optimism among 
states regarding the NPT-based regime had vanished under 
unfortunate real-world developments. Even though the 
first, ten-day-long Preparatory Committee meeting held in 
2012 in Vienna carried out its tasks in a rather positive 
atmosphere with the Chair’s concluding factual summary 
repeating language contained in the 2010 Final Document 
and stressing the importance of implementation of the 
Action Plan, in actuality all states were in a wait-and-
see mode, looking forward to the expected 2012 Conference 
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on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass 
destruction in the Middle East. As time passed, it became 
all too clear that fundamental NWS-NNWS rifts had 
resurfaced. 
 The second session of the Preparatory Committees took 
place against a background of a number of unfavorable 
circumstances. A conference to discuss a free zone in the 
Middle East could not be convened before the end of 2012, 
and no future date was ever set. North Korea tested 
missiles in December 2012 and conducted a nuclear test the 
following February. As was the case with Iran, 
negotiations over the North Korean nuclear program 
remained stuck. In addition, the NWS refused to attend a 
series of conferences on the humanitarian consequences of 
nuclear weapons held in Oslo in 2013, Nayarit and Vienna 
in 2014. Within this latter conference on the moral and 
legal consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, which 
was attended by over 150 states, the host country of 
Austria issued a so-called “Humanitarian Pledge” in which 
“effective measures to fill the legal gap for the 
prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons” were 
called upon.176  
As a consequence of these external events, the second 
session of the Preparatory Committee that ended in early 
May could not but end in disarray. During its work, 
																																																						
176	For	a	background	on	it	and	related	documentation,	see	http://www.icanw.org/pledge/.		
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Egypt announced it was withdrawing from the Preparatory 
Committee because of the lack of progress toward convening 
a Middle East conference. The states parties to the Non-
Aligned Movement and the Arab League also expressed 
frustration with the overall process. 
Despite this, an innovation at this second meeting 
was a discussion concerning possible next steps to advance 
the NPT review process. Suggestions in this respect 
included shortening the duration of the first two 
Preparatory Committee meetings and holding meetings in 
cities and countries other than Vienna, Geneva and New 
York; transitioning from summary records to digital audio 
recordings; making better use of technology and 
webcasting, as well as enhancing interactive discussions 
and direct engagement with non-governmental organizations. 
As was the case in 1999, 2004 and 2009, the final 
preparatory meeting did not produce substantive 
recommendations for the Conference. However, the Chair 
issued his non-consensus report under his own authority 
with a note explaining that: “this document reflects the 
Chair’s assessment of the elements on which the 
Preparatory Committee may have been able to evolve 
convergence sufficient to convey the following 
recommendations to the review conference in a spirit of 
flexibility and compromise.” In sum, the three preparatory 
meetings did not reveal significant improvement of the 
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NPT’s goals. Thanks in large part to the constant efforts 
by NGOs to track progress with the 2010 Action Plan, it 
become obvious that implementation related to nuclear 
disarmament lagged far behind than that related to non-
proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  
 The 161 states parties attending the 2015 Review 
Conference could not reach consensus on a Final Document. 
By all expert analyses, this lack of substantive agreement 
can be attributed to the discussions around the 
establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, an issue 
that has been linked to the NPT since the “Middle East 
Resolution” adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension 
Conference. This single issue sparked a lot of 
controversies and heated debate among states parties, with 
the result of further polarizing the negotiating positions 
of key states and groups thereof. As Rauf has summarized, 
responsibility for its collapse can be attributed to “the 
inflexibility of delegations, improper implementation of 
the strengthened review process and an absence of 
leadership.” The author goes on to observe that: 
“…dangerous new tendencies and developments are on the 
rise. These include an unchecked resurgence in the 
salience of nuclear weapons in European security, setbacks 
for reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons, increasing 
discord both between and among the NNWS and NWS, 
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deteriorating confidence in the NPT among Arab states 
parties, and an overall loss of credibility for the 
nuclear disarmament pillar of the NPT.”177 Moreover, the 
movement on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of 
nuclear weapons, originally developed at the margins 2012 
session of the Preparatory Committee, reinforced 
disarmament cleavages between nuclear haves and have-nots, 
thereby causing further drifts, inflexibility and actual 
fear on the part of NWS and some of those NNWS that still 
rely to some extent to U.S. nuclear weapons for their 
survival.  
Regrettably, as much as the thorny issue of creating 
the conditions for the establishment of a zone free of 
catastrophic weapons in the Middle East had reinforced 
centrifugal forces, so too might be the case with the 
recent move to sidestep the NPT and its review process in 
favor of separate negotiations over a legally binding 
treaty banning nuclear weapons, which started in 2017. In 
the end, increased frustration with the NPT review process 
and fragmentation among NPT states, which could eventually 
lead to disintegration of the NPT-based regime, might well 
be in the offing. It is against this bleak and worrisome 
background that political leaders, diplomats and the 
military should bear in mind Einstein’s original quote: 
“The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything 
																																																						
177	Rauf,	“Assessing	the	2015	NPT	Review	Conference,”	in	Dhanapala	and	Rauf,	208.		
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save our modes of thinking, and we thus drift toward 
unparalleled catastrophe.”178 
 
Preliminary findings 
 
Informed by empirical studies and analyses carried out by 
scholars and nuclear policy practitioners, this chapter 
has analyzed the establishment phase of the NPT through 
its negotiating history and its development through the 
institution of review conferences in order to identify 
those factors that theories of international cooperation 
and regime approaches emphasize with regard to the theme 
of institutional effectiveness. Understanding the problems 
surrounding NPT negotiations in the 1960s and its present-
day configuration is key in order to frame potential 
remedies for a more effective NPT. Based on the sources 
consulted, this concluding section stresses the relevancy 
of knowledge-based sources of effectiveness, especially 
during the second age of the NPT, that is, from the 1995 
NPT Review and Extension Conference.  
A combination of power- and interest-based factors 
played a crucial role in the establishment phase and seems 
ultimately to be better equipped at explaining the 
creation of the NPT. This can be extrapolated from the 
																																																						
178	 Quote	 taken	 in	 George	 Lee	 Butler,	 “We	 Still	 Drift	 toward	 ‘Unparalleled	 Catastrophe’,”	New	 York	
Times,	 23	 January	 1997.	 Available	 at:	 http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/23/opinion/we-still-drift-
toward-unparalleled-catastrophe.html.		
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accounts of Shaker and Johnson, according to which NPT 
negotiations were ‘controlled’ by the U.S. and the USSR. 
In addition, using counterfactual reasoning, the NPT text 
does preserve, rather than abolish, the status of the five 
nuclear-armed states, thus indicating a prominent role 
played by the rational self-interest of a few powerful 
states. However, realist or power-based theories of 
international regimes focusing on the distribution of 
material resources, and the theory of hegemonic stability 
in particular, cannot fully explain the establishment of 
the NPT. As observed by Smith, during the NPT negotiation 
phase and up until the late 1970s and early 1980s, “the 
U.S. began to suffer from the classic symptoms of a 
hegemon in decline: rising costs of system maintenance, a 
diffusion of technology and a level of consumption that 
outweighed investment.”179 Key propositions of hegemonic 
stability theory, such as the presence of a powerful state 
responsible for regime creation and the unfeasibility of 
collective action in the absence of hegemonic power, are 
partly disproved.         
 External galvanizing factors, be it the end of the 
Cold War, the discovery of clandestine weapons program or 
the revelations of the capabilities and intent of 
malevolent non-state actors, matter during the NPT’s 
implementation phase. At the same time, these same factors 
																																																						
179	Smith,	“Explaining	the	non-proliferation	regime:	anomalies	for	contemporary	international	relations	
theory,”	269.		
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work in the other direction and lead to explanations as to 
why periodic stock-tacking NPT reviews have ended in 
disarray. Such exogenous dynamics, and particularly the 
occurrence of shocks and crises, cannot be easily 
transposed into the categories, or black boxes, of power, 
interest and knowledge. However, the propensity for 
learning from both positive and negative crises is 
correlated with intra-regime, intra-NPT dynamics. The 
propensity to absorb shocks and turn crises from negative 
to positive opportunities depends to some extent on 
engaging creative and energetic personalities and 
secretariats as well as on initiating the right kinds of 
programmatic activities.   
Endogenous factors provide cogent explanations for 
the development and further refinement of NPT non-
proliferation cooperation than power-based explanations. 
Institutional design is an important aspect and even more 
significant is adaption in light of changing 
circumstances. In essence, the design of adequate 
implementation review processes can provide the 
foundations within which a less costly (and less damaging) 
learning occurs by making parties better understand and 
more effectively address common (in)-security problems. In 
conclusion, as the analysis of the rise and evolution of 
the NPT attests, knowledge-based theoretical approaches 
and, by the same token, policy prescriptions configured as 
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to maintain and foster expertise and education have been 
and will be more effective in the long-term.      
    A further key take-away emerging from this analysis 
and that can be also applied to any other phenomena of 
multilateral cooperation is that negotiations at the 
international level do not actually stop with the signing 
of a specific agreement, but rather continue into the 
phase of implementation and its review. What essentially 
demarcates negotiations to establish a working arrangement 
from implementation and post-implementation reviews of the 
established arrangement is the accumulation of information 
and experience, that is, the steady build-up of exogenous 
and endogenous events over time. Even if a product of a 
time when nuclear was considered a panacea technology and 
even if a relic of a by-gone era when bilateral relations 
between the two superpowers dominated international 
politics, given that the nuclear power is here to stay, 
the NPT maintains relevancy as a framework institution 
providing baseline guiding principles. Those states having 
or wanting to have nuclear power have to accept a series 
of adaptive inspection measures while those states 
possessing nuclear weapons have to dismantle their 
arsenals and proceed together to nuclear disarmament.180  
In order to heal long-standing and deeply rooted 
pathologies of NPT and its arrangement, policy frameworks 
																																																						
180	 In	 both	 instances,	 and	 especially	 in	 the	 latter	 case,	 some	 sort	 of	 multilateral	 monitoring	 and	
verification	arrangement	is	needed	and	yet	to	be	established.				
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that create, maintain and foster expertize, education and 
experience and that establish processes by which these 
very knowledge-based factors can thrive are needed. As 
much as there have been established global and regional 
Centers of Excellence dealing with nuclear security and 
counterterrorism, it would be high time to develop NPT 
Centers of Excellence, so as to maintain and foster 
institutional memory and unbiased knowledge of this 
cornerstone arrangement for future generations. At the 
same time, it should be acknowledged that the NPT has been 
surpassed by both extra-NPT and intra-NPT events. In 
addressing real-world nuclear proliferation, the action 
seems to lie elsewhere. The recent growth of non-
proliferation arrangements, including U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1540, attests to it.  
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Chapter IV 
 
The U.N., the Security Council and the 1540 Regime 
 
Setting the context  
 
In assessing the record of concerted action on the 
management of non-proliferation problems and on the 
mitigation of associated proliferation risks, the U.N. 
system represents the classic starting place. Empirical 
work on international regimes is ripe with studies of 
particular U.N.-centered activities dealing with common 
problems, including atomic weapons and weapons-usable 
materials and technology.181 As one of the most 
authoritative instances of traditional state-based and 
state-centric multilateralism, it stands as the most 
encompassing endeavor to institutionalize within a loose 
framework of rules and practices. Though the universe of 
cases of multilateral non-proliferation is vast, U.N.-
centered institutional processes and governing mechanisms 
are of critical importance. Their import is a discriminant 
characteristic over other non-proliferation arrangements.182   
																																																						
181	See,	for	example,	Young,	International	Cooperation:	Building	Regimes	for	Natural	Resources	and	the	
Environment,	 1989.	 	 In	 it,	 a	 case	 study	 addressing	 regime	 creation	 efforts	 to	 solving	 nuclear-accident	
problems	is	provided.	See	also,	Avenhaus	et	al.	Containing	the	Atom,	2002.	On	the	United	Nations	and	
nuclear-related	regimes,	see	Boulden	et	al.	The	United	Nations	and	Nuclear	Orders,	2009.		
182	On	issues	of	treaty	interpretation,	judicial	bodies	such	as	the	ICJ	but	also	political	entities	such	as	the	
General	 Assembly	 and	 the	 Security	 Council	 play	 a	 prominent	 role.	 The	 development	 of	 law	 and	
diplomacy	has	 taken	place	within	 the	U.N.-centered	 international	 system	 since	 1945.	On	 the	political	
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In the complex formation of international regimes, 
the General Assembly and the Security Council have played 
stepping stone roles. Agreement-making processes performed 
under its banner include summits at highest political and 
ministerial levels, periodic diplomatic negotiations, 
treaty review processes, implementation and monitoring 
agreements, technical verification arrangements, as well 
as the use of sanctions and other coercive acts short of 
warfare. Their objective and perceived (institutional) 
legitimacy, representation and crosscutting reach are 
unmatched by other arrangements. However, if not 
skillfully developed and implemented, these same features 
and procedures can constitute stumbling blocks. At the 
same time, a number of extra-U.N. bodies have emerged, 
especially since the onset of the new century. Sometimes, 
however, less onerous, voluntary forms of cooperative 
interaction are pursued. And sometimes, no cooperation at 
all takes place. In his John Holmes Memorial Lecture, 
Williams provides a sobering account by noting how “the 
shadow of power politics still haunts the U.N.’s ability 
to act impartially” and that today’s “global governance … 
is in a state of deep crisis.”183 Other scholars stress that 
the crux of the U.N. is that it does not operate as truly 
‘united’ nations, but rather as a chessboard for 
																																																																																																																																																														
side,	this	system	has	scored	better	than	any	prediction	about	the	fall	of	the	states-based	system	based	
on	a	loose	framework	of	common	principles	and	rules.		
183	Williams,	John	Holmes	Memorial	Lecture,	in	Global	Governance	22	(2016),	32-33.		
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governments and powerful coalitions thereof. As to the 
Security Council, its composition and modus operandi have 
been pinpointed as stumbling blocks to a better performing 
organization.184  
Security Council Resolution 1540 warrants attention 
because its establishment phase as well as its further 
refinement through implementation stages seem to defy 
arguments of institutional rigidity and power-based 
explanations. By drawing on a growing body of secondary 
sources as well as on information gained from participant 
observations,185 interviews and correspondence with U.S. 
government officials, independent consultants of the Group 
of Experts supporting the Security Council and its 1540 
Committee186 and document analysis,187 this chapter unfolds 
in four sections. The first overviews U.N.-centered 
nuclear activities by focusing on efforts spearheaded by 
the General Assembly and the Security Council. Based on 
																																																						
184	Szasz,	“The	Security	Council	Starts	Legislating,”	American	Journal	of	International	Law	96(1):	901-05,	
2002;	Talmon,	 “The	Security	Council	 as	World	 Legislature,”	American	 Journal	of	 International	 Law	 99:	
175-93,	 2005;	 Rosand,	 “The	 Security	 Council	 as	 ‘Global	 Legislator’:	 Ultra	 Vires	 or	 Ultra	 Innovative?”	
Fordham	International	Law	Journal	28(3):	542-90,	2004.		
185	 Workshop	 titled	 “Non-Proliferation	 in	 a	 Non-Compliant	 World:	 Rethinking	 U.N.	 Security	 Council	
Resolution	1540”	and	co-sponsored	by	the	Stimson	Center	and	the	Washington	Foreign	Law	Society.	See	
also,	 “Towards	 the	 2016	 Comprehensive	 Review:	 Former	 experts	 assess	 UNSC	 Resolution	 1540,”	
Institute	for	Security	Studies,	2016.		
186	Numerous	interactions	with	professionals	were	carried	out.	They	included	former	U.S.	officials	within	
the	Department	of	State,	members	of	the	1540	Committee’s	Group	of	Experts	as	well	as	scholars	and	
experts.	The	first	round	of	interviews	was	conducted	in	February	2016	in	Washington	with	senior-level	
officials	 from	 the	 State	 Department	 and	 the	 Department	 of	 Energy’s	 National	 Nuclear	 Security	
Administration,	and	a	number	of	experts	at	the	Arms	Control	Association,	the	Center	for	Strategic	and	
International	Studies,	the	Partnership	for	Global	Security	and	the	Nuclear	Threat	Initiative.	The	second	
cycle	took	place	in	June	2016	in	New	York	with	the	Coordinator	of	the	1540’s	Group	of	Experts	and	two	
other	 consultants	 partaking	 in	 the	 Expert	 Group.	 A	 list	 of	 the	 interviewees	 that	 have	 agreed	 to	
collaborate	is	provided	at	the	end	of	the	study.			
187	In	particular,	see	the	records	of	the	open	session	of	the	Security	Council	on	22	April	2004,	and	those	
regarding	its	actual	adoption	on	28	April	2004,	documents	S/PV.4950	and	S/PV.4956,	respectively.		
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existing published materials and accounts, such digression 
is warranted by the need to contextualize prior 
cooperative work and capture the related import. The 
second section delves into the gestation and negotiation 
periods, looking at the nature of the issues raised and 
how these matters were tackled. In the third section, 
attention shifts to its operational evolution by focusing 
on implementation and its monitoring stage to scrutinize 
the ways in which 1540-centered strategies have helped or 
hindered the achievement of the Resolution’s goals.  
 
Nuclear multilateralism and the United Nations 
 
U.N.-sanctioned nuclear engagement has a rich and long 
background, beginning 70 years ago in 1946.188 Similarly, 
the first approaches to (nuclear) non-proliferation go as 
far back as 1946 and precisely to the U.S. Baruch Plan, 
the “Atoms for Peace” speech delivered by U.S. President 
Eisenhower at the General Assembly in 1953 and, relatedly, 
the establishment of the IAEA in 1957.189 Though 
international controls through binding standards and 
cooperative mechanisms were lacking, the security 
surrounding nuclear weapons, delivery systems and 
sensitive materials was contemplated as not only a strict 
																																																						
188		Resolution	1	(I),	“Establishment	of	A	Commission	to	Deal	with	The	Problem	Raised	by	The	Discovery	
of	Atomic	Energy.”	24	January	1946.		
189	 For	historical	 overviews	of	 early	non-proliferation,	 Potter,	Nuclear	Power	and	Nonproliferation:	An	
Interdisciplinary	 Perspective,	 1982;	 McGeorge	 Bundy,	Danger	 and	 Survival;	 Pilat,	 Atoms	 for	 Peace:	 A	
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national prerogative and responsibility, but also those 
treaties and post-treaty agreements could not provide for 
adequate responses.  
At the turn of the new century, the combination of a 
new type of proliferation in facilitating the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction challenged the NPT-based non-
proliferation regime on several grounds. While most 
accounts of non-proliferation efforts attest that the 
preeminent political and decisional organ of the U.N. 
system, namely the Security Council, remained paralyzed by 
political differences among its five permanent, veto-
wielding members and Cold War dynamics, the General 
Assembly devoted significant time and effort on narrower 
(nuclear) arms control and non-proliferation.190 Besides a 
short period between 1945-48, up until the 1990s actions 
led by the General Assembly and the Security Council 
remained rather dormant in narrower (nuclear) arms control 
and non-proliferation dimensions.  
The text of the founding political and legal document 
of the U.N. architecture does of course not reference 
either (non)-proliferation, nor nuclear weapons. The 
Charter’s gestation and negotiations predate the first and 
only use of nuclear weapons in history. However, given the 
paradigmatic shift brought by the most destructive 
technology, engagement and negotiations emerged rather 
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quickly under U.N. auspices. The regulation of armaments 
is intrinsic to the raison d’être of the U.N. and 
fundamental to the maintenance of international security. 
Since the discovery of atomic energy in the midst of World 
War II and the advent of the nuclear weapons age in 1945, 
cooperation has been a consequential, almost inevitable 
development. The state-based international system of 
states, convened at the General Assembly in 1946, devoted 
its very first session and very first negotiating efforts 
to the adoption of a resolution to address nuclear 
problems in a bold, comprehensive and forward-looking 
fashion. Through its first resolution, the General 
Assembly established the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). 
With Resolution 1, the AEC was mandated to “inquire into 
all phases of the problem” of atomic energy.191 
Specifically, it was tasked to make proposals for the 
extension of the benefits of nuclear energy to all 
nations, for the control of atomic energy for peaceful 
purposes through a system of nuclear safeguards and, 
thirdly, for the elimination of nuclear armaments.192 The 
three principles undergirding the regime, the three-pillar 
structure of peaceful nuclear energy, non-proliferation 
and disarmament, derive from General Assembly Resolution 1 
of 1946. Further, in its first session the General 
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192	See	Paragraph	5.		
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Assembly adopted Resolution 41, titled “Principles 
governing the general regulation and reduction of 
Armaments,” in which it recommended the Security Council 
to consider negotiations aimed at the establishment of an 
“international system of control and inspection,” 
including on the “prohibition of atomic and all other 
major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass 
destruction and the control of atomic energy to the extent 
necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes.”193 
Ever since 1946, the “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) 
terminology entered multilateral disarmament diplomacy and 
the term’s import was so conceptualized as to point to a 
special classes of weapons and associated systems deemed 
to require, by necessity, cooperative steps to achieve the 
goal of prohibition, regulation and reduction. 194 To this 
day, no consensus exists at national and even across 
different government ministries and departments as to 
which categories the term should refer to. 
The term “WMD” acquired a new resonance after the end 
of the Cold War at a time when several fault lines 
embedded in key non-proliferation treaties, including the 
NPT, were exposed in light of novel threat dynamics. The 
non-proliferation policy earthquake was provoked by a 
novel form of proliferation that was induced by states of 
																																																						
193	 Resolution	 41	 (I),	 “Principles	Governing	 the	General	 Regulation	 and	 Reduction	 of	 Armaments.”	 14	
December	1946,	paragraph	4.		
194	See,	for	example,	Carus,	“Defining	“Weapons	of	Mass	Destruction,”	2012.		
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secondary or no concern or even by states unbound by 
existing regimes in collusion with a heterogeneous group 
of non-state actors ranging from for-profit smugglers, 
corrupted officials, middleman, trading companies to 
terrorist organizations.  
Notably, the earliest and most authoritative opinions 
concerning nuclear security and nuclear terrorism dates 
back to the dawn of the nuclear age in 1946. It originates 
with Robert Oppenheimer – the Scientific Director of the 
secret, U.S.-led Manhattan Project and the designer of the 
first atomic weapons. Specifically, to the question of 
whether a nuclear weapon being smuggled into the U.S. 
could be detected, Oppenheimer’s telegraphic reply was 
that the only way to do it properly would be to open every 
container and suitcase “with a screwdriver.”195 The take-
away points emerging from the hearing of the foremost 
‘nuclear insider’ in history was that the United States 
(or for that matter any other country) could not solely 
rely on technology, such as detection equipment and export 
controls. Trafficking can go undetected and broader 
nuclear smuggling episodes could not be ruled out in 
principle, unless states were willing to eliminate 
																																																						
195	Coll,	“The	Unthinkable:	Can	the	United	States	be	Made	Safe	from	Nuclear	Terrorism?”	New	Yorker,	
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associated infrastructure and completely and verifiably 
disarm.196  
The far-reaching conclusions reached in the 1940s by 
the Scientific Director of the Manhattan Project remain 
not only valid to these days, and perhaps even more so 
today than it was some 50, or even 20 years ago, but are 
also resembling similar controversial issues puzzling 
policymakers and experts alike. Initially, Oppenheimer’s 
advice did not fall on deaf ears, and the thrust for 
handling the nuclear weapons problem right after WWII 
called for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons 
globally. Interestingly, this is the principle 
underpinning both the U.S. Baruch and the Soviet Gromyko 
Plans, both of which were put forth in 1946 before the 
onset of the bipolar conflict and the Cold War. However, 
while both the Soviet Union and the U.S. agreed in 
principle to the goal of nuclear disarmament, 
insurmountable differences on the means to achieve it 
prevailed. Despite the adoption by the General Assembly in 
1948 of what was then rebranded the “U.N. Plan” for the 
control of nuclear energy, any hope for averting vertical 
and horizontal proliferation were soon dissipated by the 
nuclear weapons tests carried out by the Soviet Union in 
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1949, the U.K. in 1952, France in 1960 and later China in 
1964.197  
The mastering of nuclear technology and the 
statements released by these four countries concerning 
their possession of nuclear weapons moved multilateral 
negotiations from early comprehensive disarmament efforts 
to a more restricted focus on halting the spread of 
weapons to additional countries while at the same time 
locking in the privileged status of those five countries – 
the so-called NPT’s “nuclear weapons states”. In other 
words, it was no longer a matter of eliminating nuclear 
weapons tout court, but of prohibiting them to all other 
states, while legitimizing their existence to a special 
group of states, provided they would negotiate and 
implement “in good faith” arms control, non-proliferation 
and disarmament agreements, such as the CTBT or the FMCT 
(both of which treaties remain in a legal and political 
limbo), and eventually proceed to verifiable disarmament.  
A review of early nuclear non-proliferation efforts 
by the General Assembly reveals they were mostly 
disarmament-oriented. Indeed, its Charter 
institutionalizes multilateral disarmament diplomacy. 
Article 11 states that: “the General Assembly may consider 
the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance 
of international peace and security, including the 
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principles governing disarmament and the regulation of 
armaments.”198 The General Assembly partly succeeded in 
fulfilling its role under Article 11. Both in its plenary 
sessions and through its subsidiary bodies, the General 
Assembly, less exposed to the cleavages of great power 
politics in comparison with the Security Council of the 
time, passed several resolutions that paved the way for 
the construction of non-proliferation regimes. Examples 
are the Geneva-based Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament 
of 1960, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference of 
1962 – importantly, this is where negotiations over the 
NPT were conducted – the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament of 1969 and, as a result of the first Special 
Session on Disarmament of the U.N. General Assembly, the 
Conference on Disarmament in 1979.  
Notably, the three first-order multilateral treaties 
concerning nuclear, chemical and biological weapons have 
been endorsed or adopted by General Assembly resolutions. 
Besides the NPT, the General Assembly has blessed other 
cornerstone multilateral non-proliferation treaties. They 
include the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the 1993 
Chemical Weapons Convention and the 1996 CTBT. They were 
all negotiated at the Conference of Disarmament – the 
single multilateral disarmament forum at the disposal of 
the international community. When it comes to the 
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intersection of non-proliferation and terrorism, the 
General Assembly still acts as one of the most important 
mediums through which non-proliferation governance 
innovation can initiate. As we shall see, initial bids and 
proposals for what would soon emerge as Resolution 1540 on 
the threats posed by non-state actors in the realm of WMD 
were first publicly announced at General Assembly meetings 
by U.S., British, French and Russian representatives in 
September 2003.  
Shifting attention to Security Council activities, it 
should be emphasized that historically – in spite of 
Article 26 of the Charter, which gives the Security 
Council the authority to formulate concrete “plans for the 
establishment of a system for the regulation of 
armaments”199 – its engagement with WMD has been occasional 
and its impact on the course of multilateral non-
proliferation efforts close to nothing, and at least until 
the beginning of the new century. What is more, 
resolutions adopted by the Security Council followed a 
common pattern of addressing specific state-centered and 
time-limited threats with the ultimate aim to respond to, 
rather than prevent, peace and security threats such as 
WMD proliferation. The actual negotiations and 
implementation of binding agreements, and the 
																																																						
199	See	Article	26	of	the	U.N.	Charter.		
	 182	 	
establishment of the nuclear non-proliferation regime 
wholly understood, occurred outside the Security Council.  
Yet, a further important and unique toolkit at the 
disposal of the Security Council – as the ultimate 
international political authority on issues of war and 
peace – is the recourse to Chapter VII of the U.N. 
Charter.200 Measures called for in Chapter VII resolutions 
are automatically international law of the highest order 
for all states and all states have a responsibility and a 
duty to follow through the binding obligations set forth. 
Resolution 687, adopted in 1991, illustrates the first and 
foremost example of Security Council’s use of Chapter VII 
with regard to non-proliferation. In it, the Security 
Council imposed specific weapons-related prohibitions on 
Iraq with regard to its possession and threatened use of 
chemical and biological weapons and materials, as well as 
concerning the undeclared presence of nuclear weapons-
related activities and technologies in violation of NPT 
obligations. Resolution 687 also included measures geared 
toward the prohibition of certain delivery systems and 
imposed on Iraq the obligation to cooperate with an ad-hoc 
U.N. weapons inspection regime to verify compliance. What 
is more, the resolution authorized a mandate for a broad 
range of sanctions and export controls. Ultimately, aside 
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from resolution on Iraq, in the first six decades of its 
work the Security Council managed to pass a nuclear-
weapons-related resolution every ten years.201  
Before the turn of the new century, Security Council 
non-proliferation activities have been quantitatively and 
qualitatively scarcer in comparison to the work carried 
out by the General Assembly and its subsidiary and 
implementing bodies. Further, the crux of the former 
focused on enforcement aimed at the restoration, rather 
than prevention, of country-specific and time-limited 
threats posed by WMD. Resolutions highlighted measures to 
halt (nuclear) non-proliferation to the detriment of 
disarmament commitments. It also stressed a reactive, 
case-by-case approach to dealing with security threats, as 
opposed to a pro-active and thematic method, which will be 
a signature feature of Security Council’s modus operandi, 
starting with the first-ever Security Council Resolution 
to make a connection between unconventional, ‘living 
threats’ of terrorism and proliferation, that is, Security 
Council Resolution 1373 adopted in September 2001, and 
reaching the apex with Resolution 1540 adopted in 2004.202  
To conclude, the General Assembly has been the 
central forum and medium through which states and regional 
groups thereof started formal discussions on nuclear 
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weapons and proliferation matters, which led to the 
construction of a state-centric and government-oriented 
control regime based around the NPT and its review 
conferences. However, since the passage of the very first 
resolution in 1946, the achievements produced through the 
efforts of the General Assembly have been modest. Overall, 
the increasing diversification of multilateral state-led 
action and the division of non-proliferation labor has 
impacted on U.N.-centered efforts. When it comes to 
nuclear security, multilateral cooperative engagement has 
mostly emerged and evolved through informal governance 
approaches in the form of voluntary agreements between 
like-minded partners.  
In addition, while the relevance and impact of the 
U.N. has been greatest in driving states to agree on an 
agenda for taking non-proliferation forward, its potential 
has been smallest in implementation and, needlessly, in 
the enforcement.203 While binding agreements are necessary 
for establishing a set of minimum required standards of 
verifiable compliance and punishable non-compliance, they 
are not per se sufficient for a comprehensive response. 
Further, what is also to highlight is that there is a 
common thrust across General Assembly resolutions over the 
course of time. This refers to the goal of nuclear 
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disarmament. Its verification, and especially the ways in 
which to reduce secrecy and increase transparency, is all 
the more important in today’s threat environment and 
technological sophistication than it ever was in history.  
The truly universal membership of the General 
Assembly, its periodic meetings and its political mandate 
on arms control and disarmament issues contribute a great 
deal, over the longer term, to the gradual build-up and 
further evolution of the principles and norms governing 
cooperation on non-proliferation. It is thus not quite 
conforming to reality to argue, as some have pointed out, 
that the piling up of resolutions has resulted in “the 
overall failure of the U.N. to play a meaningful role in 
efforts to build a comprehensive multilateral normative 
system on arms control and non-proliferation.”204 Security 
Council Resolution 1540 mentions the dual reinforcing 
normative character of non-proliferation and disarmament.  
Regarding effectiveness, it is to note a 
preoccupation by practitioners and, to a lesser extent, by 
non-proliferation experts to look at the broader status of 
the non-proliferation regime in terms of legal binding-
ness and, consequently, running the risk of neglecting to 
consider novel approaches. The galaxy of non-proliferation 
cooperation includes several other examples within both 
NPT-plus and extra-NPT cooperative measures, scientific 
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collaboration, business and private industry and, in the 
final analysis, the drivers that make institutionalized 
multilateral non-proliferation cooperation both manifest 
and sustainable over time are not only of a legal nature, 
and may not even be of a strictly political dimension.  
The Security Council instead has shown greater 
cohesion and a willingness to tackle emerging threats in 
novel ways, beginning with Security Council Resolutions 
1737 dealing with terrorism prevention and 1540 dealing 
with non-state proliferation prevention of “chemical, 
biological and nuclear weapons, their means of delivery 
and related materials.” As such, it is to underline that 
the controversial WMD term is not mentioned in Resolution 
1540. The Resolution avoids terminological disputes and 
cognitive dissonances by referring to, and providing a 
definition of, “non-state actors.”  
Since its inception, the U.N. has stressed the 
mutually reinforcing link between non-proliferation and 
disarmament as a multilateral objective. The elimination 
of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons has surged – 
as a matter of practice – to a fundamental principle of 
the international community, and it was the subject of the 
first General Assembly resolution. After the decisional 
impasse caused by Cold War rivalries among the five veto-
wielding members of the Security Council and formally 
acknowledged NPT’s NWS started to fade away. The first-
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ever meeting of the Security Council held at the level of 
heads of state and government produced a Presidential 
Statement in which it was declared: “the proliferation of 
all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security.” Notably, a reference to 
nuclear disarmament was added. The Presidential Statement 
underlined – as Security Council Resolution 1540 would 
later reaffirm 12 years later – "the need for all States 
to fulfill their obligations in relation to arms control 
and disarmament."205 It is then within these political, 
legal, normative and institutional milieus that the 
genesis and negotiations of Resolution 1540 should be 
examined. In essence, one should look at the question of 
nuclear security and non-state threats within the 
framework of state non-proliferation and disarmament 
efforts. Understanding how the decision-making process 
unfolded forms the first step in answering why 1540 
Resolution arrangement has moved from a contentious policy 
measure to a widely endorsed success story.   
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Toward 1540: genesis and institutional precursors  
 
More than a decade after its passage in 2004, no 
conclusive evidence exists as to the framer(s) of 
Resolution 1540. While the draft text to be negotiated was 
co-sponsored by four permanent members of the Security 
Council, that is, the U.S., the U.K., the Russian 
Federation and France along with Romania and Spain as 
rotating Security Council members, its gestation period 
remains shrouded in opacity. As Cupitt, has noted, “No 
definitive work on the origins of UNSCR 1540 exists … 
Tackling those questions requires interviewing the many 
participants in this creation story and seeing the 
documents they saw, many of which remain classified.”206 
Building on this note, a further comment should be 
emphasized when tracing its origins. Pointing to 
particular, individual accounts and factors without 
grasping the background within which the history of 1540 
has unfolded can lead to imperfect explanations.  
While an overwhelming majority of open-source 
material points to attention-riveting external events that 
catalyzed public and, most critically, government 
attention, including mass terrorist attacks such as 11 
September 2001 and the unraveling of illicit trafficking 
networks such as the A.Q. Khan proliferation enterprise in 
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2003, the establishment of the resolution is interlocked 
with developments within non-proliferation regimes, 
suggesting multi-causality and the presence of additional 
intervening factors.  
Certainly, one can advance that several other events, 
such as the live-broadcasting of the collapse of the World 
Trade Center in New York City, the terrorist attacks in 
Moscow, the trafficking and seizures of illicit cargo 
shipments and the train bombings in Spain, induced wider 
buy-in and acceptance by those states that were initially 
doubtful of the new instrument and even by those states 
that described the measures called for in the draft text 
as reflecting longstanding cleavages, such as spurious 
either-or, North versus South, nuclear armed versus non-
armed arguments. External events however did not alter a 
pre-existing and crosscutting evaluations of, and opinions 
about, the capacities of existing instruments to address 
old-fashioned problems in a radically modified context.  
Notwithstanding the problem of secrecy and opacity 
surrounding Resolution 1540, the ‘living’ sources and 
‘published’ sources consulted indicate the United States 
as initiator of the process,207 and specifically the White 
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House headed by former U.S. President George W. Bush. In 
an interview with a former U.S. government official 
involved in the drafting process, it arises that the co-
sponsored draft text had already been the product of 
domestic inter-agency consultations held over the summer 
of 2003 with the Departments of State, Defense and 
Justice.208 This also highlights the nature of the issues 
involved and the political, military and legal dimensions 
of the undertaking. Such back-and-forth internal 
negotiations ostensibly formed the basis on which the U.S. 
could start making compromises multilaterally.  
Prior to consultations, there already was a strong 
case for a comprehensive response, and a prior example on 
which to build upon, namely the outcome of the G-8 Summit 
in Kananaskis in 2002. Remarkably, the so-called 
Kananaskis Principles were designed to “prevent 
terrorists, or those that harbor them, from gaining access 
to weapons and materials of mass destruction.”209 They 
provided the signifiers “appropriate” and “effective” in 
relation to a series of measures, such as export controls 
and physical protection and accounting measures. 
Precisely, four of the six Principles use the terms 
“appropriate” and “effective,” either used in tandem or 
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separately. The choice for this rather abstract language 
would later puzzle diplomats, implementers and experts 
attempting to understand the requirements of Resolution 
1540.210 Soon after its adoption in 2004, attention focused 
on the legal aspects of Resolution 1540, including the 
legislative role and powers of the Security Council and 
the legitimacy of the whole decisional process.211    
Another important forerunner to Resolution 1540 is 
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) established in 
May 2003 and aimed at interdicting trafficking in 
dangerous weapons and materials involving state and non-
state actors.212 The PSI emerged in response to a gap in the 
capacity of the core global nuclear non-proliferation 
treaty, that is the NPT, to address the evolving realities 
of trafficking in nuclear-related materials through states 
and private-sector networks and, though an informal 
agreement, it helped pave the diplomatic path that led to 
the conclusion of non-treaty based, yet legally binding, 
arrangements such as the 1540 one. Indeed, one of the non-
legally binding yet intensely debated paragraphs in 
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commentators	point	 to	 the	 lack	of	definitions	 regarding	 the	meaning	of	 these	“appropriate	effective”	
signifiers,	 there	 is	 value	 and	 much	 to	 command	 in	 loose	 definitions,	 especially	 in	 light	 of	 evolving	
technologies	and	risks.	The	power	of	1540	lies	just	in	its	general	and	perpetual	applicability.		
211	As	noted,	early	academic	attention	was	devoted	to	analyzing	 legal	aspects	of	 the	Resolution.	Later	
on,	 scholars	 focused	 and	 continue	 to	 analyze	 institutional	 and	 implementation-related	 aspects	 of	 the	
Resolution	as	well	as	of	the	1540	arrangement.		
212	 U.S.	 Department	 of	 State,	 “Proliferation	 Security	 Initiative”	 and	 “Statement	 of	 Interdiction	
Principles,”	 https://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm	 and	 https://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm,	
respectively.		
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Resolution 1540 implicitly alludes to this informal 
activity when it calls upon “all States … to take 
cooperative action to prevent [rather than interdict – as 
it was originally conceived] illicit trafficking.”213 
Another critical institutional precursor to 
Resolution 1540 is U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373 
on transnational terrorism, in which the Security Council 
acting under Chapter VII mandated all states to take far-
reaching measures to combat terrorism and to prevent and 
suppress terrorism financing.214 This is the first Security 
Council resolution to ever make a passing reference to the 
nexus of proliferation and non-state terrorist threats. 
Resolution 1373 shares a number of commonalities with 
Resolution 1540, one of the most important being the 
establishment of a ‘follow-up mechanism’ under the guise 
of a Security Council Committee to review implementation 
of the measures called for in the text of Resolution 1540 
and subsequent resolutions reviewing, updating and 
extending the mandate of the 1540 Committee.215 The 
establishment of a dedicated organization, by no means an 
undisputed point during the negotiations, arguably proves 
neo-institutionalism’s take on the role of international 
organizations. While the U.S. did not envision the 
possibility of a standing monitoring body, the idea became 
																																																						
213	For	the	reference,	see	Datan	as	well	as	Ogilvie-White,	“UN	Security	Council	Resolution	1540:	Origins,	
Status,	and	Future	Prospects,”	141,	in	Knopf,	International	Cooperation	on	WMD	Nonproliferation,	2016.	
214	See	the	website	of	the	Security	Council	Counter-Terrorism	Committee,	https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/	
215	 Biersteker,	 “The	UN’s	 Counterterrorism	 Efforts:	 Lessons	 for	UNSCR	 1540,”	 in	 Bosch	 and	 van	Ham,	
Global	Non-Proliferation	and	Counter-Terrorism.	See	also,	Oosthuizen	and	Wilmhurst,	6-7.		
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a reality when negotiations expanded beyond the permanent 
five Security Council members to include non-permanent as 
well as the entire U.N. membership. The inclusion of what 
will become the 1540 Committee, technically a subsidiary 
body of the Security Council, shows evidence of a forward-
looking move.   
Both as resolution and arrangement, 1540 has several 
points of origin. Security Council Resolution 1373, the 
Kananaskis principles, along with the PSI, are relevant 
precursors to Resolution 1540 and predictors of its 
design. It is also to be appreciated that this status of 
affairs arguably stands as an indicator of the existence 
of an emerging consensus on the threats and a simultaneous 
willingness to respond to them, possibly in concert and 
within a loose framework of rules and procedures. Clearly, 
self-interest goes a long way to explain states’ 
willingness to negotiate on the most appropriate policy 
responses. The root cause that prompted the start of 
negotiations was the acknowledgment supported by mounting 
evidence and knowledge of the fact that a greater number 
of nations, sometimes in collusion with private non-state 
entities, were capable of engaging in proliferation and 
circumventing existing laws and regulations. Some 
important faces of proliferation, such as its financing, 
transshipment and brokering, were exposed.  
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At the same time, compounding the problem, there was 
the concurrent appreciation of the subtle irony that 
existing legal, regulatory and decision-making mechanisms 
were not only insufficient to address the growingly 
complicated threats of non-state-led proliferation, but 
also hampered concrete remedial action on the ground. 
Cumbersome negotiations and lengthy ratification 
processes, annual General Assembly resolutions and the 
unfeasibility of amending existing agreements could not 
provide for the needed responses to these challenges. 
Treaty review processes and conferences, such as those 
held every five years for the NPT, could not accommodate 
the views and needs of the big elephant in the room 
represented by the burgeoning private sector. Relatedly, 
despite the resemblance of NPT review conferences with the 
monitoring and review processes related to Resolution 
1540, the obligations emanating from multilateral treaties 
are not as wide-ranging as those deriving from Resolution 
1540 and its successor resolutions. Lastly, treaty review 
processes involve diplomatic and other government-related 
actors and, regrettably, do not fully include other 
equally and perhaps at this day and age even more crucial 
stakeholders, such as the private sector. Be as it may, 
agreeing on the threats would prove far easier to achieve 
than agreeing on the courses of actions. 
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The negotiation process 
 
The proposal for a binding Security Council resolution 
dates back to September 2003 when former U.S. President 
Bush delivered his speech at the General Assembly’s annual 
gathering at the U.N. headquarters. He urged to put in 
place and enforce a number of legislative countermeasures 
for, and regulatory controls over, WMD proliferation – 
weapons and systems deemed so destructive as to require 
special control–, and to secure related sensitive 
materials and technology. In his words, “Because 
proliferators will use any route or channel that is open 
to them, we need the broadest possible cooperation to stop 
them. Today I ask the Security Council to adopt a new 
anti-proliferation resolution. This resolution should call 
on all members of the U.N. to criminalize the 
proliferation of weapons—weapons of mass destruction, to 
enact strict export controls consistent with international 
standards, and to secure any and all sensitive materials 
within their own borders. The United States stands ready 
to help any nation draft these new laws and to assist in 
their enforcement.”216  
Notably, in their General Assembly speeches, the 
representatives of the Russian Federation and France, 
along with the U.K., also urged the U.N. as a whole to act 
																																																						
216“President	 Bush	 Addresses	 United	 Nations	 General	 Assembly,”	 document	 available	 online	 at:	
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030923-4.html		
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against proliferation. As the Russian representative 
stated: “A serious challenge to the modern world is the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means 
of delivering them. And the most dangerous of all is for 
them to fall into the hands of terrorists. Methods 
of eliminating these threats are well known. They include 
further universalizing existing non-proliferation system, 
consolidation of international inspection tools, 
introduction of safe technology in nuclear production 
and energy.”217 The U.K. raised the question of Security 
Council action during the General Assembly, saying: "We 
all know that proliferation is one of the greatest threats 
we face. Much good work is being done by U.N. agencies, 
particularly the IAEA. But the Security Council itself has 
not addressed this issue for 10 years [arguably referring 
to the 1992 Presidential Statement in which for the first 
time the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was 
seen as a threat to international peace and security]. It 
is time that it did."218  
As such, before negotiations over a draft text, there 
already was an embryonic consensus among four Security 
Council permanent members over the dangers of new 
proliferation pathways and the loopholes embedded in 
existing treaties. For example, more than a year before 
																																																						
217	See,	President	Putin’s	speech	at	the	58th	session	of	the	General	Assembly	of	the	United	Nations,	25	
September	2003.	Online	at:	http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22128		
218	See	Datan.			
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the speeches of September 2003, the U.K., France and 
Russia made a political commitment to the Kananaskis 
principles. China as the fifth permanent member of the 
Security Council and fifth recognized NPT’s NWS however 
did not attend the G-8 Summit, nor did speak in favor of 
any Council action at the General Assembly meeting. China 
also acted as a guarantor of the principles of sovereignty 
and non-interference in domestic affairs by negotiating 
cautiously during the negotiations, especially in matters 
of textual interpretation.219 France, the U.K., the U.S. and 
Spain were also original parties to the PSI. In sum, early 
interest alignment among four of the five veto-wielding 
Security Council members was already significant.220  
However, as opposed to agreeing on the urgency of 
addressing novel proliferation dangers, the enactment and 
implementation of responses would prove much more 
daunting. The negotiating process followed emerges as both 
conventional and revolutionary in character. It was 
conventional in the sense that debates took place first 
among like-minded states, it then expanded to include the 
fifth Security Council permanent member, that is, China, 
and the other non-permanent Council members. Finally, 
																																																						
219	 Interview	 with	 Will	 Tobey,	 Senior	 Fellow,	 Belfer	 Center	 for	 Science	 and	 International	 Affairs,	
Cambridge,	April	2016.			
220	 In	 addition,	 the	European	Union’s	 Strategy	against	WMD,	adopted	 in	December	2003	at	 a	 time	of	
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given the far-reaching implications resulting from the 
measures called for, the entire membership of the U.N. was 
invited to share their views in an open session of the 
Security Council.221 This latter move is what sets the 
negotiating process apart with respect to previous 
Security Council practice.  
It was revolutionary essentially because, after 
having secured agreement within the P-5 and the other 
elected members, debates expanded to include not only the 
entire membership of the U.N. and regional groupings, but 
also committed non-governmental organizations. Standard 
Security Council practice has it that discussions over 
draft resolutions – especially those that involve hard 
security issues and those that may be adopted under 
Chapter VII as Resolution 1540 was – would take place in 
closed sessions. Given the nature and scope of the draft 
resolution and the stated intention to adopt it under 
Chapter VII rules (thus not only potentially envisioning 
enforcement powers and even the threat or use of force in 
cases of non-compliance, but also raising the Resolution’s 
legal profile to the very top of the international law 
hierarchy), the P-5 likely predicted that there would be 
greater than usual friction and, a week before its 
adoption, an open meeting was held in which over 30 
countries participated. Not even Resolution 1373 
																																																						
221	Arguably,	representatives	of	states	spoke	for	many	when	they	commended	the	Security	Council	and	
the	sponsors	of	the	Resolution	to	consult	with	the	wider	U.N.	community.		
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concerning measures to address the threats posed by 
terrorism, adopted in 2001, which most closely resembles 
the text, spirit and design of Resolution 1540, enjoyed 
such a degree of involvement. As the representative of the 
Philippines remarked during that session, “Those who are 
bound should be heard. This is an essential element of a 
transparent process and is the best [way] to proceed on a 
resolution that demands legislative actions and executive 
measures from the 191 Members of the United Nations.”222  
While proliferation risks were invariably assessed as 
“imminent,” “urgent” or “serious” and some form of policy 
response deemed as needed, it is instructive to highlight 
the contentious points raised by a number of delegations. 
The most debated issues raised during the open debate on 
22 April 2004 included: the legally binding nature of the 
provisions; the legislative activity of the Security 
Council and the consequent bypassing of national 
parliaments; the appropriateness of the use of Chapter VII 
and, relatedly, whether non-compliance would automatically 
lead to enforcement actions; the scope of the measures 
called for in the Resolution, specifically with regard to 
the terms “non-state actors”, “delivery means” and 
“related materials”; the emphasis on non-proliferation to 
the detriment of both disarmament and peaceful cooperation 
in the nuclear, chemical and biological domains; and, 
																																																						
222	See	the	4950th	meeting	of	the	Security	Council,	22	April	2004,	2.		
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finally, the functions, roles and composition of the 
follow-up monitoring committee.  
As to the first controversial point raised by a 
number of delegation, it is to note that the first and 
foremost motive behind Resolution 1540 was to fill a legal 
gap in state-centric non-proliferation regimes by adding 
the new dimension of state-less, border-less 
proliferation, epitomized by the Khan global nuclear 
smuggling network. As a matter of fact, the majority of 
speakers at the April 22 open debate, as well as during 
the official adoption date on April 28, highlighted that 
non-proliferation regimes did not fully address the issue 
of how to prevent access by non-state actors to such 
weapons.  
Regarding the legally binding nature of the 
Resolution on all U.N. membership, it is to remember that 
not all the provisions thereof, though 1540 was adopted 
under Chapter VII powers, are of such a nature. The 
mandatory paragraphs are those numbered 1 to 5 and 12, 
commonly referred to as the “decides that” paragraphs, 
which are deemed to exercise added legal heft than those 
numbered 6 to 11, and in which the Security Council 
obliges all states to: a) refrain from supporting non-
state efforts to access nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons, materials, equipment and technology; b) adopt and 
enforce “appropriate effective laws” in those domains; c) 
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establish effective domestic controls; d) establish “a 
Committee consisting of all members of the Council, which 
will, calling as appropriate on other expertise, report to 
the Security Council for its examination, on the 
implementation of this resolution” and, finally, the not-
so ephemeral paragraph 12 in which the Security Council 
decided to “remain seized of the matter,” thereby 
monitoring its developments on a continuous basis.223  
Relatedly, a number of delegations also discussed the 
Security Council’s right to assume the role of a ‘global 
legislator’ overriding the authority of national 
parliaments in matters of internal affairs and especially 
as concerns states’ domestic legislation, some arguing 
that the Council was going beyond its mandate and some 
others stressing that, as a clear international peace and 
security threat, WMD proliferation fell squarely within 
its mandate.  
A number of permanent and non-permanent members cited 
the flexibility with which the Council was allowing states 
to implement the provisions of the resolution. In this 
regard, the Spanish Ambassador said that the resolution 
"was not intrusive as it gives States leeway on how to 
internally interpret its implementation."224 Notably, the 
representative of France added that the Council was simply 
"establishing the goals, but leaving each state free to 
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define the penalties, legal regulations and practical 
measures to be adopted" to fulfill them.225 Even the most 
vocal detractor, Pakistan, made it clear that the 
elasticity the Council allowed states in implementing the 
resolution was part of the reason that it could join 
others in adopting the text.226  
On the use of Chapter VII powers, Pakistan noted: “A 
legitimate fear arises that when one sees the draft 
resolution under Chapter VII, with language such as that 
used – to ‘combat by all means’ – an authorization is 
being sought which could justify coercive actions 
envisaged in Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, including 
the use of force.”227 The U.K., however, confirmed that: 
“the draft resolution is not about coercion or 
enforcement. Many delegations have raised questions about 
the Chapter VII legal base for the draft resolution and 
about what that implies. What this draft resolution does 
not do is authorize enforcement action. Any enforcement 
action would require a new Council decision.”228 The U.S., 
after having explained why Chapter VII should be invoked, 
said that the draft resolution was of the same opinion by 
stating squarely that 1540 was not about enforcement. 
Other speakers also acknowledged these reassurances. 
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When it comes to definitional issues, several 
representatives opined that a number of concepts contained 
in the draft resolution were not sufficiently precise and 
asked for clarifications on the definition of terms such 
as “non-state actor”, “means of delivery” and “related 
materials”. The representative of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran said that the draft resolution contained certain 
concepts and definitions that were either inadequately 
elaborated or inconsistent with the terms and definitions 
embodied in existing international instruments.229 According 
to the text of Resolution 1540, a “non-state actor” is an 
‘individual or entity, not acting under the lawful 
authority of any state in conducting activities which come 
within the scope of this resolution.” While the preamble 
refers to non-state actors such as those listed in the 
Security Council resolutions on terrorism (Resolutions 
1276 of 1999 and 1373 of 2001), this indicates only the 
Council’s primary focus on terrorism.  
However, the definition is wide enough to cover 
private commercial enterprises. While the phrase “not 
acting under the lawful authority of any state” would 
cover, for example, a group of terrorists manufacturing or 
transporting weapons of mass destruction, it also includes 
companies transporting weapons without the necessary 
governmental authorization. The bottom-line effect is that 
																																																						
229	Repertoire	of	the	Practice	of	the	Security	Council,	2004-07,	812-4.		
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every state must control all those involved in such 
activities, not simply non-state actors. The term “means 
of delivery” refers to “missiles, rockets and other 
unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, 
or biological weapons, that are specially designed for 
such use.” As such, it covers any means of delivery 
specially designed, manufactured or modified for such use, 
thereby making sure the legitimate development, trade and 
use of systems such as missiles and unmanned drones are 
not hindered. The term “related materials” refers to 
“materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant 
multilateral treaties and arrangements, or included on 
national control lists, which could be used for the 
design, development, production or use of nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons and their means of 
delivery.” By adding the words “equipment” and 
“technology”, the broad definition stands to include so-
called dual-use goods – that is, goods that can be used in 
both civilian and military applications.  
Regarding disarmament, in one of the earliest and yet 
most detailed accounts of the negotiations, Datan notes 
that only at the end of the negotiating process when non-
permanent Council members were invited to express their 
views on the draft text some disarmament references were 
added. To begin with, the pre-ambular portion of the 
resolution notes that proliferation means “proliferation 
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in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction” and 
that preventive action includes the implementation of 
“multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or 
prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or 
biological weapons,” as well as the need for “all member 
states to implement fully the disarmament treaties and 
agreements to which they are party.” As a number of 
commentators have noted, the interpretation of Resolution 
1540 can be ‘stretched’ to encompass efforts to prevent 
not only horizontal but also vertical proliferation.230  
However, several delegations were of the view that 
the Resolution did not emphasize disarmament enough. 
Indeed, besides the pre-ambular portion of the Resolution, 
there are no disarmament references in the operative part. 
For example, Norway spoke for many in saying that “Non-
proliferation and disarmament are two sides of the same 
coin. The irreversible destruction of stockpiles of WMD is 
the best guarantee that such weapons do not fall in the 
wrong hands.”231 Similarly, the President of the Security 
Council, speaking on behalf of his country, stressed that 
Germany would have preferred seeing a disarmament 
reference in the operative part as well and not just in 
the preamble.232  
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Lastly, outstanding questions surrounding the 
mandate, function and composition of the monitoring 
committee were explored. At the outset, it is to note that 
a strong precedent was already set by Resolution 1373 of 
2001 establishing the Counter-Terrorism Committee to 
oversee national implementation. Views regarding the 
feasibility of a similar monitoring body for Resolution 
1540 spanned from those who preferred the committee to 
play a rather passive role whose major task was to receive 
reports by states, such as was the case with Pakistan, to 
those who saw the follow-up body as a building block to 
successful implementation, such as was the case with the 
U.K., France and the Russian Federation.  
As to its mandate, the future review body would have 
lasted for a period of no more than six months (then 
extended to 2 years following the open Council session). 
States were to report back on their implementation efforts 
and future plans to fulfill the resolution’s requirements. 
Though the Committee’s terms of reference were still to be 
adopted (the 1540 Committee was established in late 2004), 
the representative of Spain stated that the future 
committee should be “governed by principles of 
cooperation, equal treatment and transparency, and 
technical assistance to states should be one of its key 
components.”233 Almost a week after the open meeting on the 
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draft text, on 28 April the Security Council gathered to 
cast its vote.  
Largely as a result of the process followed, the 
resolution was adopted by consensus. Despite the legal and 
political points previously raised, such as the distrust 
about the nature and scope of the resolution, the nebulous 
mandate and role of the monitoring body, the achievement 
of unanimity underscores the positive effects the 
accommodating negotiation process and cooperative, 
inclusive approach had on the outcome. However, when the 
establishment phase of resolution 1540 is isolated, it is 
not straightforward to identify the factor(s) that 
theories of, and lower-level approaches to, international 
regimes highlight to provide explanations for the 
formation of cooperative agreements and institutional 
arrangements. Clearly, this case seems to prove neo-
liberalist explanatory accounts over both neo-realist, 
power-based as well as over norm-based, constructivist 
interpretations. The real and perceived rational self-
interest of states has worked in the direction of making 
them agree to cooperate in the first place, even to the 
real and perceived detriment of other principles that have 
been vocalized during the negotiations. Even the most 
vocal critical of the whole 1540 enterprise in the 
negotiations shared in tandem with the sponsors of the 
resolution the basic objective of preventing the 
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proliferation of deadly weapons and technology to and by 
non-state actors. In addition, the creation of an 
international monitoring body adds to neo-liberal accounts 
of cooperation. Given the participatory and somewhat 
transparent negotiating process, US or P-4 hegemony (not 
leadership) and later P-5 supremacy can be ruled out. For 
example, even if the underlying reasons remain unclear, 
the U.S. resisted the idea of having a subsidiary body of 
the Security Council monitoring and reviewing 
implementation and initially omitted any disarmament 
reference.  
In short, the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1540 
does not reflect entirely the preferences of the process 
initiator and the conventionally depicted most powerful 
actor in the international system, that is, the U.S. 
Further, while relevant, especially in the early aftermath 
of the Resolution’s adoption, normative concerns were 
sidestepped by the uttered urgency to address non-state 
proliferation threats and risks in a comprehensive manner. 
Specifically, despite the evidence that the new non-
proliferation arrangement and the contextual background 
within which it was conceived was seen by some states as 
yet another unnecessary imposition of the advanced global 
North against the developing global South or as yet 
another exposure of the cleavage between haves and have-
nots, thus suggesting a power-based dynamic, actually the 
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unfolding of the negotiations and the unanimity reached 
leads one to conclude that normative and power-based 
factors mattered comparatively less than neo-liberal 
dynamics. Relatedly, besides normative concerns, legal 
anxieties were also circumvented. While principles of 
international law have it that binding requirements for 
states to comply with should come with their consent and 
involvement, mostly in the form of treaties, Resolution 
1540 created a binding regime that bypassed traditional 
decision-making and lawmaking processes.  
As a final note that proves the relative validity and 
accuracy of neo-liberal, institutional explanatory factors 
is the envisioning of a monitoring body. Since 2004, 
(though Resolution 1540 was adopted in April, the so-
called 1540 Committee became fully operational only in 
early 2005), its mandate has been extended on three 
occasions through the unanimous adoption within the 
Security Council of Resolutions 1673 in 2006 and 1810 in 
2008, and most recently, Resolution 1977 in 2011. Among 
other implementation promoting tools and practices, 
Resolution 1977 extended the mandate of the 1540 Committee 
by ten years until 2021. In addition, the Committee 
conducted two comprehensive reviews in 2009 and 2016. 
Another full review is scheduled to take place before the 
expiration of the (current) mandate in 2021.  
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The operating procedures, tools and the larger 
approach to arranging implementation and managing its 
review experimented by the 1540 Committee is considered as 
carrying a substantial explanatory power for the relative 
success of this cooperative arrangement. Indeed, and 
especially in light of the contested nature of Resolution 
1540 and the mentioned controversies and challenges 
expressed by states during negotiations, the contemporary 
increasing acceptance and constructive engagement by the 
international community, including by once skeptical 
states, regional groupings thereof and other essential 
stakeholders such as the private industry, the scientific 
community, international and national organizations, 
suggests that the analytical focus should turn to explore 
governance dynamics related to the ‘back-end’ of the 
cooperation loop, and implementation monitoring and 
assessment processes in particular.  
 
1540’s framework of implementation  
 
This section evaluates the operating procedures and tools 
to facilitate implementation of the requirements mandated 
by Resolution 1540. At the outset, two reminders are in 
order. First, implementation is understood as a given set 
of procedures and activities to gather, monitor and assess 
the achievements of agreed upon objectives and, should 
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cases of poor performance or non-adherence by states to 
given courses of action such as is the case, for example, 
with voluntary reporting, the procedures and solutions 
with which to remedy such shortcomings. Second, given the 
‘all-in’ approach followed by the Security Council to the 
prevention of nuclear, chemical and biological 
proliferation, implementation and review procedures and, 
most critically, the nature of risks may differ and 
intersect across and within domains. Suffice to note the 
rapidly advancing fields of nanotechnology, synthetic 
biology, 3-D printing and unmanned drones, all of which 
challenges non-proliferation. Technological innovation is 
occurring at a speed that calls into question the ability 
of governments and organizations to keep pace. This status 
of affairs poses formidable implementation challenges. 
Relatedly, the existence of multiple arrangements that 
impact on 1540-related issues makes the study of 
effectiveness more challenging and its dynamics more 
difficult to isolate. A focus on the governance mechanisms 
is thus even more warranted. After an analysis of the 1540 
arrangement, the following section also scrutinizes those 
processes and tools being institutionally employed over 
the course of more than a decade of 1540 implementation 
monitoring and review.  
To begin with, a useful starting point is an 
examination of the three follow-up Security Council 
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Resolutions 1673, 1810 and 1977, each of which not only 
and simply recalled states’ obligations under Resolution 
1540 and extended the time-limited operations of the 
Committee by two, three and ten years, respectively, but 
also and most critically added new facets in terms of 
operating procedures and implementation-enhancing tools. 
The functions of the 1540 Committee have expanded at each 
single adoption of successor resolutions.234 Remarkably, 
while the text of Resolution 1540 envisioned the creation 
of a subsidiary body of the Security Council by explicitly 
deciding in operative paragraph 4 to establish a Security 
Council Committee, no reference is made in the text as to 
how the 1540 Committee would identify, monitor and gauge 
measures adopted by states. Paradoxically, and as former 
1540 expert Volker Beck has remarked, by reading the text 
of 1540, and specifically operative paragraphs 5 and 8(c) 
on the IAEA and OPCW and multilateral cooperation, 
respectively, the functions of the soon-to-become 1540 
Committee in facilitating national implementation are 
rather vague or outright inexistent.235  
Another interrelated aspect, which impacts on the 
effectiveness of the 1540 regime, is associated with the 
ways in which states’ willingness to cooperate and provide 
the Security Council with first or updated reports in 
																																																						
234	Kasprzyk,	“The	1540	Committee’s	capacity-building	function	set	for	increased	efficiency,”	In	Towards	
the	2016	Comprehensive	Review,	2015,	39-49.			
235	Beck,	“The	tools	of	the	1540	Committee,”	2.	Towards	the	2016	Comprehensive	Review,	1-7.		
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particular might be boosted. Indeed, while states were 
called upon to provide the Security Council 1540 Committee 
with a report on the measures taken or that they intend to 
take to implement the resolution within six months from 
the adoption of the resolution, no guidance or sample 
template as to how to report was offered. This facet will 
also be taken into consideration. Notably, it can already 
be advanced that the Security Council has given the 1540 
Committee some extra leeway and margins of action as to 
the devising of appropriate engagement strategies and 
implementation-inducing tools under which to operate. As 
we shall see, the 1540 Committee has not shied away from 
making use of its freedom of action and has thus 
experimented unusual methods and practices.  
 
The 1540 Committee and the Group of Experts  
 
The 1540 Committee is technically a subsidiary body of the 
Security Council as provided by article 29 of the U.N. 
Charter and comprised of the five permanent and the ten 
rotating U.N. member states represented by Ambassadors, 
senior level diplomats and members of Permanent Missions 
to the U.N. Following in the footsteps of similar 
mechanisms and mimicking the modus operandi of the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee, states acknowledged the need 
for objective, depoliticized expert knowledge and, to this 
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end, set up in 2005 a loosely connected group of 
independent subject-matter consultants, each of which is 
appointed by the U.N. Secretary-General and subsequently 
approved by the Committee. With the adoption of the third 
and most far-reaching document after Resolution 1540, 
namely Security Council Resolution 1977 of 2011, the 
experts group was formally established.236  
The Expert Group, initially consisting of four or 
less operating members, has currently up to nine 
specialists. The 1540 Committee and its associated experts 
are primarily tasked with two main duties and 
responsibilities, namely the examination of reports 
submitted and activities performed by states and the 
periodic fulfillment of accountability activities to the 
Security Council, such as the submission of implementation 
monitoring and review reports and other information to the 
Security Council. Since the beginning of its operations in 
2005, the 1540 Committee has adopted so-called periodic 
“programs of work” to accomplish its broad mandate. In 
essence, work programs serve the purpose of identifying 
priorities and major areas on which to focus attention and 
scarce human and financial resources at its disposal.  
The main concerns outlined in early documents, and 
specifically in those programs of work adopted until 2008, 
centered on five themes: the encouragement of submission 
																																																						
236	U.N.	Security	Council	Resolution	1977	of	2011.	Paragraph	5(a).			
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of first reports by states; technical assistance; 
cooperation with Security Council Committees; the 
examination of reports and additional information provided 
to the Committee; and measures to promote transparency. It 
is also worth noting that since 2009, and in stark 
contrast to early work programs, these guiding documents 
mapping out priorities became more detailed, formalized 
and ambitious.  
Following the 2009 adoption of the eight program of 
work, in order to focus efforts more efficiently and 
redirect the work of the experts more productively, the 
1540 Committee established a system of four Working 
Groups, open to all members of the Committee, with each 
focusing on what transpires to be the key pillars of the 
1540 regime. These are: monitoring and national 
implementation; assistance; cooperation with international 
organizations, including the Security Council Committees; 
and transparency and media outreach. The working groups 
meet separately and jointly on a regular basis, usually 
once a month and sometimes along with the 1540 Committee. 
Notably, and as a further corroboration of 1540’s 
institutionalization, the 2012 work program emphasizes a 
new, crucial theme on which the 1540 Committee and its 
experts are to focus. The inclusion of the agenda item 
titled “administration and resources,” both financial and 
human, not only points to common sustainability issues, 
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but also reflects an almost natural bureaucratic 
enlargement process, which is a salient feature of almost 
any organization dealing with the prevention of evolving 
risks.  
Rather innovatively, following the adoption of 
Resolution 1977, the 2012 program of work stresses that 
the Committee will promote, among other initiatives, 
greater transparency by holding open meetings on working 
groups’ outcomes. As such, meetings’ agenda, summaries of 
meetings and deliberation outcomes are now posted on the 
official website of the 1540 Committee. National reports 
by states and their respective Committee-approved matrices 
are now also put in the cyberspace. In this regard, online 
posting has increased substantially over time, and 
especially after the adoption of Resolution 1977 in 2011, 
which among other steps, explicitly requests the 1540 
Committee to continue to institute transparency measures 
and organize activities and outreach events to selected 
stakeholders at the international (for example, IAEA), 
regional (for example, EU) and national (for example, 
parliamentarians) level. Over time, informative and 
constructive interactions have been established with civil 
society, namely with industry, academia, professional 
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associations, members of national Parliaments and the 
interested public.237  
In this regard, since 2012 the 1540 Compass, an 
electronic journal devoted to exploring 1540-related 
issues published by the University of Georgia-affiliated 
Center for International Trade and Security in cooperation 
with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, provides a 
platform for interdisciplinary dialogue among a wide range 
of civil society actors, including former and current 1540 
experts. The outreach to wider audiences and public 
opinion has also featured among related 1540-centered 
implementation strategies. A section called “1540 in the 
media” has been created on the official 1540 Committee’s 
website where attention-grabbing videos, opinion pieces 
and newspaper articles are posted.238  
As mentioned, no less important has been the 
consensus decision taken in 2012 to increase the number 
and visibility of the Group of Experts. This suggests that 
the Committee’s workload has increased significantly over 
the course of time. In addition, according to primary 
sources, the nature of the expertise related to 1540 has 
gradually changed over time from a political to a more 
technically bent professional profile. This may not only 
indicate that, while at the beginning experts were tasked 
																																																						
237	For	a	snapshot	on	these	and	additional	‘marketing’	activities,	see	the	website	of	the	1540	Committee	
in	 particular	 the	 “transparency	 and	 media	 outreach”	 section	 at:	
http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/transparency-and-outreach/general-information.shtml	
238	Cerini,	 “Transparency,	communication	and	outreach,”	 In	Towards	 the	2016	Comprehensive	Review,	
81-7.	
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with reaching out to skeptical states and other 
stakeholders, thereby seeking to soothe existing and 
perceived cleavages, mainly related to the negotiating 
procedure and content of the Resolution, but also is 
indicative of the greater acceptance of benefits accrued 
in implementing the Resolution.239    
While both the Committee and the Experts Group carry 
out the operative work of collecting and studying the 
reports submitted by states, the UN Secretariat, and 
specifically the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the 
Department of Political Affairs, provides substantive, 
administrative and logistical support. The Office for 
Disarmament Affairs also contributes to the Committee’s 
activities in the areas of implementation, assistance, 
cooperation, outreach and transparency. In addition, 
financial support is granted by the so-called U.N. Trust 
Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities, also 
shortened as the U.N. 1540 Trust Fund, which is backed by 
voluntary contributions from states and designed for 
financing specific projects to further 1540 implementation 
by identifying gaps in implementation and assistance 
needs. The U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs manages the 
Trust Fund.  
Institutional interactions have also increased, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. In this regard, it is 
																																																						
239	 Email	 correspondence	 and	 interview	with	 Thomas	Wuchte,	 former	 U.S.	 1540	 Coordinator,	 August	
2016.		
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worth noting that early programs of work only mentioned 
cooperation with existing Security Council Committees. 
Beginning in 2008-2009, they included cooperation with 
sector-specific international and regional organizations, 
such as the IAEA and the EU, respectively. With the 
adoption of the first successor resolution to 1540, namely 
Resolution 1673 of 2006, the Security Council invited the 
Committee to investigate ways in which cooperation with 
international, regional, and national organizations could 
be boosted in order to help countries fully implement the 
requirements set out in Resolution 1540. As a result, the 
Committee cooperates with a wide range of over 40 such 
bodies. At the regional level for example, the African 
Union, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe have all adopted 
decisions and resolutions to give their political and 
practical backing.240 Similar actions have also been taken 
by international organizations, such as the IAEA, which 
now incorporates 1540’s obligations in its Integrated 
Nuclear Support Plans.  
Further, the widening and deepening of interactions 
and assistance can also be seen in another institutional 
innovation, namely the establishment and designation in 
2015 of regional points of contact, acting as hubs for the 
streamlining of implementation activities. Proposals for 
																																																						
240	Email	correspondence	with	Thomas	Wuchte,	August	2016.				
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the establishment ‘national and regional 1540 hubs’ for 
assistance and coordination related matters were already 
called for by the 1540 Committee right at the beginning of 
operations in 2005. This long-term and soft approach to 
creating and maintaining expertise might well lead to an 
epistemic community. Even though a number of participants 
in the April 2016 Civil Society Forum on 1540 complained 
about a lack of nuclear-related institutional interactions 
and advocated for an all-encompassing strategic 
coordination, one should take time seriously and not 
forget how it all began.  
 
1540 implementation review process: tools and practices  
 
In the course of the initial timeframe within which the 
mandate was set to last according to the text of 
Resolution 1540, the work carried out by the Committee and 
the contingent of experts focused on fostering the 
submission of national reports and analyzing incoming 
ones.241 Ironically, while the text does inform on what 
implementation measures states shall take, it does not 
prescribe how to do so, ultimately affecting working 
relationships on both the Committee and national sides. In 
doing so, and preeminently as a matter of practice and 
																																																						
241	However,	 already	by	 the	beginning	of	2006	 it	was	acknowledged	 that	 the	 “Full	 implementation	of	
resolution	 1540	 by	 all	 States	 is	 a	 long-term	objective,”	 thereby	 suggesting	 the	 open-ended	 and	 long-
term	dimensions	of	the	issues	involved.	See,	in	this	regard,	the	fourth	“Program	of	Work	of	the	Security	
Council	Committee	established	pursuant	to	Resolution	1540	(2004),”	4.		
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trial-and-error, it was realized that states had different 
interpretations as to what measures to prioritize and how 
much detailed reporting should be. In addition, the 
complexity of juridical and judicial systems at national, 
regional and international levels made any assessment 
particularly difficult to gauge.  
As a consequence, upon the experts’ own initiative, a 
so-called “1540 matrix” was developed for each U.N. member 
state in order to summarize the requirements states should 
fulfill according to Resolution 1540. Concomitantly, a 
database was set up in order to keep track of legislative 
and other regulatory measures. These are the two first and 
most prominent tools that have been developed. These are 
primarily intended to maintain records of and keep tabs on 
the legal, regulatory, administrative and organizational 
matters related to effective implementation of the 1540 
regime. The latter tool provides mostly legal and 
regulatory information about a country’s implementation 
status.  
Notably, via implementation of transparency measures 
by the 1540 Committee, such as the promotion gained in 
open-source online posting, the database also acts as a 
guiding reference for other countries and as a ‘peer 
pressure’ tool on what and how states may report. The 
former tool, namely the 1540 Matrix, represents a 
standardized structure of rows and columns representing 
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the general and the specific requirements arising from the 
text of 1540 Resolution and, in particular, those 
obligations revolving around the implementation of 
“appropriate effective” controls of borders, exports, 
financing of proliferation-related activities and several 
other countermeasures related to non-state actors. 
Alongside each field, states indicate the measures they 
have taken. The information in the 389 sub-fields of the 
Committee-approved matrices comes from reports by states 
and international specialized organizations, such as the 
IAEA.  
In the first seven years of its existence, the 
Committee has adopted a quantitative approach to 
evaluating reports of how states were implementing 
measures related to nuclear, chemical and biological 
terrorism prevention set in Resolution 1540 and its 
subsequent ones. While the rate of reporting states was 
reportedly low during the timeframe within which states 
were to report back, it nonetheless steadily grew, and by 
the end of 2016, 176 states representing over 90 percent 
of the whole U.N. membership have submitted reports. 
Several of them have done so more than once or twice, in 
addition to submitting additional information, action 
plans, letters and other forms of correspondence). Thus 
far, 17 states have not submitted a report.  
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While much remains to be carried out in terms of data 
collection methods and evaluation approaches,242 an equally 
valuable qualitative approach to gauging across-the-board 
national implementation is taking shape, in part spurred 
by the increased sophistication in the experimentation 
with additional strategies and tools geared to maintaining 
focus and achieving commonly desired objectives. Paragraph 
3 states that “the Committee will conduct a comprehensive 
review on the status of implementation of resolution 1540, 
both after five years and prior to the renewal of its 
mandate, including, if necessary, recommendations on 
adjustments to the mandate, and will submit to the 
Security Council a report on the conclusions of those 
reviews.”243 Accordingly, “The Comprehensive Review [is] 
intended to address ways of improving implementation by 
identifying and recommending specific, practical and 
appropriate actions to this end, and to analyze the 
operation of the Committee in the conduct of its tasks and 
recommend any changes considered necessary.”244 Resolution 
1977 of 2011 constitutes a step to the 
institutionalization of an atypical 1540 non-proliferation 
regime.  
This may be further suggested, in no small part, by 
new forms and areas of cooperation envisioned in the text 
																																																						
242	Husbands,	“Transparency:	Effective	Implementation	of	UNSCR	1540	Now	and	in	the	Future,”	UNSCR	
1540	Civil	Society:	A	Dialogue	with	Academia	and	Civil	Society,	11-12	April	2016,	78-81.		
243	Paragraph	3	of	Resolution	1977	of	2011.		
244	See,	“Background	Paper	for	the	Formal	Open	Consultations	by	the	1540	Committee,”	1540	Compass,	
issue	11,	2016,	36.		
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of Resolution 1977 of 2011. Along with updated versions of 
the legislative database and the matrices, the Security 
Council, the Committee and the emerging Group of Experts 
have experimented with additional dynamic implementation-
enhancing tools and iterative procedures. These processes 
include the development of technical reference guides, the 
sharing of effective implementation practices, the 
encouragement to draft and execute so-called “National 
Implementation Action Plans,” as well as the 
accomplishment of thorough experts’ official “visits” to 
states at their invitation.245 Taken together, these 
mutually reinforcing implementation tools are meant to 
update national measures, review the steps undertaken and 
sustain dialogue among a wide range of stakeholders, 
spanning the whole hierarchy from high-level political 
figures down to the sector-specific actors and facility 
operators.  
The exploration of novel monitoring and review 
practices has been partly stimulated by the outcomes of 
the two review exercises undertaken in 2009 and 2016. In 
Security Council Resolution 1810 of 2008, the 1540 
Committee was requested to consider a comprehensive review 
of the status of implementation of Resolution 1540. To 
this end, the assessment of proliferation risks, the 
identification of measures to address critical issues that 
																																																						
245	Final	document	on	 the	2016	Comprehensive	Review	of	 the	Status	of	 Implementation	of	 resolution	
1540	(2004),	at:	http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/comprehensive-review/2016.shtml		
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have not yet been resolved and the experimentation with 
possible new implementation approaches have been key focus 
areas, which ultimately prompted the establishment of the 
above-mentioned tools. In addition, highlighting the 
rediscovered participatory nature of the formal 
discussions held as part of the Comprehensive Review, the 
1540 Committee held an open meeting in 2009 that witnessed 
broad participation by civil society groups. States, 
international, regional and national organizations and 
other stakeholders participated in both the review process 
and in the open meeting. The final 2009 report on the 
status of implementation is six-page long.  
What is more, the perception of the growing impact of 
non-governmental actors on supporting implementation has 
been corroborated by the first-ever Civil Society Forum 
organized by U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs in 
January 2013 and designed to integrate non-governmental 
entities, i.e. – all of those actors that are not legally 
bound to the text of Resolution 1540 and subsequent ones – 
into multilateral efforts to achieve the resolution’s 
goals. In 2016 the Committee carried out extensive 
consultations with states and non-governmental groups 
aimed at seeking input and ideas for effective 
implementation. The final 2016 report on the status of 
implementation is over one-hundred-page-long. In the final 
analysis, the participatory, consultative and yet 
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constructive nature of such knowledge sharing and trust 
building processes almost clashes with real and perceived 
theoretical and methodological assumptions about dealing 
with seemingly intractable issues. Similarly, prior to 
formal open consultations of the 1540 Committee with 
states, organizations and civil society were conducted in 
the summer of 2016, a second Civil Society Forum, titled 
“A Dialogue with Academia and Civil Society,” was hosted 
by the U.N. University in cooperation with the U.N. Office 
for Disarmament Affairs. Civil society is a term that does 
not only include actors within and insights from academia 
and non-governmental organizations, but also cover private 
sector networks and national parliamentarians.  
In this regard, new interactions and outreach events 
to targeted audiences have been developed and, in some 
cases, have even been gradually institutionalized, such as 
a process that led to a series of conferences named after 
the German city of Wiesbaden where the first such 
multilateral summit of private-sector stakeholders and 
1540 experts, and largely involving strategic trade and 
exports controls, took place.246 As such, progress over the 
years has also been made on those requirements that by 
some interpretations are considered voluntary, non-legally 
binding in nature for states to implement, yet crucially 
																																																						
246	 For	more	 information	on	 the	 so-called	 “Wiesbaden	process”	of	 industry	engagement,	 see	Kiessler,	
“Private	 sector	 engagement:	 Lessons	 learnt	 from	 the	 Wiesbaden	 Process,”	 in	 Towards	 the	 2016	
Comprehensive	Review,	88-96.		
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important in WMD prevention efforts. Already the text of 
Resolution 1540, specifically paragraphs 8(d) and 9, “call 
upon” all states to “develop appropriate ways to work with 
and inform industry and the public regarding their 
obligations under such laws” and facilitate “dialogue and 
cooperation on nonproliferation.”  
 In conclusion, the ‘non-standard’ operating 
procedures, tools and the broad approach to arranging 
implementation and managing its review experimented by the 
1540 Committee and the 1540 Group of Experts carries 
substantial explanatory power for the relative success of 
this cooperative non-proliferation arrangement. It surely 
is a relative success compared with traditional 
cooperative instances across the nuclear proliferation 
domain, such as are the cases with the NPT review process. 
It is also a success story relative to similar U.N. 
Security Council-mandated Committees, such as has been the 
case with U.N. counter-terrorism sanctions committees and 
regimes. In light of the contested nature of Resolution 
1540 and the questions raised by national delegations 
during negotiations, the constructive engagement by the 
1540 Committee along with its group of experts, as well as 
the increasing acceptance by the international community 
as a whole speak volumes to the largely positive 
repercussions on effectiveness that adaptive processes 
generate.    
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Chapter V 
 
The Nuclear Security Summits  
 
Introduction 
 
In international politics, Summits are multilateral 
gatherings of heads of states and governments that take 
place sparingly. Therefore, they may well denote and 
symbolize events of the highest significance. More often, 
the conduct of multilateral diplomacy is routinely 
conducted at ministerial, administrative, and technical 
levels from which experts and negotiators are drawn. 
Summits involving the direct presence of states’ “chief 
executive officers” represent the exception rather than 
the rule. Even more exceptional has been the practice of 
holding repeated high-level intergovernmental meetings on 
a biannual basis between 2010 and 2016 that aimed at 
tackling novel nuclear proliferation challenges faced by 
existing regimes. Specifically, the topic of the security 
of nuclear and radioactive materials enjoyed scant 
interest among countries, and has been, and in some 
aspects still is, an evolving and contested policy area. 
The non-proliferation regime embodied by the NPT and 
ensuing agreements has historically left the issue of 
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nuclear security at the margins of the mainstream 
political attention.  
The Nuclear Security Summits are the latest iteration 
in a series of efforts aimed at highlighting the need for 
multilateral cooperation, institution-building, and 
operational coordination in mitigating the threats posed 
by the confluence of two phenomena that have – up until 
the onset of the 21st century – enjoyed a splendid (policy) 
isolation. The first, older phenomenon is state-centric, 
state-led, and symbolized by the presence of nuclear 
weapons, the storage of stocks of fissile materials 
(highly enriched uranium and plutonium), and the use of 
sensitive radioactive materials for legitimate peaceful 
purposes. The security implications of these materials are 
further exacerbated by the consolidation and expansion of 
civilian nuclear power programs across the world. The 
second, newer phenomenon is state-less, and comes from the 
fact that malevolent non-state actors, including 
terrorists, have both the intent and capabilities to go 
down the nuclear route.247 Once relegated to the fringes of 
																																																						
247	The	confirmation	that	9/11	hijackers	initially	considered	targeting	nuclear	power	plants	increased	the	
concern	 about	 nuclear	 terrorism.	 One	 of	 the	 ISIS-affiliated	 suspects	 involved	 in	 the	 November	 2015	
terrorist	 attacks	 in	 Paris	 stalked	 a	 Belgian	 researcher	 working	 in	 a	 nuclear	 research	 reactor	 –	 where	
highly	 enriched	 uranium	 is	 used	 –	 by	 videotaping	 his	 whereabouts.	 According	 to	 a	Washington	 Post	
editorial	on	13	March	2016,	“the	authorities	speculate	that	it	might	have	been	part	of	a	terrorist	plot	to	
capture	nuclear	materials	from	the	center,	perhaps	by	kidnapping	the	researcher.”	According	to	a	New	
York	Times	article	published	on	4	April	2016,	the	attacks	that	targeted	a	metro	station	and	an	airport	in	
Brussels	were	 fallback	 options	 as	 the	 original	 plan	was	 to	 strike	 a	 nuclear	 plant.	 Also,	 in	 Belgium,	 in	
August	 2014,	 there	was	 the	 first-ever	 reported	 case	 of	 nuclear	 sabotage,	which	 arose	 out	 of	 a	 labor	
dispute.	An	 insider	caused	U.S.	$	100	 to	200	million	worth	of	damages	by	opening	a	 locked	vault	and	
crashing	a	turbine.	More	shockingly,	during	investigations	it	came	out	that	another	worker	at	the	same	
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specialized technical debates, the security as well as the 
governance implications of nuclear materials management 
has surged to the highest level in the international 
political agenda, in no small part due to the high-level 
attention brought by the Summits approach to the issue of 
nuclear security in recent years.248  
This chapter focuses on the formation and evolution 
of the latest multilateral nuclear non-proliferation 
arrangement, namely the Nuclear Security Summits. The 
Nuclear Security Summits are a case of what this study has 
problematized as new forms of institutionalized 
multilateral cooperation in the field of nuclear non-
proliferation. These novel arrangements go beyond first-
order instances of interstate cooperation embodied in 
building-block instruments and institutions, such as the 
NPT, the IAEA, and ensuing second-order arrangements. 
Scholarly inquiry and diplomatic capital have largely 
focused on the establishment and development of a nuclear 
weapons-centered regime by discussing (theoretically) and 
negotiating (operatively) on the three foundations of the 
international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The three 
pillars embodied in the NPT consists of “non-
proliferation” – a series of efforts that aim to control 
the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries; 
																																																																																																																																																														
plant	had	left	Belgium	to	fight	 in	Syria	as	a	foreign	fighter	under	ISIS	and,	upon	his	return,	he	had	still	
been	able	to	retain	his	security	clearance	and	access	highly	sensitive	installations	(Bunn	et	al.	2016:	29).		
248	 The	 first	multilateral	 cooperative	 nuclear	 non-proliferation	measures	 to	 focus	 on	 preventing	 non-
state	 actors,	 and	 terrorist	 organizations	 in	particular,	 are	 the	PSI	 of	 2003,	 Security	Council	 Resolution	
1540	of	2004,	and	the	Global	Initiative	to	Counter	Nuclear	Terrorism	of	2006.	
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“disarmament,” – efforts that aim to reduce the roles and 
numbers of nuclear weapons among those countries that 
already possess them; and “peaceful uses,” – efforts that 
aim to promote civilian applications of atomic energy.249 
The strategies and mechanisms – or otherwise what Krasner 
has called the “norms, principles, rules, and decision-
making procedures” – used to govern nuclear and other 
radioactive materials, rather than the weapons themselves, 
reflect the complexities associated with a changed 
environment where threats no longer stem solely from 
states and governments, but rather from a variety of non-
state actors. Even though nuclear dangers have increased 
during the post-Cold War period, the threat dimension is 
not the only dynamic worth monitoring to explain the rise 
and fall of non-proliferation cooperative projects – the 
overarching explananda of this study.  
In a recent overview of the political science 
literature on nuclear non-proliferation, Scott Sagan has 
noted a lack of analyses on non-proliferation arrangements 
other than those stemming from the NPT and the IAEA, and 
concluded by observing that these “newer institutions are 
crucial elements of the regime and should not be 
																																																						
249	Studies	on	the	security	implications	of	nuclear	materials	are	rare;	exceptions	include	Avenhaus	et	al.	
(2002);	a	National	Academy	of	Sciences	report	released	in	1994	on	plutonium	by	Matthew	Bunn	and	by	
John	Holdren.	Since	2003,	the	Belfer	Center	for	Science	and	International	Affairs’	Project	on	Managing	
the	Atom	has	issued	regular	reports	on	the	security	of	nuclear	weapons	and	fissile	materials	and	on	the	
topic	of	nuclear	terrorism.	Recently,	see	Bunn	et	al.	(2016).		
	 232	 	
ignored.”250 As a matter of fact, this study analyzes newer 
multilateral cooperative ventures by disaggregating the 
traditional international nuclear (weapons) regime into 
individual components in order to explore the sources of 
multilateral cooperation and evaluate progress or regress 
in nuclear threats management institutions. In fact, it 
seeks in the final analysis to test the claim that these 
newer institutions, such as the Nuclear Security Summits, 
constitute elements of an international non-proliferation 
regime that is not centered on the NPT. 
The objective of this chapter is twofold. The first 
is to gauge the relative explanatory power of a set of 
factors that IR literatures on regimes and non-
proliferation identify when exploring the rise and demise 
of multilateral cooperation. The second is to assess 
governance effectiveness by focusing on the governance 
dimensions. In so doing, the institutional innovations 
brought by the Summits approach to nuclear security are 
highlighted. The chapter unfolds in four sections. The 
first seeks to clarify the terms nuclear security and 
nuclear terrorism, while the second section examines the 
genesis of the Nuclear Security Summit initiative and its 
formative stages. Consideration is given to the objectives 
of, and motivations for, the initiative, as well as the 
																																																						
250	 Sagan,	 “The	 Causes	 of	 Nuclear	Weapons	 Proliferation,”	Annual	 Review	 of	 Political	 Science	 17(14):	
225-44,	2011,	239.	Studies	on	the	effectiveness	of	the	NPT-based	regime	include	Fields	and	Enia	(2009),	
Grotto	(2010),	and	Fields	(2014).	On	legitimacy,	but	still	based	on	the	NPT	regime,	see	Rathbun	(2006).	
On	 the	 role	 of	 domestic	 politics	 and	 economics,	 see	 Solingen	 (2007);	 on	 principles	 and	 norms,	 see	
Rublee	(2009)	and	Müller	and	Wunderlich	(2013).		
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drivers behind states willingness to participate. The 
third section analyzes the negotiation process, the 
substantive outcomes reached, as well as the main 
accomplishments in the context of the four biennial 
Summits that took place between 2010 and 2016. In 
particular, it identifies those institutional novelties 
that depart from NPT-based cooperative activities by 
considering the stages of implementation and its review 
process. The final section evaluates the findings in light 
of the factors that are considered by the literatures on 
international regimes to make multilateral cooperation 
both manifest in the first place and sustainable over 
time.  
 
Nuclear security and nuclear terrorism: problems of 
definition  
 
At the outset, it is useful to break down the terms 
nuclear security and nuclear terrorism into their core 
features. Like many other nuclear-related concepts, these 
notions cover a wide-ranging set of interlocking issues 
and, if not properly defined and contextualized, make it 
difficult for scholars and practitioners alike to fully 
grasp the policy implications. The most authoritative and 
widely used definition of nuclear security is found in 
IAEA documents. Ironically, the mandate of the IAEA does 
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not explicitly include any security-related work on 
nuclear materials.251 The IAEA was created to promote the 
peaceful applications of nuclear energy while preventing 
its use for (malicious) military purposes, that is, 
acquisition of nuclear weapons by so-called NPT’s “non-
nuclear-weapon states.” However, the IAEA does crucial 
work on nuclear materials. Indeed, almost the whole budget 
is spent on protecting and monitoring sensitive nuclear 
materials. This is true only in so far as measures of 
safety and safeguards are concerned. This is no small 
distinction.   
In order to better grasp the differences between 
safeguards, safety, and security, it is useful to specify 
what safety and safeguards are. The IAEA defines nuclear 
safety as a set of measures for “the protection of people 
and the environment against radiation risks, and the 
safety of facilities and activities that give rise to 
radiation risks.”252 Nuclear safeguards are agreements 
between an NPT non-nuclear-weapon states and the IAEA in 
																																																						
251	Contrary	to	nuclear	safety	and	safeguards,	no	nuclear	security-specific	treaties	exist.	The	Convention	
on	 the	 Physical	 Protection	 of	 Nuclear	 Materials	 (CPPNM)	 is	 the	 only	 legally	 binding	 undertaking	 on	
nuclear	security,	opened	for	signature	in	1980	and	entered	into	force	in	1987.	However,	the	devil	lies	in	
the	details.	The	CPPNM	focuses	on	a	“physical	protection	approach”	to	nuclear	material	solely	used	for	
peaceful	 purposes	 and	 during	 international	 transport.	 It	 does	 not	 cover	 the	 protection	 of	 nuclear	
facilities,	nor	domestic	transport.	In	2005,	the	Parties	to	the	CPPNM	adopted	an	Amendment	in	order	to	
broaden	its	scope.	Notably,	it	is	set	to	enter	into	force	soon	(so	the	announcement	at	the	2016	Nuclear	
Security	Summit)	following	the	pressure	exercised	by	the	Summits.	IAEA	Director	General	Amano	stated	
that:	 “The	 Amendment’s	 entry	 into	 force	 is	 the	 single	 most	 important	 step	 to	 strengthen	 nuclear	
security”	(IAEA	2016).	The	U.S.	ratified	the	Amendment	in	2015,	thereby	setting	a	good	precedent	and	
pressuring	hold	out	states	to	follow	suit.	U.S.	ratification	spurred	the	way	for	the	Amendment	to	come	
into	existence.		
252	 See,	 IAEA.	 2007.	 “IAEA	 Safety	 Glossary,	 Terminology	 Used	 in	 Nuclear	 Safety	 and	 Radiation	
Protection.”	 Vienna:	 IAEA.	 Document	 available	 at:	 http://www-
pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pub1290_web.pdf.		
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order to monitor and verify the non-diversion of nuclear 
materials and related activities to military uses. In 
contrast to nuclear security, IAEA safety and safeguards 
measures are enshrined in legally binding treaties that 
are internationally monitored. In contrast to nuclear 
safety, no consensus exists about the threat or even the 
consequences posed by the acquisition of nuclear or other 
radiological materials by non-state actors. Because of the 
perceived sensitivities involved in nuclear security 
matters, states, international organizations, and the 
private sector, including industry, have generally been 
reluctant to share information, even within national 
borders.  
The IAEA defines nuclear security as “the prevention 
and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, 
unauthorized access, illegal transfer, or other malicious 
acts involving nuclear material, or other radioactive 
substances or their associated facilities.”253 This 
definition is very broad and encompasses the whole 
spectrum of (policy) responses ranging from prevention, 
physical protection, recovery of lost radiological 
sources, and stopping nuclear smuggling to nuclear 
forensics, export and border controls and emergency 
response. The working definition of nuclear security used 
																																																						
253	 See,	 IAEA.	 2015.	 “Nuclear	 Security	 Series	 Glossary.”	 Vienna:	 IAEA.	 Document	 available	 at:	
http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/security/nuclear-security-series-glossary-v1-3.pdf.		
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here is narrower and focuses on the prevention side 
because of non-state actors’ record of demonstrated 
capabilities and interests to acquire and possibly use 
weapons and materials of mass destruction. The definition 
that this study adopts is also materials-centered, 
process-based, and focuses on the supply rather than on 
the demand side. In short, I focus on prevention, that is, 
measures to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism, thus 
leaving aside detection, criminalization, emergency 
responses and the like. I also focus on materials, that 
is, the two fissile materials without which nuclear 
weapons cannot exist (highly enriched uranium and 
separated plutonium) as well as high-risk radioactive 
sources (those radiological materials that, owing to their 
characteristics, are suitable for a “dirty bomb”) rather 
than nuclear facilities, power plants, and associated 
installations. Further, I understand nuclear security as a 
process and not as an outcome. Preventing nuclear 
terrorism requires constant vigilance, continuous 
monitoring, and adaptation in light of evolving threat 
assessments and changing contextual environment. Lastly, 
the definition I adopt is focused on the supply side 
because that is where the international community has the 
most leverage to act. In other words, this study assumes 
that nuclear power and the many peaceful applications of 
the atom will stay with us for the foreseeable future and, 
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as such, the focus is on the reduction and minimization in 
(and eventual elimination of) fissile and other high-risk 
radioactive materials that pose a security threat. A final 
note regarding fissile materials deserves to be mentioned. 
Highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium have both 
peaceful and military uses. At this point, I do not 
discriminate between the two as the large majority of 
measures that are agreed upon and implemented in one realm 
(the civilian) could be applied to the other (the 
military).  
Other contrasting definitions exist that confuse the 
issue. There is still widespread misunderstanding about 
the meaning and policy implications of nuclear security, 
even among independent experts and negotiators. The latter 
group has never been trained in nuclear security 
negotiations, as the topic of nuclear non-proliferation 
has been historically dealt with within disarmament or 
export control frameworks.254 For example, in the formal and 
informal conversations and interviews that I have 
conducted, some within the U.S. Department of Energy and 
Department of Defense, along with personnel at national 
nuclear research laboratories, refer to nuclear security 
as a series of measures aimed at ensuring the security, 
reliability and effectiveness of nuclear weapons. On the 
contrary, some within the U.S. Department of State, the 
																																																						
254	 Conversations	 held	 with	 Matthew	 Bunn,	 Belfer	 Center	 for	 Science	 and	 International	 Affairs,	
Cambridge.		
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White House, as well as outside experts and analysts in 
the NGO community converge on the notion that nuclear 
security is about reducing and, wherever economically and 
technically feasible, eliminating dangerous materials.  
As such, definitions of nuclear security differ even 
within national entities and professional groups, and 
range across the entire spectrum from maintaining well-
cared nuclear weapons and stockpiles of fissile material 
to measures conducive to disarmament. As this definitional 
overview makes clear, nuclear security can be understood 
as the physical protection of materials and facilities 
(the “guns, guards, and gates” approach as also implicitly 
called for by the CPPNM), the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons (the safeguards approach), nuclear safety (the 
radiation protection approach), and the security and 
maintenance of nuclear weapons into the future (military-
industrial approach).  
Similar to the definitional conundrums that 
exacerbate technical and political cooperation, the 
catchphrase nuclear terrorism can also be misleading, thus 
making nuclear security negotiations and implementation 
extremely difficult tasks to accomplish. Whereas nuclear 
security deals with a wide variety of measures to protect 
materials from a series of intentional malevolent acts, 
nuclear terrorism refers to a series of plausible 
scenarios in which non-state actors (and not only 
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terrorists) can breach those measures. According to both 
literatures on “nuclear terrorism” and cases of reported 
incidents, nuclear terrorism events can unfold in four 
ways.255 These include the possibility of acquisition and 
use of: a) intact weapons; b) fissile materials; c) 
radioactive sources and d) radioactive material 
dispersion, either through sabotage of or attack against a 
nuclear facility or while nuclear or other material is in 
transit. While scenarios a) and b) are low-probability and 
high-consequence events, scenarios c) and d) are assessed 
as high-probability and lower-consequence events. Indeed, 
cases of nuclear sabotage and attacks against nuclear 
facilities have happened before. Taken together, these 
four scenarios encompass nuclear terrorism and, as such, 
reflect the multilayered prevention policies that states, 
organizations, and the private sector have adopted. In 
doing so, the international community has developed a 
seemingly patchy framework composed of overlapping 
instruments and institutions. As noted during an interview 
with Matthew Bunn, one of the main rationales of the 
entire Nuclear Security Summit initiative was to design 
ways to improve the existing complex of instruments by 
enhancing their interaction.256 Whether this has been 
achieved remains to be seen.  
																																																						
255	 For	 comprehensive	 book-length	 studies	 on	nuclear	 terrorism,	 see	 Ferguson	 and	Potter	 (2005)	 and	
Allison	(2005).	
256	Matthew	Bunn,	Co-Principal	 Investigator	at	the	Project	on	Managing	the	Atom	at	the	Belfer	Center	
for	 Science	 and	 International	 Affairs,	worked	 at	 the	White	 House’s	 Office	 of	 Science	 and	 Technology	
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The genesis of the Summits idea  
 
The first documented evidence of the Summits idea dates 
back to July 2008 during U.S. Senator Obama’s presidential 
election campaign remarks in which he called for a “Summit 
on Preventing Nuclear Terrorism.”257 However, the most 
impactful vocalized iteration came in April 2009 when 
President Obama laid out a strategy to counter nuclear 
dangers writ large, known as the “Prague Agenda,” which 
reflected both change and continuity in thinking and doing 
non-proliferation. In terms of continuity, the speech 
reiterates past commitments including calls for renewed 
U.S.–Russian, bilateral nuclear arms control reduction 
efforts; the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty, opened for signature in 1996 and yet to 
enter into force after more than 20 years; the resumption 
of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, 
which also began in 1996 (treaty not yet negotiated); and 
the strengthening of the NPT. In terms of change, Obama’s 
																																																																																																																																																														
Policy	 during	 the	Clinton	Administration.	He	describes	 himself	 as	 a	 “nuclear	 policy	 entrepreneur.”	He	
worked	 under	 Senator	 Obama’s	 presidential	 campaign	 in	 2008	 and	 he	 has	 been	 credited	 with	
persuading	the	Obama	administration	to	take	up	the	initiative	to	secure	all	vulnerable	nuclear	materials	
within	 four	 years	 by	 having	 world	 leaders	 talking	 about	 the	 topic.	 Interview	 with	 Matthew	 Bunn,	
Cambridge.	11	March	2016.		
257	 Note	 the	 transition	 from	 the	 original	 emphasis	 put	 on	 “nuclear	 terrorism”	 in	 2008	 to	 “nuclear	
security”	 in	 2009.	 The	 archives	 of	 the	 American	 Presidency	 Project	 at	 the	 University	 of	 California	 at	
Santa	 Barbara	 contain	 a	 vast	 amount	 of	 sources	 retrievable	 online	 as	 regards	 policy	 platforms,	
presidential	 candidates’	 remarks,	 speeches	 and	 other	 documentation.	 See:	
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=93199#axzz2gOg4n57B.	 To	 be	 sure,	 the	 first	 historical	
example	 of	 world	 summits	 on	 the	 topic	 dates	 back	 to	 1996	 following	 an	 initiative	 by	 the	 Russian	
Federation	who	convened	a	G-7	Summit	on	Nuclear	Security	in	Moscow.	According	to	recent	estimates,	
the	U.S.	 and	 Russia	 together	 hold	 90	 percent	 of	 operational	 nuclear	weapons	 (ca.	 15,000).	 About	 99	
percent	of	weapons-grade	HEU	is	held	by	states	that	possess	nuclear	weapons,	and	most	of	it	belongs	to	
Russia	and	the	U.S.	(IPFM	Report	2015).		
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so-called “Prague Speech” added a new dimension to the 
usual nuclear non-proliferation’s to-do list, namely 
countering the threats posed by non-state actors, and 
terrorists in particular, across the nuclear domain.  
An example of the priority given to this issue is 
found in the 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, an official 
document that lays out actionable steps to reduce nuclear 
dangers, released shortly after the Prague speech.258 The 
document states that the “prevention of nuclear terrorism 
and proliferation is at the top of the U.S. policy agenda” 
and “today’s most immediate and extreme danger.” Recently, 
in a March 2016 opinion article published in the 
Washington Post, U.S. President Obama himself wrote, “of 
all the threats to global security and peace, the most 
dangerous is the proliferation and potential use of 
nuclear weapons”.259  
Most interestingly, in both the Nuclear Posture 
Review and in Obama’s Prague speech, nuclear security 
efforts were linked to the end goal of achieving the 
“peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” 
In his Prague speech, Obama declared that, “we must ensure 
that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon.” And 
notably, in order to help deal with this dynamic threat, 
																																																						
258	See	Nuclear	Posture	Review,	Report	(April	2010),	U.S.	Department	of	Defense,	iv.	Document	available	
at:http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_R
eport.pdf.		
259	 “Obama:	How	we	can	make	our	vision	of	a	world	without	nuclear	weapons	a	 reality,”	Washington	
Post,	30	March	2016.		Document	available	at:	https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obama-how-
we-can-make-our-vision-of-a-world-without-nuclear-weapons-a-reality/2016/03/30/3e156e2c-f693-
11e5-9804-537defcc3cf6_story.html?hpid=hp_no-name_opinion-card-b:homepage/story.		
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he stated that the world needed “durable institutions” to 
prevent this nightmare scenario from happening.260  
While the 2009’s Prague speech brought discussions on 
nuclear security to the highest level of political 
attention, lower-level technical cooperation on the matter 
started at least two decades earlier. As a matter of fact, 
under the so-called U.S.-led Cooperative Threat Reduction 
(CTR) programs, the legislation for which was co-authored 
by Democrat Senator Sam Nunn and Republican Senator 
Richard Lugar, the U.S. began cooperating with states of 
the former Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation in 
particular, to increase the status of nuclear security by, 
among other things, dismantling and removing nuclear 
weapons, and by securing sensitive nuclear materials and 
associated facilities. These activities continued for two 
decades until 2013 when U.S.–Russia nuclear security 
cooperation ceased to continue as part of both broader 
geopolitical reasons (the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s 
annexation of the Crimean peninsula top the list) and 
narrower considerations embedded in the terms of trade of 
the cooperation agreement signed in 1992, and in 
particular the “buy American” provision.261 CTR programs 
have been praised as one of the most successful non-
																																																						
260	The	White	House,	Office	of	the	Press	Secretary,	“Remarks	by	President	Barack	Obama,	Prague,	Czech	
Republic,”	5	April	2009.		
261	 See,	 Kassenova,	 “Implementing	 Nonproliferation	 Programs:	 The	 Cooperative	 Threat	 Reduction	
Process	 in	 the	 Former	 Soviet	 Union,”	 in	 Knopf,	 International	 Cooperation	 on	WMD	 Nonproliferation,	
2016.			
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proliferation activities in history and, no less 
important, an important first-hand experience and learning 
opportunity for U.S. Senator Obama himself. Indeed, 
Obama’s first official trip as a freshly elected U.S. 
Senator was a tour of CTR projects with Senator Lugar.  
Notably, Obama’s public remarks following that trip 
offer an insight into his views on the topic, as he 
remarked that “sources that can be used to construct 
improvised nuclear weapons and radiological devices must 
be brought under control” and that this will require 
“sustained involvement by the executive branch, Congress, 
non-governmental organizations, and the international 
community.  Everyone has a role to play, and everyone must 
accelerate this involvement.”262 Perhaps even more 
instructively, Obama wrote term papers in college on the 
topic of nuclear arms control and the need to “break the 
Cold War mentality,” and published a magazine article in 
1983 in which the phrase “nuclear weapons-free world” 
first emerges.263 In sum, the Summits approach to nuclear 
security has evolved from President Obama’s long-standing 
interest in nuclear issues.  
																																																						
262	 Council	 on	 Foreign	Relations,	 Transcript,	 “Challenges	 ahead	 For	Cooperative	 Threat	Reduction,”	 (1	
November	 2005).	 Document	 available	 at:	 http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-
disarmament/challenges-ahead-cooperative-threat-reduction-rush-transcript-federal-news-service-
inc/p9138.		
263	 “Obama’s	 Youth	 Shaped	 His	 Nuclear-Free	 Vision,”	 The	 New	 York	 Times,	 4	 July	 2009.	 Document	
available	at:	http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/05/world/05nuclear.html?_r=0.	I	thank	Matt	Bunn	and	
Nicholas	 Roth,	 research	 associate	 at	 the	 Belfer	 Center’s	Managing	 the	 Atom	 Project,	 for	 this	 and	 for	
directing	my	attention	to	the	newspaper	article.	See	also,	Turpen	(2016:	184).		
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 The 2009 Prague speech was the natural result of a 
long learning process initiated decades earlier, but it 
must also be located within the context of two prominent 
newspapers op-eds titled “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons” 
and “Toward a Nuclear-free World,” published by George 
Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn in 
2007 and 2008, respectively. In a strange turn of history, 
these authors and leading U.S. statesmen are some of the 
most prominent practitioners and staunchest defenders of 
the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. The essence of their 
argument is that while nuclear weapons have been essential 
in maintaining international peace and security during the 
Cold War, reliance on them is an illusion in today’s 
complex threat environment; the emergence of new nuclear 
weapon states and non-state groups, including terrorists 
bent on martyrdom and mass destruction, presents dangers 
of a totally new kind. Hence, the goal of nuclear weapons 
abolition. The initiative of the so-called “Gang of Four” 
to write a bi-partisan opinion piece was followed around 
the world by former statesmen in such countries as Poland, 
Norway, France, Russia, the U.K., Italy, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Belgium.264  
																																																						
264	For	the	U.K.,	see	Hurd,	Douglas,	Malcolm	Rifkind,	David	Owen,	and	George	Robertson,	The	Times,	30	
June	 2008.	 For	 Italy,	 see	 D’Alema,	 Massimo,	 Gianfranco	 Fini,	 Giorgio	 La	 Malfa,	 Arturo	 Parisi,	 and	
Francesco	Calogero,	Corriera	della	Sera,	24	July	2008.	For	Germany,	see	Schmidt,	Helmut,	Richard	von	
Weizsäcker,	Egon	Bahr,	and	Hans-Dietrich	Genscher,	 International	Herald	Tribune,	9	January	2009.	For	
Poland,	see	Kwasniewski,	Alexander,	Tadeusz	Mazowiecki,	and	Lech	Walesa,	Gazetata	Wyborcza,	3	April	
2009.	For	Norway,	see	Nordli,	Odvar,	Gro	Harlem	Brundtland,	Kåre	Willoch,	Kjell	Magne	Bondevik,	and	
Thorvald	 Stoltenberg,Aftenposten,	 4	 June	 2009.	 For	 France,	 see	 Juppé,	 Alain,	 Bernard	 Norlain,	 Alain	
Richard,	and	Michel	Rocard,	Le	Monde,	15	October	2009.	For	the	Netherlands,	see	Lubbers,	Ruud,	Max	
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It is instructive to note that one of the common 
themes highlighted in the various op-eds is a reference to 
the threat of nuclear terrorism. Relatedly, it is 
important to note that the international endorsement of 
the threats posed by nuclear terrorism should not be seen 
as a U.S. obsession or a strategic diversion from 
longstanding NPT-based commitments, such as nuclear 
disarmament and unfettered cooperation in the peaceful 
applications of atomic energy. As Obama acknowledges, the 
two “Gang of Four” op-eds had an important influence in 
shaping his views on nuclear weapons and set the stage for 
his Prague Speech.265   
In the follow-up to that speech, Obama reiterated his 
commitment at the U.N. General Assembly in September 2009 
and introduced a resolution to the U.N. Security Council 
calling for steps to move toward a world without nuclear 
weapons. As testimony to the importance attached to 
nuclear disarmament and multilateral cooperation, in 
October Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. His 
perspectives on nuclear weapons and disarmament, along 
with his commitments to multilateral diplomacy and to 
breaking away from past unilateralist approaches of the 
previous U.S. Administration, were among the reasons for 
																																																																																																																																																														
van	 der	 Stoel,	 Hans	 van	 Mierlo,	 and	 Frits	 Korthals,	 Altes	 NRC	 Handelsblad,	 23	 November	 2009.	 For	
Belgium,	see	Claes,	Willy,	 Jean-Luc	Dehaene,	Louis	Michel,	and	Guy	Verhofstadt,	De	Standaard	and	Le	
Soir,	19	February	2010.		
265	See,	Kelleher	and	Reppy,	Getting	to	Zero:	The	Path	to	Nuclear	Disarmament,	2011,	xv.		
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giving him the award.266 As a consequence of all of these 
steps, the groundwork was set for nuclear security to rise 
to the forefront of the international political agenda.  
The first gathering of heads of states and 
governments, as well as of relevant international 
organizations took place in the U.S. in 2010, followed by 
another one in the Republic of Korea in 2012 and in the 
Netherlands in 2014. At a speech in Berlin in 2013, Obama 
announced that contrary to his initial Prague proposal, a 
fourth Summit-level gathering to communicate, discuss, and 
negotiate on the subject of nuclear security be convened 
in the U.S. in 2016.267 As Laura Holgate, in her role as 
U.S. lead negotiator for the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, 
remarked: “in announcing his intent to host a fourth and 
final Nuclear Security Summit, President Obama situated 
this decision squarely in the vision of a world without 
nuclear weapons that he put forward in Prague in 2009. 
Clearly, disarmament cannot be fully achieved in a world 
in which nuclear terrorism remains a threat.”268  
 
 
 
																																																						
266	 See	 Nobel	 Peace	 Prize	 Announcement	 as	 video	 delivered,	
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/announcement.html.		
267	The	idea	of	hosting	a	fourth	and	final	Summit	was	first	aired	by	Gary	Samore,	Obama’s	former	White	
House	 Coordinator	 for	 Arms	 Control	 and	WMD,	U.S.	 chief	 negotiator	 for	 the	 2010	 and	 2012	Nuclear	
Security	Summits,	and	current	Director	for	Research	at	the	Belfer	Center	for	Science	and	International	
Affairs.	 See	 Arms	 Control	 Today,	 28	 February	 2013,	 “Samore	 Suggests	 2016	 Security	 Summit.”	
Document	 available	 online	 at:	 https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_03/Samore-Suggests-2016-
Security-Summit.					
268	Quote	taken	from	Choubey	(2015:	16).		
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The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit  
 
As noted by U.S. Secretary of Energy, Ernest Moniz, in a 
speech delivered at the 2015 Carnegie International 
Nuclear Policy Conference, the 2010 Summit established at 
the outset a historical record as the largest gathering of 
world leaders ever convened by a U.S. president since the 
1945 Conference on International Organization in San 
Francisco, which established the UN and its Charter.269 
Attended by 38 heads of states, several high-level 
ministerial delegations, and the heads of three 
international organizations, that is, the U.N., the IAEA 
and the EU, the 2010 Summit produced a consensus document, 
called Communiqué, and a plan of action, called Work Plan, 
that set forth specific objectives and actions to secure 
vulnerable nuclear materials around the world.  
Notably, the 47 participating states included NPT 
countries with and without nuclear weapons, but also, and 
most importantly, countries with nuclear weapons that fall 
outside the purview of the NPT framework. Participants 
also ranged from major nuclear energy users to aspiring 
nuclear states. The senior White House Director for WMD 
Terrorism and U.S. chief negotiator for the 2016 Nuclear 
Security Summit, sometimes referred to as “Sherpa,” Laura 
Holgate, remarked: “We were looking for countries that 
																																																						
269	 See	 http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/01/05/2015-carnegie-international-nuclear-policy-
conference/hyxl.	Transcript	version	is	also	available.		
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represented diversity where we had states with nuclear 
weapons, states that don’t have weapons, states with large 
nuclear programs and those with small nuclear programs.”270  
In the informal discussions and formal interviews 
conducted for this case study, two interrelated factors 
stand out as the main explanations for the coming together 
of so many different countries: Obama’s personal 
leadership and the catalyzing role of principles and 
norms. I found this to be remarkable that all 
interlocutors have agreed on this point. More than other 
factors that theories of rules-based international 
cooperation or international regimes highlight, such as 
domestic politics, hegemony or self-interest 
considerations, it was the combination of the 
peculiarities of Obama and his profound knowledge of 
nuclear issues as well as his powerful ideas that 
motivated states to join the initiative. As the genesis of 
the Summits initiative has highlighted, personalities and 
knowledge convergence have mattered more than drivers 
embedded in threat perceptions and power considerations. 
Laura Holgate, who previously worked at Harvard’s Kennedy 
School of Government as assistant to former U.S. Secretary 
of Defense Ash Carter has noted, the Summit initiative was 
a “Belfer conspiracy.”271 Similarly, and most recently, an 
																																																						
270	Quote	taken	from	Findlay	(2014:	3).		
271	See	the	Youtube	video	at:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFhrjVwpirg.		
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Israeli official has observed that this experiment has 
been “a victory of the Belfer Center.”272  
In sum, the genesis of this latest multilateral 
endeavor suggests that academics and non-governmental 
organizations played an important role as sources and 
framers of new ideas and norms. They actually contribute 
more than creating new ideas, new principles or new norms. 
They are the medium by which knowledge gets diffused and 
reinforced through academic and executive training. 
Explaining multilateral cooperation on non-proliferation 
requires examining the different roles played by national 
governments, international organizations, non-governmental 
organizations, research centers, industry and the ways in 
which these actors affect the rise and sustainability of 
nuclear multilateralism.  
 The 2010 outcome documents were the product of a 
series of closed-door negotiations and preparatory 
meetings that took place before the actual Summit. These 
preparatory meetings were conducted in the U.S., in the 
Netherlands and in Japan. It is worth noting that the 
Communiqué stated at the outset the shared goals of 
nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and 
peaceful nuclear energy uses, but without explicitly 
mentioning the NPT. The wording was careful not to 
reference the NPT due to the sensitivities of the three 
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non-NPT nuclear weapon possessors’ states of India, 
Pakistan, and Israel, all of which participated in the 
Summit process. At the same time, however, the 
participants also asserted the shared objective of nuclear 
security, thereby adding an extra dimension (or a fourth 
pillar) to the non-proliferation agenda.  
The Communiqué also promoted efforts to improve the 
security and accounting of nuclear materials and to 
strengthen regulations on fissile materials; ratification 
of key nuclear security treaties; the importance of 
capacity-building among law enforcement, industry and 
technical personnel; additional resources for the IAEA to 
develop and facilitate implementation of guidelines and 
the sharing of best practices among nuclear industry. The 
Work Plan laid out a series of specific, actionable steps 
to strengthen the international nuclear security 
framework.  
Four innovations ensured the outcome of the Nuclear 
Security Summit in 2010. The first is the novelty of a 
U.S. President urging participants not to make pre-
packaged rhetorical speeches and engage in genuine 
dialogue.273 Strictly related to this point, and prior to 
the actual summit, President Obama encouraged 
participating Heads of States and Governments to announce 
measures that they would be able to undertake voluntarily. 
																																																						
273	 Interview	 with	 Kelsey	 Davenport,	 Director	 for	 Nonproliferation	 Policy	 at	 the	 Arms	 Control	
Association,	Washington,	D.C.	24	February	2016.		
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This was achieved through a second remarkable innovation, 
that is the use of so-called “house gifts,” named after 
guests who bring presents to a party.  
This governance innovation was a response to one of 
the greatest weaknesses of multilateral negotiations, 
namely the problem of the lowest-common-denominator 
agreements that naturally result from the consensus rule. 
To be sure, some “house gifts” were effort-free and rather 
modest in the sense that individual countries pledged to 
provide additional funds to international organizations. 
Others, on the contrary, were innovative and forward-
looking in the sense that they established new regional 
nuclear security cooperation hubs, called nuclear security 
Centers of Excellence for purposes of specialized 
education and training. As such, leveraging knowledge-
based dynamics in such ways in order to develop and 
maintain cooperation is recognized as a key priority. 
“House gifts” helped to raise awareness about nuclear 
security issues and enabled high-level attention to be 
focused on it.  
The third innovation lays within the sui-generis 
negotiation process itself and its rather novel division 
of labor. High-level, political Sherpa and lower-level, 
technical Sous-Sherpa meetings negotiated the Summit 
outcomes in advance of the official gathering. In 
addition, so-called Yaks carried out the work from their 
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respective national capitals and were responsible for 
integrating the different official perspectives on nuclear 
security that usually arise when different government 
departments and agencies (and ensuing interests) are 
involved.  
Finally, though not originating from a U.S. 
government initiative, an NGO Summit (rebranded Nuclear 
Knowledge Summit in 2012) and an Industry Summit took 
place, albeit concomitantly and, consequently, without 
space for much interaction, on the margins of the high-
level political gathering.  
 
The 2012 Summit in the Republic of Korea 
 
The follow-up Summit in Seoul in 2012 was intended to 
renew the commitments and, more importantly, to check 
implementation of nuclear security measures taken in 2010. 
The agenda witnessed increasing participation by states, 
the addition of INTERPOL as fourth subject-matter 
international organization, the enlargement of issues 
under negotiation that moved beyond the focus on fissile 
materials, and highly enriched uranium in particular, to 
encompass non-nuclear, radiological materials, as well as, 
in light of the Fukushima accident in 2011, the interface 
between nuclear safety and security and the importance of 
considering both dimensions for the safe and secure 
	 253	 	
development of nuclear energy. The 2012 Seoul Communiqué 
also highlighted the security implications of spent 
nuclear fuel and waste management practices as well as 
transportation security issues.  
As noted by a senior officer in the Department of 
Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, one of 
the most positive aspects of 2012 was the issuing by 
participating states of national reports highlighting 
progress made since 2010.274 However, as noted by another 
interviewee, standardized reporting mechanisms would have 
been more effective but given the sovereignty taboo in 
sharing sensitive information, it still was a positive 
step in the right direction forward.275 South Korea took 
pride in hosting the event because it was an opportunity 
to play a global and visible role in the nuclear field. 
South Korea is the world’s fifth largest nuclear energy 
producer and has emerged as a new nuclear exporter. As 
such, performing the role of host was clearly in South 
Korea’s real and perceived self-interest. Interestingly, 
the South Korean government reportedly engaged a famous 
Asian rock-star to write, perform and sing a “nuclear 
security” song at the launching of the Summit event, which 
was greeted by sumptuous fireworks.276  
																																																						
274	 Interview	 with	 senior	 government	 official,	 Department	 of	 Energy,	 National	 Nuclear	 Security	
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The Communiqué reaffirmed the value of multilateral 
instruments in the global nuclear security architecture as 
well as the role of international organizations and ended 
with calls to enhance information security and increase 
international cooperation. While producing a consensus 
Communiqué, the Summit did not produce any additional 
consensus document. This reflected the intent to signal 
continuity with, and give priority to, the Work Plan set 
forth at the Washington Summit in 2010. Although the 
results were not as impressive as those accomplished two 
years earlier, the 2012 Summit achieved some important 
remarkable accomplishments.277 Noteworthy outcomes included 
ensuring that national commitments from the 2010 Summit 
were achieved and monitored, garnering new pledges and 
emphasizing greater coordination between international and 
regional nuclear security organizations.  
One of the major innovations under the South Korean 
leadership of the Summit process was the shift from 
individual country commitments (“house gifts”) to 
multiple-country pledges (called “gift baskets”). As noted 
by two interviewees who have been involved in tracking 
nuclear security progress for the NGO community, the move 
																																																						
277	 Cirincione,	 President	of	 the	Ploughshares	 Fund,	 has	 called	 it	 an	 “underperforming	 summit”	with	 a	
“minimalist	 agenda.”	 Sharon	 Squassoni,	 director	 and	 senior	 fellow	 for	 the	 Proliferation	 Prevention	
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to joint gift baskets represents one the most significant 
stimulus for new forms of cooperation in this area. 
Through these joint statements, states pledged to work 
together on a large number of actionable nuclear security 
items, such as: developing high-density fuel that would 
enable conversion of remaining highly enriched uranium-
powered research and test reactors, thereby facilitating 
the minimization of highly enriched uranium stockpiles; 
countering nuclear smuggling, and educating personnel 
through training and education as well as the development 
and strengthening of regional nuclear security centers of 
excellence.  
According to a civil society assessment, 42 of 53 
participants signed on to at least one of the 13 gift 
baskets (Davenport et al. 2015). The move from individual 
“house gifts” to collective “gift baskets” represents one 
of the most significant innovations as to new forms of 
multilateral nuclear non-proliferation cooperation. A 
final note deserves to be stressed. The Communiqué noted 
the explicit acknowledgment of the important contributions 
of industry and civil society, highlighting the human 
dimension and the importance of nurturing a strong nuclear 
security culture. In contrast with 2010, the 2012 Summit 
side-events of both nuclear industry and non-governmental 
experts improved in terms of cohesiveness and clarity of 
purpose. For example, for the first time, the Nuclear 
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Industry Summit issued a joint statement outlining steps 
taken to improve physical protection, material accountancy 
and nuclear security culture. In addition, contrary to the 
2010 event, space for more interaction between the two 
seemingly opposite professional groups was given.   
 
The 2014 Summit in the Netherlands 
 
The preparations for the 2014 Summit already began in 
2012. In July 2012, a serious security breach at a nuclear 
weapons facility (a military facility) in the U.S. where 
hundreds of tons of highly enriched uranium are stored 
highlighted once more the multiple risks of failure even 
in the world’s most advanced nuclear security system. The 
dynamic of the incident demonstrated “a pervasive culture 
of tolerating the intolerable and accepting the 
unacceptable.”278 As much like South Korea, the Netherland’s 
reasons for hosting the 2014 Summit reflect a mix of self-
interested goals and prestige associated with the high-
level event.279 The Netherlands has played a prominent role 
in multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, 
including by being the world’s capital of international 
law. More specific reasons included Dutch awareness that a 
Pakistani metallurgist named A.Q. Khan (the father of 
																																																						
278	 Augustine,	 Letter	 to	 the	 U.S.	 Secretary	 of	 Energy,	 6	 December	 2012,	 3.	 Document	 available	 at:	
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Pakistan’s nuclear bomb) had started setting up his 
illicit global smuggling network while in the Netherlands 
and, relatedly, the role of URENCO as one of the world’s 
major producers and suppliers of enriched uranium 
services. Moreover, the Netherlands is also a major 
producer of radioactive substances. The Dutch government 
also perceives nuclear terrorism and illicit trafficking 
as a major threat given their role as a major 
transshipment point within Europe.  
For the first time since the process initiated, a 
series of so-called “track 1.5” meetings with national 
negotiating teams comprising “Sherpas” and “Sous-Sherpas”, 
representatives from international organizations and 
nuclear security experts, were held. Track 1.5 meetings 
are meetings in which senior high-level governmental 
officials involved in a given negotiation sit together 
with non-governmental and qualified subject-matter experts 
to discuss specific topics. Those governmental officials 
that take part in these dialogues do so in an unofficial 
way. Whereas the actual two-day Nuclear Security Summits 
are an example of track 1 diplomacy and, more precisely, 
are the epitome of track 1 diplomacy, given the direct 
involvement of Heads of States and Governments, the value 
of track 1.5 dialogues is to enhance understandings of a 
topic and constructively engage with those who will 
eventually make the final decision.  
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An important difference to underscore is that, while 
pre-negotiations are on-the-record and reflect individual 
countries’ interests, the three track 1.5 dialogues 
conducted between 2012 and 2014 have been off-the-record, 
exploratory consultations and were held on a non-
attribution basis, thereby allowing participants time and 
space to think freely and unconstrained. This cooperative 
effort envisioned to facilitate discussions on a secretive 
topic such as nuclear security stems from a project led by 
the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) called the Global 
Dialogue on Nuclear Security Priorities. Reportedly, these 
meetings have achieved tangible results and ideas 
generated within these meetings made it to the highest 
political level. Indeed, perhaps the most important 
success of this cross-cutting initiative has been the 
inclusion in the 2014 consensus-based Communiqué of the 
item titled “voluntary measures” intended to promote the 
need for a strengthened global nuclear security system by 
employing international standards and best practices, 
thereby allowing states to build confidence in each 
others’ nuclear security policies and practices and 
holding each other politically accountable (Hague 
Communiqué 2014: 4).  
In addition, civil society input and engagement 
during NTI’s Global Dialogue meetings proved relevant in 
pushing for the promotion of a gift basket called the 
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“Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation” and signed 
by 35 participating states, though India, Pakistan, China 
and Russia did not subscribe to the initiative. The 
signatories undertook to exceed the nuclear security 
recommendations in relevant IAEA documents and to conduct 
self-assessments and host multilateral peer review 
missions to measure how well (or poorly) they were 
performing.280 This is a testament to the values of 
including the opinions of different stakeholders and 
conducting an open and frank dialogue among experts and 
negotiators.  
Notably, the IAEA took note of this remarkable 
achievement and, following a letter submitted to the IAEA 
by the original 35 signatories, the Vienna-based Agency 
translated the Strengthening Nuclear Security 
Implementation initiative into an official IAEA document, 
which was published in October 2014 (known as INFCIRC/869 
under IAEA jargon), thereby allowing states that have not 
signed up, such as Russia and China or even non-NPT 
nuclear weapons possessor states, like India and Pakistan, 
or even states that have not participated in the Summit 
process, such as Iran, to join in at a later stage.281  
As such, INFCIRC/869 offers a potential structure for 
states to move nuclear security forward after the Summits 
																																																						
280	Interview	with	senior	policy	officer,	Nuclear	Threat	Initiative,	Washington,	D.C.,	23	February	2016.		
281	 At	 the	 2016	 Nuclear	 Knowledge	 Summit,	 it	 has	 been	 said	 that	 India	 is	 about	 to	 sign	 onto	
INFCIRC/869,	thereby	putting	pressure	on	Pakistan	to	follow	suit.		
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end in 2016. This also represents an important stand-alone 
innovation; besides the consensus rule, another weakness 
in the Nuclear Security Summit process has been its “mini-
laterality” status, that is, only a select group of 
countries have been participating in a rather exclusive 
process. In no small achievement, with the adoption of 
INFCIRC/869, an exclusive initiative became an inclusive 
effort.  
Not only in terms of building consensus, but also in 
the phase of implementation monitoring, non-governmental 
expert groups have achieved tangible results. The 
increasingly important role of experts was underscored at 
official levels during the Summit. For example, another 
influential initiative jumpstarted by NTI, in 
collaboration with the Economist Intelligence Unit, has 
focused on developing the “nuclear materials security 
index” and scoring countries’ implementation record. 
Ironically, during the 2014 official Summit, one 
government’s representative was proud to boast of her 
country as ranking 16th among 24 states examined in the 
Index, but this also highlights the importance of this 
NGO-led initiative among states.282 Besides the 
Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation initiative, 
new gift basket topics introduced included the security of 
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the maritime supply chain, nuclear forensics, and 
supporting implementation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540.  
An additional important innovation that has never 
been brought up before was the release by the government 
of the Netherlands in 2014 of the results of an IAEA-
conducted peer review mission to inspect the status of 
nuclear security policies and practices in the country.283 
This had never happened before and can be regarded as a 
watershed event in multilateral nuclear security affairs; 
not only are IAEA peer reviews voluntary and requested by 
IAEA member states, but also the related information is 
secret or, at least, kept confidential between the 
inspected state and the small IAEA nuclear security team. 
The release of the peer review results has potentially set 
a precedent for other countries to follow and created peer 
pressure to demonstrate their track record, thus 
demonstrating to the international community that striking 
a balance between the need to protect sensitive nuclear 
security information and the need to share information and 
build confidence is possible. In essence, more information 
can be safely shared and incremental opening-up can lead 
to greater cooperation among states.  
As in Seoul, the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit 
featured official parallel Summits of experts and nuclear 
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industry representatives. A priority for the Dutch 
government was “improving the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the relationship between governments and industry” (de 
Klerk 2014: 19). There was also an effort to promote the 
interaction between governments, industry, and civil 
society through the intergovernmental process. 
Representatives of industry and civil society were, for 
the first time, invited to brief the official negotiating 
teams. As a consequence, more interaction and exchanges of 
opinion was generated. The Summit proved to be dynamic for 
another reason. World leaders conducted an interactive 
scenario-based, tabletop exercise, which focused on the 
coordination of a response to a radiological incident, 
thereby enhancing common understandings of the problem 
where previously none might have existed, and its 
mitigation pathways.284 Again, leveraging such knowledge-
based dynamics in such innovative ways is a key priority 
for developing multilateral cooperation and maintaining it 
over time.    
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The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit: final act?  
 
Between March and April 2016, Heads of States and 
Governments from more than 50 countries returned to 
Washington, D.C., for the fourth and final Summit in order 
to gauge progress made in, and to set new goals for, the 
security of nuclear materials and other radioactive 
sources. Over the course of the two-day high-level 
political talks, participants followed the usual protocol 
by committing themselves to a series of initiatives aimed 
at minimizing vulnerabilities in nuclear security systems, 
while maximizing international cooperation and 
collaboration. These official statements consisted of a 
consensus-based Communiqué, a series of “gift baskets” 
such as on transport security, certified personnel 
training, and cyber security, plus a number of joint 
statements issued by countries and international 
organizations alike, such as the U.S.-China statement on 
nuclear security cooperation and the EU-U.S. statement on 
nuclear forensics. National statements and national 
progress reports were also released during the Summit.  
In addition, with a view to both carry forward the 
work after the conclusion of the Summits and maintain 
political momentum, participating states officially 
pledged to continue joint efforts through multilateral 
diplomacy by negotiating five so-called “Action Plans.” 
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Each document identifies tasks and responsibilities for 
the five international nuclear security organizations, 
i.e., the IAEA, the U.N. in its General Assembly and 
Security Council formats, Interpol – the international law 
enforcement organization, the Global Initiative to Counter 
Nuclear Terrorism – an informal international partnership 
devoted to combating nuclear and radiological terrorism, 
and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons 
and Materials of Mass Destruction – a group of donor 
countries on such issues. However, at closer look, the 
Action Plans largely restate what these organizations were 
already doing, without setting a path for future activity.  
Other commitments made provide a more solid base for 
continuous improvement and constant interaction. For 
example, more than 30 countries signed onto a gift basket 
in order to continue meeting annually on the margins of 
the IAEA General Conference as a so-called “Nuclear 
Security Contact Group” consisting of past Summits’ 
Sherpas and Sous-Sherpas in order to push forward the 
Summits agenda. Remarkably, the membership of the Contact 
Group is open to other countries, no matter if they 
participated in the Summits or not. As such, this could 
represent an important milestone for sustaining 
multilateral cooperation on nuclear security going 
forward. Furthermore, an indirect contribution of the 
Summit process has been the pressure applied to some hold 
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out states regarding the entry into force of the 2005 
Amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Materials (CPPNM).285 This amendment obliges states 
parties to secure their civilian nuclear material in use, 
storage, or transport in a manner consistent with IAEA 
guidance, and facilitates the criminalization and 
prosecution of nuclear smuggling.  
Perhaps most interestingly with a view to sustaining 
progress over the long run is the fact that the entry into 
force of the CPPNM Amendment will trigger a mandatory 
meeting in five years. The CPPNM also allows parties to 
request additional review conferences at intervals of five 
years or more. By supporting the convening of regular 
CPPNM review conferences beyond the first mandatory 
meeting, countries are acknowledging the need for an 
institutionalized mechanism for long-term progress.286 In 
the final analysis, all of these efforts suggest that 
political attention will not fade away in the absence of 
high-level summitry, and that states will be held 
politically, if not legally, accountable for progress on 
strengthening nuclear security policies and practices. In 
sum, the inclusive interactive venues epitomized by both 
the “contact group” on nuclear security as well as by the 
initiative on nuclear security implementation, along with 
																																																						
285	 The	 majority	 of	 states	 that	 have	 ratified	 the	 2005	 Amendment	 have	 done	 so	 during	 the	 nuclear	
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the mandatory review conference of the CPPNM that will 
take place in five years, will go a long way toward 
realizing President Obama’s objective of “keeping this 
process alive and effective” after 2016.287 These forums 
will likely provide opportunities for discussion, 
reporting on progress, and further multilateral 
cooperation.    
Another important development at the 2016 Summit was 
the endorsement by China – a state that not only possesses 
nuclear weapons but also faces serious security threats by 
non-state actors, of the 2014 “Strengthening Nuclear 
Security Implementation” initiative. By signing onto the 
initiative, China commits to follow IAEA nuclear security 
principles and guidelines in its national rules and 
regulations and allow teams of international experts to 
periodically evaluate its security procedures through the 
practice of IAEA-mandated peer review missions, such as 
such as International Physical Protection Advisory Service 
and International Nuclear Security Advisory Service on a 
periodic basis. And, just after the 2016 Summit ended, 
India, also a nuclear weapon possessor state, announced 
that it too is joining the initiative. Pakistan – a 
nuclear weapon possessor state that falls outside the 
purview of the NPT regime – has so far refused to follow 
suit. Whether it will follow in India’s footsteps and sign 
																																																						
287	See	Bunn	et	al.,	Preventing	Nuclear	Terrorism:	Continuous	Improvement	or	Dangerous	Decline?,”	2.		
	 267	 	
onto the Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation 
initiative remains an outstanding question.  
As far as the security of non-nuclear, radioactive 
materials is concerned, another important gift basket 
deserves mentioning. The gift basket on “strengthening the 
security of high-activity sealed sources,” signed by 28 
countries plus Interpol, seeks to prompt states to make an 
effort to build an important, yet overlooked, cornerstone 
of the nuclear security regime given that the amended 
CPPNM does not apply to radioactive materials. A 2003 
voluntary Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of 
Radioactive Sources only covers these materials. This non-
legally binding measure does not tackle many of the 
criticalities surrounding such sources, such as their safe 
and secure disposal. The gift basket commits the signatory 
states, most of which do commercially produce such sources 
such as Canada, the Netherlands, and the U.S., to 
strengthen the international framework on such sources and 
cooperate more on disposal. It also includes a new 
commitment by states to support the development of new 
technologies that could replace high-risk radioactive 
sources with less dangerous ones and promote their 
development when technically and economically acceptable.  
Although significant progress has been achieved, it 
is important to note a number of deficiencies pertaining 
to the last Summit event. First and foremost, the absence 
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of Russia and its refusal to participate in the 
negotiating process leading to the 2016 Summit. Even 
though nuclear security is a shared interest of both the 
U.S. and Russia, as the long history of bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation demonstrates, Russia’s decision 
not to get involved in the process had less to do with 
divergences on the threat of nuclear terrorism and the 
need for strengthened nuclear security, and more to do 
with broader geopolitical reasons, specifically with 
regard to Ukraine. Furthermore, Russia and Pakistan are 
the only nuclear weapons’ possessor states that have not 
signed onto the initiative that aims to strengthen nuclear 
security implementation. Any effort to make progress in 
this issue area needs the cooperation of Russia, as it 
possesses, along with the U.S., about 80 percent of 
sensitive nuclear materials. Moreover, the Summit outcomes 
did not tackle the big elephant in the room represented by 
stocks of nuclear materials in military uses. Not only 
were pledges in joint statements and gift baskets without 
a time limit against which to check progress, but also, 
and perhaps more importantly, the official Communiqués 
released between 2010 and 2016 largely glossed over the 
sensitive nuclear materials stored in military 
applications, which represent the bulk of the total stock 
of fissile material across the world. Most of the tangible 
progress thus far has focused on nuclear materials in 
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civilian uses. As noted above, another missed opportunity 
stemmed from the rather modest language of the “action 
plans” for the five international organizations. Whereas 
on the actual operative side, much more could have been 
done, for example, by requesting consideration of an 
increase in the IAEA budget or by giving the IAEA greater 
power to require states to take action on nuclear security 
matters, on the abstract level of theories of multilateral 
cooperation, the negotiation and adoption of the “action 
plans” explicitly stand for the recognition by states of 
the important roles international organizations can play, 
even in international security matters of the highest 
order.  
As in the Netherlands, the 2016 intergovernmental 
Summit witnessed the unfolding of two parallel side-
events, namely the Industry Summit, organized by the 
Nuclear Energy Institute, where hundreds of senior 
industry leaders met to discuss the industry’s global role 
in securing nuclear materials and installations, as well 
as the Nuclear Knowledge Summit, organized by the Fissile 
Material Working Group, where 200 NGO and academic experts 
from nearly 50 countries explored steps that governments, 
the private sector, and the nongovernmental community can 
take to strengthen the global nuclear security and prevent 
nuclear and radiological terrorism. It is however worth 
noting that states’ representatives and international 
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civil servants involved in the high-level political 
gathering did also attend segments of both the Industry 
and the NGO summits. International news media, from CNN to 
Al Jazeera, were also present. I had the opportunity to 
participate in the Nuclear Knowledge Summit and observe 
the development of the two-day non-governmental gathering.  
Panels and the ensuing debates highlighted the 
challenges surrounding the minimization and elimination 
weapons-usable materials, the benefits of achieving a 
comprehensive nuclear security regime, and the ways in 
which sustainable nuclear security governance can be 
established. In addition, closed-door breakout sessions 
were held, each of which tackled specific questions 
pertaining to civilian and military fissile materials, 
radiological materials, the role of the IAEA, as well as 
the global nuclear security governance. Remarkably, for 
the first time ever since the Summits started in 2010, the 
nuclear industry and nongovernmental communities merged 
together on the final day for a joint session, with panels 
discussing security in emerging nuclear countries as well 
as nuclear security governance systems.  
Indeed, as Kenneth Luongo, one of the key bridge-
builders among the industry and the NGO community, 
remarked, “the key outcome [in 2016] is closer cooperation 
among civil society, government, and industry. We’ve 
evolved to the point where we are having joint sessions 
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between the civil society and nuclear industry summits. It 
began with complete estrangement on both sides … and 
evolved through dedicated interaction to the point where 
we realized that there are common parts to our agenda.”288   
 
Preliminary findings 
 
The Nuclear Security Summit process has led to a recasting 
of the narrative about the security threats posed by 
nuclear weapons and the proliferation of unchecked 
weapons-usable materials. The presence of nuclear weapons 
and vulnerable nuclear materials are now more and more 
perceived as a potential liability rather than a source of 
power, status, technical prowess or strategic military 
advantage. States’ willingness to participate in the 
Summit process can be traced back to Obama’s Prague 
speech, which charted a new path by which the United 
States in tandem with multilateral institutions and the 
international community as a whole could contribute to 
security and progress in the nuclear domain in a more 
substantive manner. Common interests and shared ideas were 
aptly captured by his speech and his long-lasting academic 
and political involvement with this issue. As this chapter 
has argued, the initiative appealed to several heads of 
																																																						
288	 Interview	 with	 Ken	 Luongo,	 in	 “Nonproliferation	 Expert	 Praises	 Security	 at	 US	 Nuclear	 Plants,”	
http://www.nei.org/News-Media/News/News-Archives/Nonproliferation-Expert-Praises-Security-at-US-
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states and governments independently from their threat 
perceptions and “egoistic” self-interests.  
Other reasons that governments decided to participate 
are rooted in norms and principles. At one level, Obama’s 
personal and longstanding engagement in the field explains 
his foreign policy focus on the matter. At another level, 
his views on nuclear arms control and disarmament as well 
as a renewed emphasis on multilateral approaches to 
international security explain other countries’ 
willingness to participate. At yet another level, the sui-
generis decision-making approach followed during the 
process was intended to spur action while avoiding the 
traditional political difficulties of agreeing to a treaty 
and making it domestically enforced. With the Summit 
process, more difficult treaty negotiation processes were 
sidestepped in favor of more action-oriented and timely 
processes at the highest possible political level along 
with several rounds of negotiation and the development of 
consolidated interagency national “points of contacts” on 
Summit-related topics. One of the most far-reaching 
decisions taken at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit was to 
harness the wealth of nuclear security knowledge and 
working level relationships created during the seven-year-
long Summits process by ensuring that the Sherpa network, 
rebranded “Nuclear Security Contact Group,” meet regularly 
once or twice a year. Recognizing the interests of those 
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states that have not participated in the Summit process, 
this Group will be open to other countries.289    
The greatest weakness of the whole enterprise, namely 
the consensus rule and the watered-down language it 
usually entails, were overcome with the idea of sponsoring 
additional voluntary, non-legally binding commitments, 
called gift baskets. The innovation of gift baskets has 
been very important for encouraging countries go beyond 
lowest common denominator consensus agreements. This 
cooperation-plus form of engagement highlights that the 
conventional stumbling blocks of sovereignty and secrecy 
do not necessarily make international cooperation 
impossible to achieve and sustain. Recently, the gift 
basket innovation has been adopted during other 
multilateral negotiations, such as the Paris conference on 
climate change and the global health security agenda.  
When it comes to the phase of formation of 
multilateral cooperation, more than changes in U.S. 
domestic politics environment as highlighted within the 
neoliberal camp of international regime scholars, or even 
more than U.S. hegemonic leadership as highlighted by 
neorealist accounts, the evidence shows that the ideas 
espoused by President Obama as a result of his experience, 
as well as the timing of the initiative, played a more 
prominent role. As regards timing, non-proliferation 
																																																						
289	 See,	 INFCIRC/899,	 IAEA,	 November	 2016.	 Document	 available	 online	 at:	
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analysts tellingly describe the 2009-10 period as a 
“nuclear spring,” a particularly cooperation-prone 
historic period in which i) the U.S. released its Nuclear 
Posture Review recognizing Russia’s and China’s security 
interests and seeking cooperative strategies to address 
them; ii) the U.S. and Russia negotiated further nuclear 
weapons reductions; and iii) a successful NPT Review 
Conference was held.  
As regards the role of ideas, the strategy pursued 
was to focus on a narrow, technical and less known topic 
(nuclear security) as a way towards a world without 
nuclear weapons. Hence, the heuristic power of 
appropriately and effectively framing that idea has 
exercised a sort of attractive pull for other states to 
join in. Further, contrary to neorealist and liberal 
explanations, as the genesis of the Summit initiative 
demonstrate, inter-state cooperation is much more than 
cooperation between states and is often the result of an 
emerging consensus on nuclear security brought by private 
and public academic research centers.  
Far from being the result of an “epistemic (nuclear 
security) community,” this case nonetheless shows the 
relevance of academic and policy networks as vehicle for 
transmitting actionable policy ideas. Along the same lines 
surprisingly, states participated for reasons different 
from self-interested behavior. The collected evidence 
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points to the power of ideas and prestige considerations 
connected to the maintenance of good relations with the 
U.S. In essence, constructing multilateral cooperation in 
this case has required learning processes, knowledge 
accumulation, and persuasion in the form of appropriately 
crafted heuristics, all of which are relevant for 
exploring the rise and fall of rules-based forms of 
international cooperation that are highlighted by the 
cognitivist-constructivist camp of international regime 
analyses.  
When it comes to implementation, high-level political 
attention has given the topic of nuclear security a sense 
of urgency. The importance of high-level, focused, and 
sustained attention somewhat resembles the role crisis or 
accidents have had in changing nuclear state behavior and 
policy. They call attention to a given problem in a 
dramatic and sudden way. In the phase of implementation, 
lower-level operational networks benefit from the 
political attention paid and sense of urgency, thus making 
it faster. For example, it is remarkable that most nuclear 
security commitments and pledges since 2010 have been 
accomplished, thereby providing practical steps towards 
locking down nuclear and other radioactive material and 
building up a nuclear material-centered international 
regime. Specifically, over 40 Summit countries have 
engaged in capacity building, whether through training, 
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centers of excellence, or simulations.  Over 30 countries 
have updated national nuclear security laws, regulations 
and institutions.  Over 20 countries have held peer review 
missions, either bilaterally or through the IAEA. Three 
original outsiders (China, India, and Jordan) have later 
subscribed to the Strengthening Nuclear Security 
Implementation gift basket (now known as INFCIRC/869). 18 
countries have taken steps to increase the security of 
radioactive sources.  17 countries have been involved in 
removal or disposal of nuclear materials, or minimization 
of highly enriched uranium.  16 countries have ratified 
relevant treaties or taken particular steps to implement 
them.  15 countries have carried out physical security 
upgrades to their nuclear installations.  A dozen 
countries have joined or launched new international or 
regional structures to support subject-matter 
cooperation.   
When it comes to implementation reviews, national 
governmental actors are supported by a myriad of other 
actors, including but not limited to NGOs, research 
centers and industry, that benchmark and check progress 
made individual countries and engage with governments on 
threat reduction efforts, sharing information and lessons 
learned about communicating effective practices. As a 
consequence, international learning and knowledge building 
is spurred. Relatedly, rather than using punitive measures 
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such as sanctions or threat or use of force, compliance-
inducing measures tend to prefer the use of soft law at 
the international level, non-legally binding mechanisms 
and voluntary measures, such as those advisory services 
and peer reviews provided by third parties, to uphold 
compliance with the international nuclear security 
standard. Whereas hard law forms the bedrock of the non-
proliferation regime, the evolution of the regime shows a 
tendency to develop and follow voluntary standards and 
codes of conduct not as a substitute for treaty law but 
rather as an additional tool.  
In the final analysis, the Summits approach has 
certainly raised public awareness of the problem, spurred 
new commitments by governments in sometimes unusual and 
innovative ways, and generated new forms of multilateral 
cooperation above and beyond the NPT-based non-
proliferation regime. To the staunchest supporters of 
nuclear security, the achievements of the Summits may 
appear modest, but without this initiative, even they 
would not have been possible. By no means have the summits 
been an unqualified success in dealing with the problem of 
vulnerable nuclear materials around the world. However, 
the efforts to strengthen nuclear security and to energize 
international cooperation in this new nuclear field stand 
out, particularly at a time when traditional multilateral 
non-proliferation mechanisms, such as the NPT Review 
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Conferences and multilateral disarmament negotiations, 
have become atrophied.  
In conclusion, it should be noted that the style and 
nature of nuclear security cooperation could prove 
beneficial to unlocking the state of cooperative atrophy 
in which the NPT review process (among other multilateral 
non-proliferation venues) finds itself. By including 
states that possess nuclear weapons but are not members of 
the NPT, the Summit process, originally surrounded by a 
nuclear disarmament rhetoric, command important lessons to 
learn and implications for the NPT regime and on issues 
such negotiations on a WMD-free zone in the Middle East 
and on a fissile material cut-off treaty. The challenge 
ahead involves institutional design and how to create 
“durable institutions” to carry on the work and processes 
set in motion.  
A preliminary lesson for effective nuclear non-
proliferation cooperative arrangements should therefore be 
to look for a process whereby learning and knowledge are 
enriched, which in turn facilitates the reduction of 
uncertainty and encourages negotiated compromise. 
Regulatory informality, process flexibility and problem-
solving approaches generate continuous improvement and 
allow for sustained interaction.  
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Chapter VI  
 
Conclusion  
 
This concluding chapter reviews the findings of the case 
studies from the perspective of the frameworks developed 
by international regime theories. It outlines preliminary 
observations about the theme of institutional 
effectiveness and, in particular, about the driving 
factors that make multilateral cooperative non-
proliferation arrangements resilient over time. Based on 
secondary works and primary information gathered through 
interviews, this chapter also draws out some practical, 
yet necessarily partial lessons for adapting present and 
designing future non-proliferation arrangements.  
 
Case study #1  
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
 
The case of the NPT is the first organized attempt to 
govern nuclear proliferation risks. It represents an 
instance of institutionalized multilateral non-
proliferation cooperation. Despite efforts at revitalizing 
its implementation review process, the NPT arrangement 
remains stagnant. and, as such, is a hostage to a bygone 
era. As Terence Taylor, Coordinator of the 1540 Group of 
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Experts, has argued, the NPT [and its review process] is 
“a prisoner of its time,” incapable of adapting to 
present-day circumstances. 290    
Historically, exactly two decades before NPT 
negotiations started in 1965, the term “non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons” was understood to serve two mutually 
reinforcing, complementary objectives. The first was to 
prevent the further spread to additional countries. The 
second was to eliminate them. The evidence of such 
understanding comes from a lesser known document, that is, 
the 1945 tripartite declaration on nuclear energy issued 
by the U.S., Canada and the U.K., as well as from the very 
first U.N. General Assembly resolution adopted in 1946. As 
much as atomic energy and its associated technology can be 
utilized for both civilian and military purposes, so too 
non-proliferation and disarmament were at the beginning 
inextricably linked.291 
 By the time NPT negotiations took off, the first 
objective took on a greater urgency to the detriment of 
the second objective. Not only is the title of the NPT 
crystal-clear about its real intentions, but also a 
cursory look at the secondary works consulted does confirm 
states’ dissatisfaction with the outcome, even by those 
who participated in the negotiations within the Eighteen-
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Assembly	resolution	is	available	at:	http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/1/ares1.htm.		
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Nation Disarmament Committee. In this regard, it is worth 
recalling an overlooked statement by France on the NPT as 
uttered at a conference held at the University of Notre 
Dame in 1967, which still widely resonates to this day:  
 
“Non-dissemination is, assuredly, a 
problem. There is no advantage, there 
would even be great danger, in having 
more and more countries manufacture 
nuclear weapons. But one thing is much 
more important—those who possess 
nuclear weapons should not manufacture 
more but destroy the ones they have. 
Yet what is being proposed seems to us 
to arrive at the opposite result: 
preventing those who do not have and 
who, for the most part, cannot have 
nuclear weapons, from manufacturing 
them. But this in no way prevents 
those [possessing] such weapons from 
continuing to manufacture them and 
from maintaining their stockpiles. 
Consequently, this is not disarmament, 
and we think that we should not, by 
taking paths of this kind, lead the 
world [to] believe there is 
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disarmament where, in fact, there is 
only a strengthening of the monopolies 
of the great powers.”292 
 
Though negotiated multilaterally, the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union took the lead and the NPT as adopted in 1968 was a 
product of bilateral negotiations. However, even if this 
can lead one to assume that hegemonic power or power-
centered dynamics prevailed, a pragmatic alignment of two 
(short-termed) interests between the U.S and the Soviet 
Union transpires. First, there was the interest in 
preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapon-
related technology to the sixth-plus country. Second, 
there was the interest in keeping these weapons for the 
foreseeable future (and eventually, since 1995, 
indefinitely). Therefore, common interests and not purely 
power-based dynamics seem to be better suited at 
explaining NPT negotiations and, as such, its 
establishment phase.  
Most crucially, the latter shared interest, that is, 
the maintenance of nuclear primacy by the recognized NPT’s 
NWS, also commands explanatory heft when it comes to the 
disregard of arguments of principled idealism rooted in 
disarmament efforts. The short-termed self-interest of the 
two most influential stakeholders, that is, the USSR and 
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the U.S. in particular, as well as the traction exercised 
by them over other parties during and after negotiations, 
including but certainly not limited to the allure of the 
problem-solving magic of nuclear energy, combined together 
and ultimately prevailed over normative considerations and 
disarmament aspirations. For example, the language of the 
NPT text lends explanatory support to safely conclude that 
its key purpose was to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. 
In addition, with reference to the negotiating history, 
disarmament references were originally not to be included 
in the text. Later on, a reference to disarmament was 
inserted in the non-legally binding, preambular part of 
the text, and eventually made its way into the text as 
article VI.  
Though interest alignment by the two most “powerful” 
players partly explains the NPT’s establishment, at the 
same time the NPT would have not seen the light in 1968 
without the later inclusion of references to disarmament 
norms. Notably, such normative appealing succeeded in 
overcoming NPT’s built-in inequalities in the form of 
differing, unbalanced rights and obligations. At the end 
of the day, only NPT’s NNWS are subject to safeguards and 
inspections. This speaks volumes to the power of 
attraction exercised by well-crafted language and 
normative objectives and aspirations.   
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NPT implementation review has been greatly affected 
by exogenous and endogenous nuclear as well as non-nuclear 
dynamics, which are difficult to disentangle in order to 
give proper attribution. The 1995 legally-binding 
indefinite extension of the NPT, coupled with the two non-
legally binding decisions on the Strengthened Review 
Process for the NPT and on the Principled and Objectives 
for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, along with a 
controversial resolution on the Middle East, have been 
made possible in large part by events taking place outside 
of the halls of NPT Review Conferences. Great non-
proliferation and disarmament hopes in the mid-1990s 
clearly facilitated the 1995 outcomes. However, primary 
sources in the form of insiders’ written accounts converge 
on the pivotal role played by those leading and chairing 
reviews and meetings, their personalities and negotiating 
skills. This recognition points to the value of knowledge-
based factors that weakly cognitivist regime approaches 
highlight. Education, experience and expertise can achieve 
short-term results, such as the agreement on Final 
Documents, as well as prospective long-term objectives, 
such as the revitalization of stagnant, atrophied 
arrangements. Most secondary sources by longtime NPT 
observers that had been consulted mention, in a way or 
another, that headways were made possible when creativity 
and innovative consensus-building approaches were 
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experimented, including the appointment of charismatic 
Presidents and experienced collaborators as well as the 
establishment of crosscutting groups to facilitate 
dialogue.293 Innovation, as I have come to understand it, is 
basically the combination of creativity and outside-of-
the-box thinking, on the one hand, with logic and 
pragmatism, on the other hand. It is the successful 
merging of interests and ideas in one single political 
project.  
If NPT effectiveness depends on the chemistry between 
leaders, negotiators, chairpersons and presidents of 
Review Conferences, then this might bode ill for the 
future of the NPT, unless serious efforts to boost NPT-
specific education, experience and expertise are pursued. 
In this regard, it is noteworthy to recall Potter’s 
assessment of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, which failed 
to agree on a consensus Declaration. In his words, “few of 
these individuals [referring to Conference officials] had 
ever attended a Review Conference. Like their counterparts 
on most delegations, they had very little institutional 
memory or first-hand recollection of the significance of 
crucial bargains that had been struck at prior 
conferences, crises that had been narrowly averted, and 
lessons – both positive and negative – that should have 
been learned. Indeed, by far the most experienced 
																																																						
293	See,	for	example,	Dhanapala	(2005),	Shaker	(1980),	Epstein	(1975),	Barnaby	(1980),	Potter	(2005),	
Sanders	(1995),	Johnson	(2007),	Rauf	(2000,	2016).		
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delegates at the 2005 Review were those from the NGO 
community.”294 Similar comments by several other participant 
observers pervade their analyses and, as such, they speak 
volumes to the significance of knowledge and its impact on 
effectiveness.295 
During the phase of implementation review, a great 
deal of declaratory progress was made to reinforce the 
disarmament pillar of the NPT bargain and to counter the 
impression that the NPT was solely about horizontal non-
proliferation, as evidenced by the 1995, 2000, and 2010 
Reviews. However, at the operative level, vertical non-
proliferation has been weakened by both weapons 
modernization programs pursued by NWS, as well as by the 
military postures of such possessors. The gap between 
declarations and postures has never been so wide. The 
current, endemic lack of progress in national reporting by 
all states, and in particular by NWS, show that the link 
between non-proliferation and disarmament is extremely 
frail to the point of no longer being satisfactory to the 
majority of states. An increasing disconnect between the 
norm of nuclear deterrence and the norm of nuclear 
disarmament is thus apparent. Despite the modest measures 
on reporting and on a more structured review process 
adopted in 1995 and 2000, the ensuing meager progress or, 
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295	See,	 for	example,	Group	of	Eminent	Persons,	 “Building	Bridges	 to	Effective	Nuclear	Disarmament,”	
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better, non-existent improvement on these two crucial 
aspects of transparency, real confidence-building measures 
are lacking.  
As a consequence, it is no wonder that given the 
institutional weaknesses and growing cognitive divergences 
among NPT parties, an overwhelming majority of states 
adopted a multilateral agreement to ban nuclear weapons, 
that is, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. 
It cannot be ruled out that the next NPT Reviews will be 
affected, more for the worse than for the better, by such 
landmark agreement. Though this can be regarded as 
speculation, what can surely be concluded is that 
knowledge dynamics, especially in multilateral 
environments, as well as soft power skills, such as an 
appropriate use of persuasive arguments and transparent 
methods by experts that display both technical and policy 
expertise prevail over hard power methods, such as the use 
or threat of force or several other coercive tactics. For 
a system to be effective, inducements usually tend to pay 
off more than deterrents.  
Endogenous features pertaining to the configuration 
and operation of a given arrangement cannot, in and of 
themselves, solve the problems affecting the NPT review 
process and cannot conceivably advance the goals of the 
NPT. They however can intervene to alter states’ 
perceptions and interests, providing the background within 
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which less costly and less damaging forms of learning 
occur. In conclusion, knowledge-based theoretical 
approaches and, consequently, policy prescriptions so 
configured as to foster expertise, education and 
experience, are likely to prove more effective if the goal 
is to strengthen the regime.  
While the NPT has been most successful at the 
beginning of its career and is now under ever-increasing 
strain, newer non-proliferation arrangements have gone 
quite the opposite way. To heal pathologies affecting the 
NPT, frameworks that create, maintain and foster 
expertise, education and experience and that establish 
processes by which these very knowledge-based factors can 
thrive are needed. As with so-called global and regional 
“centers of excellence” dealing with nuclear security, 
perhaps it would be high time to fashion similar templates 
for the NPT. Instead of learning from failures, which by 
definition always happens too late, it is time for the NPT 
arrangement to learn from other non-proliferation 
arrangements.   
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Case study #2 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540  
 
The second case of non-proliferation multilateralism that 
has been analyzed is represented by Resolution 1540 
adopted by the U.N. Security Council. Though a resolution 
that was initially meant to last for two years, its 
evolution makes the case for considering it as a full-
fledged arrangement. Its latest iteration under Security 
Council Resolution 1977, adopted in 2011, extends and 
expands the 1540 Committee’s mandate for a decade until 
2021. Though it is premature to know whether the 1540 
arrangement will be extended indefinitely, the 
proliferation challenges it tackles are likely to persist 
in the future.  
As for the genesis and the establishment phase of the 
1540 arrangement, the consensus-building approach emerges 
as both conventional and revolutionary in character. It 
was conventional because debates at the multilateral level 
took place first among like-minded states having the 
largest stakes (namely, the U.S. and the Russian 
Federation), they then expanded to include other Security 
Council permanent members, such as China, and the other 
ten non-permanent members. Finally, given the far-reaching 
implications of the measures called for, the entire U.N. 
membership was invited to participate and exchange their 
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views in an open session. Notably, this move has set the 
negotiating process apart with respect to previous 
Security Council practice. Debates expanded to include 
members of the non-governmental organizations and the 
media. Standard practice has it that discussions over 
draft resolutions would take place in closed sessions. As 
such, a week before its official adoption, an open meeting 
of the Security Council was held. Not even Security 
Council Resolution 1373 concerning measures to address the 
threats posed by terrorism, adopted in 2001, which most 
closely resembles the text, spirit and design of 1540, 
enjoyed as much involvement.  
Interestingly, a less debated issue concerned the 
modus operandi of the future Committee to monitor 
implementation. Nothing was known about the Committee, but 
it was assumed it would operate according to standard 
practice followed by similar Committees. Spain stated that 
the Committee should be “governed by principles of 
cooperation, equal treatment and transparency, and 
technical assistance to states should be one of its key 
components.”296 With hindsight, the Committee would prove to 
be the most important element of the 1540 arrangement. 
Largely as a result of the negotiating approach followed, 
the resolution was adopted by consensus. Despite initial 
distrust about the scope of the resolution and the mandate 
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of the monitoring committee, the achievement of unanimity 
underscores the effects the negotiation process and the 
cooperative, inclusive approach had on the final outcome.  
It is not straightforward, nor simple, to isolate and 
identify the factor(s) that regime approaches highlight in 
order to explain the formation of 1540. However, this case 
seems to prove neo-liberal and interests-based explanatory 
accounts rather than realist, power-based and knowledge-
oriented, constructivist angles of vision. For example, 
the envisioning (yet not the full creation) of an 
international monitoring body adds to neo-liberal accounts 
of cooperation. In addition, the self-interest of the most 
prominent players worked in the direction of making them 
agree to cooperate, even if this would have entailed 
scrapping norms-based disarmament principles. Even the 
most vocal detractor of 1540 shared with the sponsors of 
the resolution the objective of preventing the 
proliferation of deadly weapons and technology to and by 
non-state actors. In this regard, it is to bear in mind, 
once again, the external environment. The terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001 still reverberated across the 
international community; the extent of Iran’s undeclared 
nuclear activities in defiance of NPT obligations were 
surfacing in 2002; the Iraq war in 2003 carried out for 
its alleged (and later proved to be false) possession of 
WMD cast a dark shadow over U.S. intentions in the region; 
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in the same year, North Korea withdrew from the NPT and a 
global nuclear smuggling network was unmasked in 2004. 
Counterfactually, were these attention-riveting events not 
present, 1540 would have likely proved more challenging to 
negotiate and perhaps would have not even been conceived. 
Idiosyncrasies and the disentanglement of external and 
internal factors prove challenging and is one of the 
reasons for the paucity of related studies. The processes 
followed in negotiating a highly charged measure 
contradicts past practice of the Security Council. The 
very fact that 1540 was approved by unanimity (not by 
consensus) testifies to the ‘good offices’ pursued by the 
sponsors of the Resolution.  
Be as it may, power-based interpretations do not hold 
against the negotiation phase of 1540. Given the 
participatory and somewhat transparent process, U.S. 
hegemony (which is not the same as leadership – a subject 
that is not dealt with under realist approaches to 
international regimes) or even P-5 hegemony can be safely 
ruled out. For example, even if the underlying reasons 
remain unclear, the U.S. resisted the idea of having a 
subsidiary body of the Security Council, the 1540 
Committee, monitoring and reviewing implementation. Under 
a similar perspective, the U.S. initially omitted any 
disarmament reference in the draft texts. In short, the 
unanimous adoption of 1540 does not entirely reflect the 
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preferences of the initiators and the U.S. in particular, 
which is conventionally depicted as the most powerful 
actor in the international system. Further, while 
certainly relevant, especially in the aftermath of the 
Resolution’s adoption, normative concerns, including 
disarmament and the peaceful, legitimate applications and 
uses of technology, were circumvented by the vocalized 
urgency to address non-state proliferation and terrorism 
in a comprehensive manner.  
Despite the evidence that the new arrangement and the 
contextual background within which Resolution 1540 was 
conceived was seen by some delegations as yet another 
unnecessary imposition of the advanced global North 
against the developing global South, or as yet another 
exposure of the cleavage between haves and have-nots, thus 
suggesting a weakly power-based dynamic, knowledge- and 
power-based factors mattered less than interest-based 
dynamics. Relatedly, besides normative concerns, legal 
anxieties were also bypassed. While principles of 
international law have it that binding requirements for 
states to comply with should come with their consent and 
involvement, mostly in the form of treaties and 
conventions freely arrived at, Resolution 1540 created a 
binding regime that circumvented traditional (and 
cumbersome) decision- and law-making processes at national 
and international levels. As a final note highlighting the 
	 294	 	
relative validity of institutional factors is the 
envisioning and evolution of a monitoring committee. Since 
2004, the mandate of the Committee has been extended 
unanimously on three occasions.  
When it comes to implementation and its review, the 
tasks performed by the Committee and its approach to 
implementation are highlighted. To begin with, in contrast 
with the NPT arrangement, reviews are carried out on an 
annual basis. In addition to these yearly stocktaking 
exercises, there have been two comprehensive reviews in 
2009 and 2016. A first observation relates to the presence 
of different actors that are involved in the process. 
Contrary to the NPT review process, states and governments 
are not the only implementers and participants in review 
processes. While it is true that a large number of non-
governmental organizations have gained access to NPT 
reviews and those NPT meetings that are open, 1540 
implementation is characterized by the active involved of 
those actors that deal with subject matter issues on a 
daily and practical basis. Rather than an emphasis on the 
quantity of those ‘participating’ in NPT reviews, a focus 
on the quality of ‘participation’ is what makes the 
difference. For example, operators, managers, regulators, 
and the industry sector in general are part and parcel in 
the implementation (review) phase of Resolution 1540 and 
its successor Resolutions. A second observation relates to 
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the fact that practically all issues that were debated 
during negotiations have disappeared from the agenda. For 
example, the most controversial issues included the 
legally binding nature of the provisions; the legislative 
activity of the Security Council and the consequent 
bypassing of national parliaments; the appropriateness of 
the use of Chapter VII and, relatedly, whether non-
compliance would automatically lead to enforcement 
actions; the scope of the measures called for in the 
Resolution; the emphasis on non-proliferation to the 
detriment of both disarmament and peaceful cooperation; 
and, finally, the functions, roles and composition of the 
follow-up monitoring committee. In interviews conducted 
with former and current members of the so-called 1540 
Group of Experts, there is evidence that the activities 
carried out by these independent consultants in the 
initial period since the adoption of Resolution 1540 until 
2009, the year in which the first comprehensive review was 
conducted, focused on addressing these controversies in a 
non-adversarial, diplomatic and consultative manner. Once 
these challenges were cleared, the overall expertise of 
the 1540 Committee’s Group of Experts shifted from a 
political to a technically bent profile. This was a 
recurrent common theme among the interviewees. Similarly, 
while the work of the Committee initially focused on the 
quantity of reports submitted, nowadays the focus has 
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shifted to considering the quality of incoming reports by 
collecting and compiling lists of effective implementation 
practices.  
At the same time, it became clear that the initially 
slow national implementation progress was not attributed 
to states’ lack of intention and interest, but rather to 
states’ lack of human and financial capacities, as well as 
states’ lack of awareness of the implications of not 
fulfilling 1540-related obligations. As such, 
implementation challenges depended more on states’ 
knowledge deficits rather than on states’ unwillingness to 
cooperate. The Group of Experts was and still is actively 
engaged in a variety of awareness-raising and outreach 
efforts at all organizational levels – spanning from ad-
hoc initiatives, consultative meetings, annual programs to 
roundtables, parliamentary conferences, seminars and joint 
projects – to promote, discuss and instruct how states and 
other stakeholders can develop and maintain the necessary 
political will, legal framework and institutional 
structures, thereby fulfilling 1540 obligations.  
In addition, given the meager, derisory budget 
allocated to the 1540 Committee and to its Group of 
Experts to fulfill its program of work, it is striking to 
record positive results as well as an ever-expanding 
network of 1540 professionals around the world. This 
attests to the underutilized power of cooperative, 
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symbiotic relationships established over the course of a 
decade by committed officials. As one interviewee put it, 
the key challenge today is to sustain a culture of non-
proliferation across government, academic and industrial 
sectors.  
Knowledge-based dynamics loom large in this picture 
and seem to play a bigger role than mere power-based, 
coercion-oriented approaches and interest-driven factors. 
The same interest-based factors are shaped by knowledge 
dynamics, as was the case during the initial period of 
1540 existence. The ways in which knowledge is organized 
explain the relative success of this arrangement. Emphasis 
on knowledge and capacity building is a recurrent theme in 
specialized meetings dedicated to 1540. Over time, a 
variety of such knowledge-enhancing tools have been 
created. National implementation action plans, national 
points of contact that unite disparate government agencies 
as well as private sector stakeholders, regional points of 
contact, centers of excellence on chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear weapons, peer reviews and visits 
to states that enhance overall knowledge and ultimately 
affect implementation are used.  
Recently, numerous former expert consultants that 
were part of the 1540 Group of Experts gathered together 
in 2015 in order to assess the status of Resolution 1540 
and to chart a way forward for its ensuing arrangement. 
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Notably, they issued a report that contains their 
reflections.297 Together with the publication of the 1540 
Compass, an electronic journal that focuses on 1540 
implementation issues, such activities are meant to 
leverage knowledge-based dynamics with a view to reinforce 
institutional and cognitive milieus. Similarly, more has 
been done across the 1540 domain in fostering the linkage 
between non-proliferation and disarmament and between non-
proliferation and development. Though being far from the 
exclusive governing dynamic moving multilateral 
cooperation, the contemporary acceptance by the 
international community, including by once recalcitrant 
states and regional groups, as well as engagement with 
research centers, industry and the private sector, speak 
volumes to the power of knowledge as a driving factor.  
In conclusion, the ‘non-standard’ operating 
procedures and the broad approach to arranging 
implementation and managing its review experimented by 
U.N. Security Council Committee 1540 and its Group of 
Experts in a non-confrontational relationship carries 
explanatory heft. It surely is a relative success compared 
with traditional cooperative instances across the nuclear 
non-proliferation domain, such as is the case with the NPT 
review process. It is also a success story relative to 
similar Security Council-mandated Committees, such as has 
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been the case with U.N. counter-terrorism sanctions 
committees and regimes. In light of the contested nature 
of 1540 and the questions raised by delegations during its 
negotiation, the engagement by the Committee and its group 
of experts speaks volumes to the largely positive 
repercussions on effectiveness. A contrast among non-
proliferation governance arrangements materializes. While 
the NPT arrangement was at the beginning strong but 
further deteriorated, the 1540 arrangement was initially 
weak but further developed into a more effective and 
shared tool.      
 
Case study #3 
The Nuclear Security Summits  
 
The Nuclear Security Summit process is the latest 
iteration in a series of efforts aimed at raising the 
awareness of the need for institution-building and 
operational coordination in mitigating nuclear 
proliferation risks. Though a time-limited initiative, it 
falls within phenomena of institutionalized multilateral 
non-proliferation cooperation. A peculiarity of this case 
is that this multilateral effort is not based on a treaty 
or on a U.N.-sponsored resolution. Rather, it has been 
spurred, politically, by former U.S. President Obama and 
his administration in 2009. As sources consulted 
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evidenced, the idea of gatherings of high-level government 
officials discussing matters of nuclear proliferation and 
terrorism has been promoted by the Belfer Center for 
Science and International Affairs. 
However, far from being branded as a U.S.-centered 
initiative or even as an American conspiracy to shift the 
nuclear non-proliferation agenda away from disarmament and 
verification matters, the ownership of the Nuclear 
Security Summit process is multilateral as it mainly rests 
within the three hosting countries of the U.S. (for the 
kick-off as well as for the final Summits in 2010 and 
2016, respectively), South Korea (2012) and the 
Netherlands (2014), each of which contributed to the 
expansion and the deepening of the nuclear security agenda 
in their own ways. Further, far from being solely a 
biannual gathering of high-level officials, and Heads of 
State and Government in particular, it is more appropriate 
to describe the Summits as a learning process. Advanced 
multilateral, multi-stakeholder preparatory work across 
government, academic and industry sectors characterize 
this case. In addition, the four biannual political 
gatherings took place almost simultaneously, in space and 
time, as the Nuclear Knowledge and the Nuclear Industry 
Summits, meetings of members of think tanks, research 
centers and academic experts on nuclear policy and of 
representatives of nuclear regulators, operators and the 
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wider private sector, respectively. Membership in both 
side-Summits gradually increased and it was wide in 
numbers and geographical representation. Further evidence 
that disproves arguments related to U.S. hegemony is 
brought by the fact that these two side-Summits events, 
and especially the NGO Summits, were not included in the 
original plan.  
States’ willingness to participate in the process can 
be traced back to former U.S. President Obama’s speech in 
Prague in 2009, which charted a new path by which the 
U.S., in tandem with multilateral institutions, and the 
international community as a whole, could contribute to 
international security and progress across the nuclear 
domain more substantively. Clearly, nuclear security, 
though shrouded in secrecy, confidentiality and kept 
within the realm of domestic affairs of states, is less 
controversial to negotiate on than highly charged topics, 
such as nuclear disarmament. Common interests and shared 
ideas were aptly captured by Obama’s speech as well as by 
his long-lasting personal, academic and political 
involvement with this issue. The initiative appealed to 
several political leaders around the world, independently 
from their objectively or subjectively assessed risk 
perceptions and self-interests.  
Other reasons for participating in the process are 
rooted in norms and principles. At one level, Obama’s 
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engagement in the field explains his foreign policy focus 
on the matter. At another level, his views on nuclear arms 
control and disarmament as well as a renewed emphasis on 
multilateral approaches to international affairs in 
general, and international security in particular, explain 
other countries’ willingness to join. At yet another 
level, the peculiar decision-making approach followed 
during the process was intended to spur action, while 
avoiding the traditional political difficulties of 
agreeing to a multilateral treaty and making it 
domestically enforced, which is sometimes not a smooth 
process. The history of the CTBT attests to this fact. 
With the Summit process, more difficult treaty negotiation 
processes were sidestepped in favor of arguably more 
action-oriented and timely processes at the highest 
possible political level, along with several rounds of 
negotiation and the development of consolidated 
interagency national points of contacts.  
One of the most far-reaching decisions taken at the 
final Summit of 2016 was to harness the wealth of nuclear 
security knowledge gained thus far and working level 
relationships created during the seven-year-long Summits 
process by ensuring that the Sherpa network, rebranded 
“Nuclear Security Contact Group,” would meet regularly 
once or twice a year at the margins of the IAEA’s General 
Conference. Notably, recognizing the interests of those 
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states that have not participated, the Nuclear Security 
Contact Group is open to other countries. As such, the 
Summits shifted from an exclusive exercise in which only 
participating countries could share their views to an 
inclusive process, which is yet to show its full 
potential.  
Another far-reaching innovation brought by the Summit 
process relates to a long-standing obstacle to joint 
nuclear non-proliferation decision-making. The greatest 
weakness of the whole process, namely the consensus rule 
and the watered-down language it usually entails, were 
successfully overcome with the novelty of sponsoring 
additional voluntary, non-legally binding commitments, 
called ‘gift baskets’. This novelty has been a key driver 
for encouraging states to go beyond lowest common 
denominator consensus agreements. This cooperation-plus 
form of engagement highlights that the conventional 
stumbling blocks of sovereignty and secrecy do not 
necessarily make international cooperation impossible to 
achieve and sustain. Recently, the ‘gift basket’ 
innovation has been adopted in other multilateral 
negotiations, such as the Paris Conference on Climate 
Change and within the global health security agenda.298  
To sum up the analysis of the establishment phase, it 
should be added that more than changes in U.S. domestic 
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politics environment, as highlighted within the neoliberal 
camp of international regime scholars, or even more than 
U.S. dominant position, as highlighted by neorealist 
accounts, the evidence obtained through interviews, 
participant observation and a review of the ‘grey 
literature’ shows that the principled ideas espoused by 
former U.S. President Obama as a result of his experience, 
as well as the timing of the initiative, played a 
prominent role. As regards timing, non-proliferation 
analysts tellingly describe the 2009-2010 period as a 
nuclear spring – a particularly cooperation-prone and 
idyllic historic period for nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament. Further, contrary to neorealist and liberal 
explanations, as the genesis of the initiative 
demonstrates, inter-state cooperation is much more than 
cooperation between states and is often the result of an 
emerging consensus achieved by a plurality of actors 
working across different professional groups.  
Relatedly, far from being the result of an epistemic 
community on nuclear security, this case nonetheless shows 
the relevance of academic and policy networks as vehicle 
for transmitting actionable policy ideas. Along the same 
lines, and surprisingly, states participated for reasons 
that are different from, and greatly diverge with, self-
interested behavior. The collected evidence points to the 
power of intangible and subjective powers, such as 
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personality, ideas and prestige. In essence, constructing 
multilateral cooperation in this case has required 
learning and knowledge build-up, as well as persuasion in 
the form of appropriately crafted heuristics, all of which 
are relevant for exploring and explaining the rise and 
fall of rules-based forms of multilateral nuclear non-
proliferation cooperation. Such dynamics are well 
described by, and pertain to, the cognitivist-
constructivist camp of international regime analyses, and 
particularly the analytically soft-cognitivist 
denomination.  
As for the implementation, high-level political 
attention has given the topic of nuclear security a sense 
of greater urgency. High-level, focused and sustained 
attention resembles the role that crisis or accidents have 
played across the nuclear domain and arguably continue to 
play in behavioral, policy and institutional change and 
adaptation. In other words, high-level attention and 
crises alike call attention to a given problem in a 
dramatic and sudden way that instantly reverberates across 
space and time. In the phase of implementation, lower-
level operational networks have benefitted from the sense 
of urgency attached. For example, it is notable that most 
if not all commitments and pledges undertaken since 2010 
have been accomplished. To name but a few accomplishments, 
suffice to say that well over 40 Summit countries have 
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engaged in capacity-building exercises, whether through 
the provision of specialized training or the establishment 
of national and regional Centers of Excellence on topics 
relevant to nuclear security.  Over 30 countries have 
updated national nuclear security laws, regulations and 
organizational modus operandi. Over 20 countries have 
hosted peer review missions. Three original and key 
outsiders to the Summit process, such as China, India, and 
Jordan, have later subscribed to the Strengthening Nuclear 
Security Implementation ‘gift basket’.  
When it comes to post-implementation monitoring and 
review, governmental actors were supported by a myriad of 
other actors, including non-governmental organizations and 
research centers, that have benchmarked and checked 
progress made by individual countries and that have 
actively engaged with governments on threat reduction and 
information sharing efforts and lessons learned about 
communicating effective nuclear security practices. As a 
consequence, knowledge-based factors are reinforced. 
Relatedly, rather than using punitive measures such as 
sanctions, compliance-inducing measures have tended to 
favor the use of non-legally binding mechanisms and 
voluntary approaches to compliance, such as those advisory 
services and peer review missions provided by third 
parties. Whereas binding law certainly forms the bedrock 
of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the evolution of 
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the regime shows a tendency to develop and follow 
voluntary standards and codes of conduct, not as a 
substitute for treaty law but rather as additional 
reinforcing tools. In the final analysis, the Summits 
approach has raised political awareness of the problem, 
spurred new commitments by governments in novel ways and 
generated new forms of cooperation above and beyond the 
NPT-based regime. To the staunchest supporters of nuclear 
security, the achievements of the Summits may appear 
modest, but without this initiative, even these would have 
not been feasible. By no means have the Summits been an 
unqualified success in dealing with the problems and risks 
of nuclear proliferation in a ‘state-less’ environment. 
However, the efforts to strengthen and to energize 
cooperation in this field stand out, particularly at a 
time when traditional multilateral mechanisms have become 
rather stagnant. By including states that possess nuclear 
weapons but are not parties to the NPT, the Summit 
process, originally surrounded by a nuclear disarmament 
rhetoric, command important lessons to learn and 
implications for the NPT-based regime and on issues such 
negotiations on a WMD-free zone in the Middle East and on 
a fissile material cut-off treaty.  
 
So, when, why and how are multilateral efforts to mitigate 
proliferation risks proving to work? There are no 
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definitive answers, nor generalizable insights to draw 
from just a pool of three cases, as to what makes 
multilateral cooperative non-proliferation arrangements 
effective and whether their modus operandi explain 
variation in goal attainment. Nonetheless, a useful 
guiding dynamic for good enough multilateral non-
proliferation arrangements transpiring from this study 
would be to look for multiple interactive processes 
whereby learning and knowledge are stimulated, which, in 
turn, may facilitate the reductions of uncertainty and 
political friction, thereby encouraging negotiated 
compromise. Non-proliferation approaches that favor 
recursive adaption and harness knowledge are best suited 
for the generation of continuous improvement and the 
facilitation of sustained interaction. Preliminary 
empirical evidence corroborates that multilateral 
governance templates that are likely to deliver are those 
that promote a diffused organization of several national, 
regional and global implementers in a problem-solving, 
non-adversarial fashion, that incentivize learning and 
foster knowledge exchange, that create a healthy profusion 
of monitoring and verification tools to tame uncertainty 
and that facilitate synergistic partnerships among 
stakeholders and peers.  
The most successful instance of institutionalized 
multilateral non-proliferation cooperation is arguably 
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exemplified by the 1540-centered regime. Its modus 
operandi is the closest empirical example across the 
nuclear domain of new modes of multilateral governance 
that depart from traditional intergovernmental modes of 
governance and that ultimately seek to combine state-
centered actors with other stakeholders, uniform legally-
binding treaties with voluntary and revisable laws and 
regulations, as well as classic enforcement measures with 
innovative problem-solving approaches. The NPT arrangement 
arguably epitomizes the least successful instance of 
multilateral non-proliferation cooperation. Among the case 
studies, its modus operandi is the closest example of old-
fashioned modes of governance, which emphasizes the 
centrality, if not exclusivity, of change-averse and least 
adaptable state-centric actors, and the maintenance of the 
status-quo over the combination of creativity with logic.   
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Appendix  
 
List of interviews  
 
Corey Hinderstein, Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Security 
and Nonproliferation Policy Affairs, U.S. Department 
of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, 
Washington, D.C. 25 February 2016.  
Deepti Choubey, Senior Fellow, Johns Hopkins University, 
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International 
Studies, Washington, D.C. 23 February 2016.  
Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, 
Arms Control Association, Washington, D.C. 24 February 
2016.  
Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice, Co-Principal 
Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs, 
Cambridge, communications, 2015-16.  
Michael Rosenthal, UNSCR 1540 Group of Experts, U.N. 
Headquarters, New York, 30 April 2016.   
Michelle Cann, Director of Operations and Projects, 
Partnership for Global Security, Washington, D.C. 24 
February 2016.  
Nickolas Roth, Research Associate, Project on Managing the 
Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International 
Affairs, Cambridge, communications, 2015-16.  
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Richard Cupitt, former U.S. 1540 Coordinator and member of 
the Gropu of Experts, Washington, D.C. 18 October 
2012.  
Samantha Pitts-Kiefer, Senior Director, Global Nuclear 
Policy Program, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Washington, 
D.C. 23 February 2016.  
Sharon Squassoni, Senior Fellow and Director, 
Proliferation Prevention Program, Center for Strategic 
and International Affairs, Washington, D.C., 23 
February 2016.  
Terence Taylor, Coordinator of UNSCR 1540 Group of 
Experts, U.N. Headquarters, New York, 30 April 2016.   
Thomas Wuchte, Head on Anti-Terrorism Issues, Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 
correspondence, August 2016.   
William Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science 
and International Affairs, Cambridge, April 2016.  
Zawar Abidi, UNSCR 1540 Group of Experts, U.N. 
Headquarters, New York, 30 April 2016.   
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